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WHAT SHOULD AFRICANS EXPECT FROM THEIR CONSTITUTIONS?
JOHN MUKUM MBAKU*
I.

THE NEED TO REGULATE SOCIO-POLITICAL INTERACTION

One of the most intractable problems in post-independence Africa is the
failure of many countries on the continent to effectively manage social, ethnic, and
religious diversity.' African countries are extremely diverse-such extreme and
rich diversity can be traced to the various ethnic groups that populate these
countries, the influence of European colonialism, as well as the influence of
Christianity, Islam, and other external factors, which include globalization and
significant migrations of people from one country to another. 2 The failure of many
African countries to provide effective mechanisms for the management of the
interdependence, as well as the conflict that invariably arises from religious and
ethnic diversity, has produced various forms of violence and political instability.
Some of this instability can be traced to destructive mobilization by groups that
believe that national, political and economic policies have either marginalized
them or placed them on the competitive disadvantage, especially in the distribution
or allocation of the benefits of economic growth. 3 Such violent mobilization is

* John Mukum Mbaku is Presidential Distinguished Professor of Economics and Willard L.
Eccles Professor of Economics & John S. Hinckley Research Fellow at Weber State University. He is
also a Nonresident Senior Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., and an
Attorney and Counselor at Law, State of Utah. He received a J.D. and Graduate Certificate in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law from the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah,
where he was Managing Editor, Journal of Land, Resources & Environmental Law, and a Ph.D. in
Economics from the University of Georgia. This article reflects only the present considerations and
views of the author, which should not be attributed to either Weber State University or the Brookings
Institution.
1. See, e.g., MwANGI S. KIMENYI, ETHNIC DIVERSITY, LIBERTY AND THE STATE: THE AFRICAN
DILEMMA 12-82 (1997) (using the Buchanan-Tullock model of constitutional choice to argue that
African states presently do not constitute optimal units of collective choice and that the most effective
way to manage ethnic diversity, as well as Africa's present States, is to engage in the reconstitution of
the present "sovereign states," including adjusting existing state boundaries).
2. JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, Preface to CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF CAMEROON (2005) [hereinafter
MBAKU, CULTURE AND CUSTOMs] (examining, inter alia, the extraordinary diversity of the modem
Cameroon nation-state).
3. Notable examples include the Igbos of Nigeria, who led a brutal war against the federal
Nigerian government in an attempt to secede from the federation and form their own sovereign polity,
in which they would no longer suffer marginalization and exclusion from political and economic
markets. See ALEXANDER A. MADIEBO, THE NIGERIAN REVOLUTION AND THE BIAFRAN WAR, at xi-xii

(1980) (providing an eye-witness account of the Nigerian civil war and narrating, from his perspective,
reasons why the "Biafrans" waged the war and fought federal forces under extremely unfavorable
military, economic, and social conditions); RAPH UWECHUE, REFLECTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL
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said to have contributed significantly to brutal and extremely destructive civil wars
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia,4 as well as
continued ethnic- or religious-induced violence in Kenya (following the 2007
disputed presidential elections),5 and many other countries.

While conflict, especially as it relates to the competition for scarce resources,
is inherent in the diversity that spans most African countries, it is not necessary
that such conflict becomes destructive, or that the various groups that exist in these
countries resort to violent, and often destructive, mobilization in order to resolve
conflict. Individuals, as well as groups, have a natural tendency to pursue and
maximize their own interests and values and this naturally causes conflict. As
argued by H. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan,7 "[o]nly the romantic
anarchist thinks there is a 'natural harmony' among persons that will eliminate all
conflict in the absence of rules."8 This is true of individuals, as well as groups-be
they ethnic, religious or otherwise-in Africa. Hence, to produce harmony, the
behavior of individuals and collectivities must be constrained. Thus, as stated by
Brennan and Buchanan,9 "[w]e require rules for living together for the simple
reason that without them we would surely fight. We would fight because the
object of desire for one individual would be claimed by another."10 As has been
WAR: FACING THE FUTURE 7-10 (1971) (presenting a rigorous examination of the causes and
consequences, for a future Nigerian nation, of the civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970).
4. See, e.g., MARK HUBAND, THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR, at xii (1998) (providing an eye-witness
account of the horrific nature of Liberia's extremely brutal civil war); ETHNICITY AND GOVERNANCE IN
THE THIRD WORLD I (John Mukun Mbaku, Pita Ogaba Agbese & Mwangi S. Kimenyi eds., 2001)
(examining the challenges that are faced by governments in societies that exhibit significant levels of
ethnic and religious diversity, including those in Africa); DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON, THE ROOT CAUSES OF
SUDAN'S CIVIL WARS, at xiii-xiv (2003) (providing a thorough examination of the economic, social,
political, and religious factors undergirding Sudan's many civil wars); GEORGE KLAY KIEH, JR., THE
FIRST LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR: THE CRISES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 173-175 (2008) (providing an
analysis of the civil war with a view to making suggestions on how the Liberian State can be
reconstructed and reconstituted to minimize the probability of future destructive mobilization by ethnicbased organizations); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM,
NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE INRWANDA 14-18 (2001) (exploring the social, economic, and political
dynamics that led to the genocide in Rwanda); GEBRU TAREKE, THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION: WAR IN
THE HORN OF AFRICA, at xiv (2009) (providing a rigorous examination of Ethiopia's military and
political history, with emphasis on the civil war that ravaged the country during the latter part of the
twentieth century).
5. See HEALING THE WOUND: PERSONAL NARRATIVES ABOUT THE 2007 POST-ELECTION
VIOLENCE INKENYA 1-5 (Kimani Njogu ed., 2009) (providing a series of narratives by individuals
involved in or affected by the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007).
6. For an examination of civil wars in Africa generally, see generally CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA:
ROOTS AND RESOLUTION (Taisier M. Ali & Robert 0. Matthews eds., 1999) (giving examples of civil
strife in Somalia, Sudan and Mozambique, among others); WILLIAM MARK HABEEB, CIVIL WARS IN
AFRICA (2007) (explaining that since 1960, many African countries have been devastated by civil
conflict, the affects ofwhich continue today).
7. H. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 (1985).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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argued by many scholars, most of the destructive ethnic-induced mobilization in
Africa during the last several decades has been due primarily to the absence of
effective legal constraints on the behaviors of individuals and groups."
Within each African country, as is the case in other societies, the desire by
individuals and groups that inhabit these countries to maximize their various
interests and values will invariably produce conflict. The natural proclivity of
individuals and groups is to maximize their own values, and since the latter usually
do not aggregate into a single set of community or societal interests, conflict
usually results.12 Thus, each society must seek what Brennan and Buchanan refer
to as an "escape route"' 3 from a state of the world characterized by violent and
opportunistic mobilization by individuals seeking ways to maximize their interests.
Studies by Brennan and Buchanan have produced two broadly defined
"escape routes" for societies facing this dilemma: (1) the capacity of individuals
within society to love each other; and (2) the design of rules to provide
mechanisms for the coordination of the actions of individuals, and the peaceful
resolution of the conflict that arises from socio-political interaction.14 The latter is
usually considered a more efficient and predictable mechanism for coordination
and resolution of conflict. Thus, individuals and groups living within an African
country may desire rules in order to (1) minimize destructive mobilization by
groups seeking ways to increase their participation in economic and political
markets and arrest further marginalization; (2) enhance the ability of individuals
and groups to coexist peacefully; and, (3) provide the wherewithal for individuals
and groups to maximize their values and interests without unfairly interfering with
the ability of others to do the same." Brennan and Buchanan state that although

11. In a 2001 essay, John Mukum Mbaku argued that "most of the destructive ethnic conflict that
has pervaded most of post-independence Africa has been due primarily to the adoption at independence
of institutional arrangements that (1) failed to adequately constrain the power of government; (2) did
not guarantee economic freedoms; and (3) failed to provide procedures for peaceful resolution of the
conflicting interests ofthe various ethnic groups within each country." John Mukum Mbaku, Ethnicity,
Constitutionalism,and Governance in Afica, in ETHNICrrY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE THIRD WORLD
59, 59 (John Mukum Mbaku, Pita Ogaba Agbese & Mwangi S. Kimenyi eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Mbaku, Ethnicity]. Mbaku argues further that, "in many instances, the laws and institutions adopted
allowed some ethnic groups to dominate governance and use governmental structures to enrich
themselves at the expense of the rest of society." Id. Pita Ogaba Agbese, in an essay in the same
volume, examines the management of ethnicity in Nigeria in the post-independence period and makes
similar arguments as those advanced by Mbaku. Specifically, Agbese states "the state-based pattern of
capital accumulation in which the ruling classes use their access to state power as a mechanism for
private appropriation of wealth encourages the manipulation of ethnic and other forms of primordial
identities." Pita Ogaba Agbese, Managing Ethnic Relations in a HeterogeneousSociety: The Case of
Nigeria, in ETHNICITY AND GOVERNANCE IN THE THIRD WORLD 125, 127 (John Mukum Mbaku, Pita

Ogaba Agbese & Mwangi S. Kimenyi eds., 2001).
12. Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 7, at ix ("[M]an's natural proclivity is to pursue his own
interests and that different persons' interests almost inevitably come into conflict . . .
13. Id.
14. Id. at ix-x.
15. See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTmmONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC CHOICE

PERSPECTIVE 12-14 (1997) [hereinafter MBAKU, REFORM] (recommending state reconstruction to

VOL. 41: 2

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

152

human nature can "limit the attainable states of social harmony .

.

. sustainable

social order can be achieved through the appropriate design, construction, and
maintenance of rules that set limits on the way in which each person is allowed to
order his conduct toward others." 6
For there to be effective management of diversity in Africa, each country
must provide itself with a well-designed, locally-focused, and fully-functioning set
of rules, as well as a set of counteracting agencies to enforce them.' 7 Here,
"locally-focused" implies that the rules chosen reflect the values, aspirations,
traditions and customs, and worldview of each country's relevant stakeholder
groups and, in addition, take into consideration the specificities of each country.' 8
Such rules can only be obtained or secured by making certain that the process
through which the rules are chosen is participatory, inclusive, bottom-up, and
people-driven (i.e., democratic) and not top-down or elite-driven, as was the case
with constitution-making in the pre- and post-independence period.' 9 Full and
effective participation of all of each country's relevant stakeholders in the rules

provide institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the state as a way for African countries to
enhance peaceful coexistence and sustainable economic growth and development).
16. Brennan & Buchanan, supranote 7, at x.
17. JOHN

MUKUM

MBAKU,

INSTITUTIONS

AND DEVELOPMENT

IN AFRICA

17-18

(2004)

[hereinafter MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS] (arguing, inter alia, that laws and institutions enhance peaceful
coexistence in the African countries, providing the enabling environment for entrepreneurship and the
creation of wealth).
18. John Mukum Mbaku, The InternationalDimension of Africa's Struggle Against Corruption,
10 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 35, 72-75 (2010).
19. See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutionalism and Governance in Africa, in SocIoPOLITICAL SCAFFOLDING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 35, 39, 55 (Kelechi A. Kalu & Peyi Soyinka-Airewele eds.,
2009) [hereinafter Mbaku, Governance]. It is important to note here that the foundation for rules
selection must be one in which all individuals, no matter their station in life, are allowed to participate
and, are "presumed capable of making rational choices among alternatives in accordance with
individually autonomous value-scales." JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 16 (1994). As argued further by Buchanan, there should not be any
"weighting scheme through which the evaluation of some persons in the community are deemed more
important than other persons . . . ." Id. at 16. This point is critically important, especially for
constitution-making in Africa, given the continent's preference for top-down, elite driven and nonparticipatory approaches to constitution-making. Consider, for example, the constitution that produced
the Union of South Africa in 1909. HEINz KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 8-9 (2010). Although it was an act of the British Parliament, it represented the
outcome of deliberations carried out exclusively by white representatives of the four colonies that later
formed the Union of South Africa. DENIS V. COWEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM: WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA 43 (1961). The black population of these colonies, which included
various African groups, Indians, Malays, and colored peoples, was not represented. Id. Also, during
preparations for the independence of the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French
administration, the process of compacting the constitution and developing institutions for the emerging
country was monopolized and controlled by urban-based indigenous elites, French commercial and
entrepreneurial interests resident in the colony, and the colonial government. See VICTOR T. LE VINE,
THE CAMEROONS: FROM MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE 167-92 (1964). None of these groups were
selected freely by the Cameroon people to represent them in the process of selecting the rules that
would govern them when they gained independence. Id.
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selection process is critical because it helps achieve two important objectivessuch a democratic approach: (1) ensures that the outcome is rules that reflect the
values of the country's relevant stakeholders; and (2) significantly improves the
chances that the majority of the people will accept the rules and see them as an
appropriate tool that they can use to organize their private lives, protect themselves
against government tyranny, and generally enhance their ability to live together
peacefully. 20
Rules, especially those that reflect the values of the country's relevant
population groups, serve many critical functions. In addition to providing
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict and helping coordinate the
actions of individuals, 21 rules can provide individuals participating in both political
and economic markets with information and enhance their ability to anticipate the
behavior of other market participants, given the set of constraints.22 It is important
that citizens understand the rules that they have chosen to regulate their sociopolitical interaction because such an understanding would enhance their ability to
retain those rules that function properly and modify, amend, or repeal those that no
longer serve their needs. The rules approach is the subject of constitutional design.
Rules, which Adam Smith called "laws and institutions," 23 influence and, to a
great extent, determine the outcomes that result from socio-political interaction.24
Some laws and institutions produce outcomes that either enhance individual or
group welfare, or harm it. 25 Constitutional political economy, an area of inquiry
that deals with how societies determine the rules that regulate their socio-political
interaction, can be used to determine the impact of existing rules on individual and
community welfare.26 Such a process can help a society determine which rules to

20. See, e.g., MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 217.
21. Brennan & Buchanan, supranote 7, at 1.
22. Id. at 8.
23. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 40

(1887).
24. See also Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 7, at 2.
25. For example, laws that do not adequately constrain civil servants and political elites may
actually enhance the ability of these state custodians to engage in corruption and rent seeking. The
latter, which are growth-inhibiting activities, discourage investment in productive activities, and hence
stunt the creation of wealth. In many African countries, due to the existence of weak institutional
arrangements, civil servants and politicians are able to plunder national economies for their own benefit
and in the process, harm the welfare of the mass of the people. Also, throughout Africa, there exist
statutory and customary rules that oppress women. Examples include explicit or customary rules that
permit female genital mutilation, child bribes, spousal abuse, and the denial of opportunities for selfactualization for girls. Also, one can include religious practices that promote the enslavement of others.
See, e.g., Dygert, infra note 150, at 143-44. See also JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS, at xi (2010) [hereinafter MBAKU, CORRUPTION]
(demonstrating the destructive effects of corruption on the welfare of Africans and how weak laws and
institutions have significantly increased the level of bureaucratic corruption in the continent).
26. For a discussion of constitutional political economy, which James M. Buchanan also calls
"constitutional economics," see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS AND THE ETHICS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3-18 (1994) (especially Chapter 1: The Domain of Constitutional Political
Economy).
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retain, which to reform or amend, and which to discard. Additionally, the process
can also help a society pick any additional rules needed to meet changing societal
needs.2
A. Why Rules?
As argued by Thomas Hobbes, in the absence of rules, life would be "solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short." 28 Brennan and Buchanan argue that given that
the "object of desire for one individual would be claimed by another," members of
29
society would fight or engage in violent mobilization to protect their rights.
Our interest here is in the rules that govern or constrain socio-political
interaction.
Specifically, we are interested in the rules that constrain the
"economic and political relationships among [individuals]" within a society.30 In
allowing or enhancing the ability of individuals within society to maximize their
values, rules must do so within a context in which they do not constrain the ability
of others to do the same. Thus, in helping individuals maximize their interests,
rules also serve the "negative function of preventing disastrous harm." 3'
Most Africans currently live in countries or societies governed by rules that
they do not understand.32 More important, perhaps, is the fact that the majority of
these people do not understand how and why the rules that govern them were
selected.33 In these countries, only politically well-connected interest groupsprimarily the ethno-regional groups that control the governments of these countries
and which regularly subvert these laws and institutions to enrich themselves at the
expense of the rest of society-participate in the selection of rules and, hence, are
familiar with the rules.34 Participation of all the relevant stakeholders of each
country in the rules selection process must be maximized so that the outcome is a
set of rules that reflects the people's values and enhances their ability to organize
their private lives and defend against encroachment of their fundamental rights.
Not only will such a process allow them to select rules that are relevant to their
lives, but it will also enhance their ability to understand, appreciate, accept,
respect, and comply with the rules so selected.

27. It is important to keep in mind that during the process of selecting a country's laws and
institutions, "[n]o single group, either a minority or majority, dominates the process of formulation of
legal rules, and no special characteristic of individuals or groups, such as wealth or race, gives them
systematic advantages or disadvantages in rule making." David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars
in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 4 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1071 (1974).
28. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 104 (New American ed., E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1950) (1651).
29. Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 7, at 3.
30. Id. at 7.
31. Id. at 14.
32. MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 217.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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B. What is a Constitution?
According to economist Dennis C. Mueller, a constitution is "a form of social
contract among citizens defining the rules within which society functions."" In
many societies, kingship networks, extended families, and ethnic and nationality
groups handle the job of governing socio-political interaction, or coordinating the
These traditional forms of governance are present in
actions of individuals.
virtually all African countries and for many years they have served as effective
tools for the regulation of socio-political interaction.37 Mueller argues that in
traditional societies, "custom and tradition dictate the appropriate penalties to be
meted out for deviant behavior."38 However, as societies become more complex,
"new situations arise and the proper behavior and appropriate penalties should this
behavior not be forthcoming are not always known."3 To enhance governance in
such complex and more dynamic societies a set of more explicit rules is required.
The constitution represents such a set of explicit rules.40 Basically, the constitution
creates and defines legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and places limits on
the exercise of those powers. 41 These limits may come in the form of
individual or group rights against the government and, depending on the
nature of the society in question, emphasize such things as the right to
liberty and security of person, or as favored by many developing
societies, including those in Africa, the right of each ethnic or
nationality group to its economic, social and cultural development.4 2
During the last several decades, "due to industrialization and modernization
and changes in the global division of labor, African societies have become more
complex. The emergence of large urban areas, with populations made up of people
from several ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds, has rendered the
traditional methods of regulating social intercourse ineffective." 43 It has become
imperative, then, for each African country to adopt governance systems based on
explicit rules.
An effective constitution is one that reflects "the desires, aspirations, values,
customs and traditions of a society, including the worldview of the society's
relevant stakeholders,"44 and, of course, is consistent with the Universal
35. Dennis C. Mueller, Choosing a Constitution in East Europe: Lessons from Public Choice, 15

J.COMP. EcON. 325, 326 (1991).
36. MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 218.
37. Id.
38. Mueller, supra note 35, at 326.

39. Id.
40. MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 218; see generally Mueller, supra note 35; ELINOR

OSTROM, LARRY SCHROEDER & SUSAN WYNNE, INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES IN PERSPECTIVE 21-22 (1993) (emphasizing the importance

of institutional arrangements, both explicit and implicit, on sustainable infrastructure management).
41. Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 45.
42. Id.
43. MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 218.

44. Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 45.
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Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), as well as with the provisions of other
international treaties and conventions that were agreed after the UDHR, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Such a constitution, however, need not
contain all the laws that a country needs to regulate socio-political interaction.
Additional laws can be enacted in the post-constitutional period on an "as-neededbasis." However, any laws enacted in the post-constitutional period must be
consistent with the constitution since the latter is considered the supreme law of
the country. A constitution is expected to perform certain specific functions, for
instance it:

(1) provides the general and overall framework for government power:
the scope of that authority; how the authority is to be exercised; and the
procedure for the enactment of the laws needed to enhance the effective
and smooth functioning of society; (2) defines citizenship and provides
procedures for attaining citizenship and the conditions under which a
citizen can participate in governance (e.g., to vote or run for public
office); (3) defines and establishes the critical domains-the political,
administrative, and judicial foundations of the state; (4) empowers the
government to perform certain well-specified functions (e.g., collect
taxes and provide public goods and services such as national defense
and police protection); (5) divides, where necessary, power among the
various levels of govemment-this is very important, especially in
Africa, where the effective management of ethnic diversity favors some
form of constitutional federalism, which may require that each polity be
divided into as many political jurisdictions as possible; and (6) must
specify only general principles of government so that it has the
flexibility to deal effectively with the changing needs of society.45
Constitutional expert Herman Schwartz argues that in compacting a
constitution, future governments must be provided with the flexibility to deal with
"unpredictable and unforeseeable challenges." 46 Nevertheless, it is critical that
certain important issues be discussed thoroughly and dealt with during
constitution-making.
Examples include human rights, democracy, stability,
sustainable development, and social justice.4 7 Many African countries failed to
provide adequate protections to human rights in their constitutions.48 Those that

45. Id. at 46.
46. Herman Schwartz, Building Blocks for a Constitution, 9 ISSUES OF DEMOCRAcY 12, 13
(2004), available at http://infousa.state.gov/govemment/overview/docs/ijde0304.pdf.
47. See, e.g., Bereket Habte Selassie, Framing the State in Times of Transition: Focus on Five
Core Values, 28 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 19, 20-26 (2011).
48. See Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to Constitutionalism and ConstitutionalRights in Africa
and the Enabling Role of PoliticalParties:Lesons and Perspectivesfrom Southern Africa, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 3 (2007).
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did, nevertheless, failed to arm themselves with laws and institutions capable of
enforcing those constitutional guarantees.49
It is rare to find an African country that engaged its people in the thorough
examination of these critical issues during the pre- and post-independence
constitutional exercises.50 Constitution-making in virtually all the African colonies

49. Charles M. Fombad argues that although by the 1990s, "[a]lmost all of these [African]
constitutions . . . [contained] provisions that purport[ed] to recognize and protect most of the
fundamental human rights that are associated with constitutionalism and Western liberal democracy,"
many of the political parties that came to power during this period and continue to rule these countries
have failed to respect these constitutional provisions, and the abuse of human rights has become
endemic. Professor Fombad further states that "[m]any of the continent's problems have been caused,
not by the absence of constitutions per se, but rather by the ease with which constitutional provisions
were abrogated, suspended or brazenly ignored." Id. The notable exception is post-apartheid South
Africa. First, post-apartheid South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions in the world, a
constitution that was compacted through a bottom-up, participatory, inclusive, and people-driven
process. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA NO. 108 OF 1996, Dec. 18, 1996,
available at www.info.gov.zaldocuments/constitution/1996/al08-96.pdf [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF
SOUTH AFRICA]; HErNz KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 53

(2010) (providing a rigorous analysis of South Africa's "final" Constitution of 1996 and its social and
legal sources). A study of justice and the rule of law in South Africa by the Open Society Foundation
for South Africa in 2005 found some weaknesses, (e.g., by the time the study was completed, South
Africa had not yet become a party to some important treaties in the international human rights system)
but it also determined that the country had made significant accomplishments since 1994 when
apartheid was officially abolished and a new state born. By 2005, South Africa had signed five of the
most important international human rights conventions and was considered a global leader in human
rights law. OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION, SOUTH AFRICA: JUSTICE SECTOR AND THE RULE OF LAw 4

(2005), availableat http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/afrimapdiscussion 20
060223 0.pdf. Second, South Africa's 1996 Constitution is "recognised as one of the most
sophisticated and human-rights friendly constitutions in the world." Id. at 3. In addition, since the
demise of the apartheid regime, the new South Africa has made significant progress in providing its
domestic legal system with a "comprehensive human rights framework." Id. at 5. Third, unlike the
constitutional situation in many other African countries, the separation of powers guaranteed by the
South African Constitution has generally been realized in practice, and as a consequence the South
African judiciary is not subservient to the executive. Instead, the judiciary is recognized as a coequal
partner in governance, retains its independence, and is fully accountable to the Constitution. In several
court cases, South Africa's Constitutional Court has recognized judicial independence, holding that
"judicial independence . . . is foundational to and indispensable for the discharge of the judicial function
in a constitutional democracy based on the rule of law." E.g., De Lange v. Smuts, (1997) CCT 26/97,
para. 59 (S.A.). Fourth, since 1994, a diverse and robust civil society, including people from historically
marginalized and deprived groups and communities, has emerged in South Africa and has actively been
engaging the political elite, effectively serving as a check on the exercise of government agency. Fifth,
the country maintains many highly effective private (e.g., private newspapers, radios, and TV stations)
and public (e.g., regular local, regional, and national elections) structures through which citizens can
engage those who govern them. Finally, governance in South Africa, unlike that in many other
countries in Africa, is characterized by a general adherence and fidelity to the rule of law.
50. See, e.g., Victor T. Le Vine, The Falland Rise of Constitutionalismin West Africa, 35 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 181, 204 (1997). Note, however, that South Africa's post-apartheid experience with
constitutional discourse was quite robust-it was participatory, inclusive, and bottom-up and involved
an examination of the issues listed above. MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 215 (examining, inter
alia, post-apartheid South Africa's experience with constitution-making).
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was top-down, elite-driven and non-participatory. 5 ' In the post-independence era,
the elites who had captured the evacuated structures of colonial hegemony failed to
create the enabling institutional environment for the type of robust civil dialogue
that would have enhanced the ability of citizens to bring these issues into the
reforms that were being carried out in the post-independence period. 2
II.

CONSTITUTION-MAKING INPRE- AND POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICA

During the struggle for independence, Africa's freedom fighters argued that
extremely high levels of poverty and material deprivation among each colony's
indigenous populations was due to the European colonialists' monopolization of
political and economic markets.
Of course, the objectives of the colonial
government, as well as those of the European entrepreneurs who were resident in
the colony, were in conflict with those of Africans. In the case of colonies that had
large concentrations of settlers or colonists, the struggle for independence was
complicated by the fact that colonists desired a post-independence polity that
allowed them to monopolize both political and economic markets. 54
However, the African-led decolonization project was designed to (1) eject the
Europeans from each colony and from any further participation in, or interference
with, the latter's economic and political markets; and (2) provide laws and
institutions capable of enhancing peaceful coexistence, and the creation of the
wealth that these countries needed to deal with mass poverty and deprivation and
improve the welfare of the indigenous peoples. 5 Of course, the failure to achieve
these objectives in colonies such as South Africa and Southern Rhodesia delayed

51. See, e.g., LE VINE, supra note 19 (examining top-down, elite-driven constitution-making in
the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration).
52. See Le Vine, supra note 50, at 183-184 (examining the failure of post-independence West
African countries to engage in democratic constitution-making to arm themselves with effective
institutional arrangements). Note that except for Guinea, all former French colonies in sub-Saharan
Africa accepted Charles de Gaulle's offer of autonomy within the French community and hence,
forfeited true constitutional discourse in favor of adopting the French Constitution of 1958 as a
foundation for their laws and institutions.
53. See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku & Julius 0. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa's
PoliticalAdjustment in the "New" GlobalEra, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN

AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1-2 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius 0. Ihonvbere eds., 2003).
54. Consider the Ian Smith-led unilateral declaration of independence in the British colony of
Southern Rhodesia, which represented an effort by the colony's settler population to monopolize
govemance in the post-independence society. See CARL PETER WATTS, RHODESIA'S UNILATERAL
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIsIs 1 (2008). Also consider the

conditions under which the South African colonies gained independence in 1910 and formed the Union
of South Africa. The Union constitution was drafted entirely by the representatives of the white
minority, which desired institutional arrangements that would enhance their ability to maintain a policy
of "white supremacy" in all spheres of life. Such laws and institutions eventually provided the
foundation for the establishment of the dreaded apartheid system in 1948; the African population, which
formed the bulk of the population of these colonies, was not allowed to participate in constitutionmaking. See COWEN, supra note 19, at 23-24; GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 195-198 (1981).

55. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 53, at 2.
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genuine independence for many years-in South Africa until 1994 and in Rhodesia
until 1980. Africans hoped that after independence and the departure of the
Europeans from the continent, they would rid themselves of colonialism's
opportunistic and Eurocentric laws and institutions, and replace them with locally
focused, and relevant, governance structures. 56
The main strategy was for Africans-working on their own and taking into
consideration their values, interests, needs, aspirations, customs and cultures, as
well as a worldview-to reconstruct and reconstitute the state captured from the
colonialists and provide governance structures capable of maximizing their
values. 57 Specifically, the indigenous political elites who emerged to lead the
African countries to independence were expected to engage each country's
relevant stakeholder groups in a participatory, inclusive, bottom-up, and peoplecentered (i.e., democratic) constitution-making process. This process was to be
used to select and adopt laws and institutions that would provide them with the
ability to live together peacefully, to allocate their resources efficiently and
equitably, and above all, to govern themselves without any interference from the
Europeans. 5 8
Given their experiences under colonial rule, Africans expected postindependence institutional arrangements to (1) provide for the effective
management of ethnic and religious diversity and significantly enhance peaceful
coexistence; (2) promote and sustain entrepreneurial activities, especially among
historically marginalized groups-women, rural inhabitants, minority ethnic
groups, and the urban poor-and advance the creation of wealth and the socially
equitable distribution of resources; (3) minimize agro-ecological degradation and
ensure sustainability of natural resources; (4) fully and effectively constrain the
state and minimize civil servants' and political elites' engagement in political
opportunism (e.g., corruption and rent seeking); and, (5) place the welfare of the
people at the core of all public policies. During the colonial period, indigenous
groups had been pushed to the periphery of political and economic affairs and
denied the right to govern themselves and create the wealth that they needed to
meet their private and public obligations.59
It was expected that post-independence Africa would consist of countries
without any significant European presence or influence, and would have laws and
institutions that reflected African, not European, interests and values. Many
Africans viewed independence as a process through which they could rid
themselves of both the Europeans and their anachronistic institutions and bring

56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id. See also John M. Mbaku, ConstitutionalDiscourse and the Development of Structuresfor
Sustainable Development in Africa, 22 J. STUD. INECON. & ECONOMETRICs 1 (1998).
58. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 53, at 2-3. See also, e.g., MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note
17, at 9-11. Of course, those Europeans who had opted to remain in the new countries as citizens were
expected to accept and respect the new political dispensation and live as responsible and law-abiding
citizens.
59. See Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supranote 53, at 2-5.
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into effect African-centered governance systems-those that were locally focused
and designed to help Africans govern themselves effectively and manage their
resources for their own benefit.60
A. The Reluctant and DysfunctionalDecolonizationProject
Decolonization, in virtually all African countries, failed to transform the
critical domains-the political, administrative, and judicial foundations of the
state-and failed to "make them more suitable for governing post-independence
African societies." 6 1 Regardless of who the colonizer of record was-whether
British, French, Belgian, Spanish, or Portuguese-decolonization and preparation
for independence were dominated and controlled by three main groups: (1) the
colonial state; (2) European entrepreneurs and commercial leaders resident in the
colonies; and (3) a small group of urban-based indigenous elites-the majority of
whom had been schooled in Europe, had lived there for many years, and had
adopted European cultures, customs, and values. 62 These three actorscolonialists, European entrepreneurs, and urban-based indigenous elites-were not
representative of each colony's diverse population, nor were they elected by the
people to represent them in the process of selecting their laws and institutions.63
More important, perhaps, is the fact that the elites who actually carried out the
constitution-making project were not well-informed about "social, political and
economic conditions then existing in most of the colony,"6 and failed to consult
all of the colony's relevant stakeholder groups, or make allowance for and provide
them with, the facilities, to participate. For example, in the colonies that merged to
form the Union of South Africa in 1910, the constitution was an exclusive product
of deliberations undertaken exclusively by representatives of the white minority.65
The black majority was shut out of constitutional discourse completely.66
60. According to Mbaku and Ihonvbere, after ridding the colonies of the European interlopers,
Africans, with the help of their leaders, would "develop and adopt, through a democratic process (i.e., a
people-driven, bottom-up, participatory, and transparent institutional reform process), institutional
arrangements based on their own values, aspirations, traditions, and customs." Id. at 2.
61. Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 40-41.
62. Id. at 41.
63. John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutionalism and the Transition to Democratic Governance in
Africa, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE

103, 109 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius 0. Ihonvbere eds., 2003) [hereinafter Mbaku, Transition].
64. Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 41.
65. COWEN, supra note 19, at 43.
66. Id. At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain had four self-governing colonies in South
Africa, namely, the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony. Although
the colonies enjoyed a significant level of self-government, they were still subject to oversight by Great
Britain. In 1908, representatives of the legislatures of these four colonies met in convention to
determine the nature of their proposed union. The African populations, which constituted a majority of
the colonies, were not represented at the National Convention. The delegates, all white, compacted a
constitution, which was cast in the form of a "draft bill," and "which was ratified by the legislatures of
three of the colonies and by a referendum in the fourth." Id. Afterwards, the four colonies selected
delegates (all white) and sent them to London, along with the draft bill, so that the British Parliament
could enact it into law. Royal Assent was accorded to the draft bill in September 1909 "under the title
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Of course, South Africa's constitution-making experience was not unique-in
other colonies, urban-based African elites conspired with their European
benefactors to impose on the citizens of each African country laws and institutions
This
that did not reflect their values, interests, and customs and traditions.
outcome, of course, was a result of the adoption of top-down, elite-driven, and
non-participating approaches to constitution-making, which effectively deprived
most Africans from determining their own governance institutions.68 In 1958,
under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, France offered its sub-Saharan African
colonies, under the auspices of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, free
association as autonomous republics within the Communautd frangaise (French
Community). 69 Of all the French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, Guinea was the
only one that rejected de Gaulle's offer.7 0 Because virtually all of France's subSaharan African colonies accepted this so-called free association, these countries
gained independence by adopting the 1958 French Constitution and by doing so,
deprived their own citizens of the opportunity to determine their own laws and
institutions.7 ' In each new "francophone" country, the French-inspired constitution
created a Gaullist system of government with an imperial presidency and virtually
no constitutional limits on the exercise of government agency. 72

of the South Africa Act (9 Edward VII, c. 9), and came into force in the Union on 31 May 1910." Id.
Cowen states that the "South Africa Act itself, which established the Union's [i.e., Union of South
Africa] framework of government, is often and very rightly quoted as discriminatory legislation openly
adverse to non-whites, who were barred from being elected as members of an all-white Parliament; and
save in the Cape, and to a minute extent in Natal, were excluded from the franchise." Id. at 26.
67. See LE VINE, supra note 19, at 227 (providing, inter alia, a critical analysis of constitutionmaking in the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration).
68. See, e.g., id. at 224, 226-27 (examining the top-down, elite-driven, and non-participatory
approach to the design of the first constitution of the Rpublique du Cameroun-the former U.N. Trust
Territory of Cameroons under French administration, which gained independence on January 1, 1960).
69. M. Daniel Pepy, France'sRelations with Africa, 69 AFR. AFF. 155, 155 (1970).
70. LE VINE, supra note 19, at 183-184.
71. Id. at 185.
72. Id. at 187. Le Vine argues that "[t]he resemblance to the French system was certainly more
than nominal since the text of several of [the African] constitutions, especially in the sections dealing
with the presidency, followed the French document almost word for word." Id. at 184. Using
constitution-making in the U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration, Le Vine
details the influence of the French Constitution of 1958 on constitutional discourse in Africa in the preand post-independence periods. The new Cameroon republic's constitution was, like that in other
francophone countries, based on the de Gaulle blueprint. In his analysis, Le Vine argues that "there is
some question whether the constitution was more the child of political exigency than of mature
reflection." Id. at 226. Le Vine goes on to state that several members of the Consultative Committee,
which was responsible for putting together the constitution, had indicated that the "government was
more interested in producing almost any document and having it adopted as soon as possible than in
encouraging wider discussion of its basic provisions-thus, according to these critics, accounting
largely for following the French model so closely." Id. at 227. Le Vine also questions the
"appropriateness of modeling the Cameroun constitution so closely on that of the Fifth Republic." Id.
While the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic was designed "in the context of the constitutional
crisis that brought De Gaulle to power," the environment and "circumstances surrounding the writing of
the Cameroun constitution were not in any way analogous to those existing in France in 1958." Id.
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The decolonization project, which was supposed to prepare Africans to live
independently, govern themselves, and allocate their own resources, did not
Part of the reason for the decolonization project's
achieve these objectives.
failure to provide Africans with laws and institutions that reflected their values and
hence, were capable of enhancing their ability to maximize those values, was due
to the fact that constitution-making and institutional reforms in the preindependence period were dominated and controlled by non-representative
groups-European colonialists and entrepreneurs, as well as urban-based
indigenous elites, the majority of whom had been educated in Europe, had lived
there for many years, and were attracted to Eurocentric economic and political
systems.74 More important, perhaps, was the fact that these actors, all of whom
controlled constitutional discourse in the colonies, were only interested in devising
institutional arrangements that enhanced their ability to monopolize political and
economic spaces in the post-independence society.7s Hence, what emerged from
the pre-independence reform efforts were laws and institutions that allowed a few
urban-based indigenous elites (in South Africa, the white minority) to dominate
political and economic markets and effectively enrich themselves at the expense of
the rest of their fellow citizens.76
The constitutions that many of the former European colonies adopted before
or shortly after independence lacked legitimacy, which Sundhaussen argues
derives from the "understanding and voluntary acceptance of the constitution by
Even if these
the people as a prescription for settling conflict within society."7
constitutions were, indeed, legal, they could not be considered legitimate
instruments of governance. 78 Elster argues that the legitimacy of the constitutionmaking process itself must also be questioned, not just that of the outcome. 79 He

73. Mbaku, Transition,supra note 63, at 105.
74. The francophone countries were not the only ones that engaged in top-down, elite-driven, nonparticipatory constitution-making. In the British South African colonies, constitution-making was
controlled and monopolized exclusively the colonies' minority white population; Africans, who
constituted a majority of the population of all the colonies, were not allowed to participate in any form
in constitution-making. In other British colonies, constitution-making was dominated by urban-based
indigenous elites and the constitutional conferences were usually held in London, away from the people
and lacking their active and full participation. See Le Vine, supra note 19, at 185. See also Mbaku,
Governance, supra note 19, at 42.
75. Mbaku, Transition,supra note 63, at I I1.
76. In the Union of South Africa, the constitution established a governance system controlled and
dominated by whites; in the other African countries, the constitutions that brought these countries to
independence, established governments that were controlled by certain ethno-regional coalitions, with
minority ethnic and religious groups pushed to the economic and political periphery. Le Vine argues
that in "francophone West Africa, each successful [political] party set about creating structures and
institutions that would make it virtually impossible for any other to come to power by legal means." Le
Vine, supra note 50, at 187.
77. Ulf Sundhaussen, Democracy and the Middle Classes: Reflections on PoliticalDevelopment,
37 AUsTRALIAN J.P. & HIST. 100, 108 (1991).
78. Mbaku, Transition,supra note 63, at I10.
79. John Elster, Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71
PUB. ADMIN. 169, 178-79 (1993).
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identifies three types of legitimacy with regard to constitution-making: upstream
legitimacy, which deals with how the "assembly" or "committee" that is charged
with producing the constitution comes into being. If such an assembly came into
being through a legitimate process (e.g., it is elected by the people), then it would
enjoy upstream legitimacy.80 The second type of legitimacy is process legitimacy,
which applies to the outcome of the constitution-making process, as argued by
Elster, "[i]f the internal decision-making procedure of the assembly is perceived as
undemocratic, the document may be lacking in democratic legitimacy."' The third
type of legitimacy Elster mentions is downstream legitimacy, which deals with
how the constitution is ratified-if the constitution is approved by popular vote, it
would have "much stronger claims to embody the popular will." 82
Based on Elster's criteria, most of the constitutional processes through which
the majority of African constitutions were compacted lacked legitimacy. Few
constitutional assemblies (or committees) came into being through a vote of the
people. In some colonies, they were usually created through decrees. 8 3 Even where
elections were held to determine the membership of assemblies or constitutionwriting committees, certain interests, primarily those which enjoyed a comparative
advantage in the employment of the instruments of violence, dominated and
controlled these assemblies or committees and hence, the latter were not
representative of each colony's diverse population groups. 84
B.

Constitution-Makingand InstitutionalReforms in the Post-Independence
Period

Several of Africa's indigenous leaders (e.g., Tanzania's Julius Nyerere,
Cameroon's Ahmadou Ahidjo and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah) of the 1950s and
1960s argued that the institutional arrangements, which they had inherited from the
colonial government, were not suited for governance and effective management of

80. Id. at 178. Consider the case of the constitution-making in the U.N. Trust Territory of
Cameroons under French administration. The Consultative Committee, which was charged with writing
the constitution for the soon-to-be independent territory, was created by Law No. 59-56 of October 31,
1959 (Loi No. 59-56 du 31 Octobre 1959 accordant au gouvemement le pourvoir de lgif6rer et de
pr6parer la Constitution Camerounaise). LE VINE, supra note 19, at 185, 293.
81. Elster, supranote 79, at 178-179.
82. Id. at 179.
83. This was a common practice in the French colonies. See LE VINE, supra note 19, at 185.
84. In the South Africa colonies, constitution-making was controlled and dominated by the white
minority-see, e.g., COWEN, supra note 19, at 26, 43; in other colonies, it became the exclusive
purview of urban-based indigenous elites. In French Cameroons, for example, popular forces were not
allowed to participate in constitutional discourse. As stated by Mbaku, the Union des population du
Cameroun ("UPC"), the largest and most important indigenous political organization in the U.N. Trust
Territory of Cameroons under French administration, and "one that represented a significant part of
national political opinion," was proscribed by the French colonial government and hence, could not
participate in the preparations for independence, including, of course, the process of writing the
constitution. John Mukum Mbaku, Decolonization,Reunification, and Federation in Cameroon, in THE
LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA 31, 43-44 (John Mukum Mbaku &
Joseph Takougang eds., 2004). See also Mbaku, Governance,supra note 19, at 50.
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ethnic diversity in their new countries, nor for the promotion of the rapid economic
growth needed to generate enough resources to fight poverty and deprivation.85
85. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 251-252. For example, Ahmadou Ahidjo-who
became president of Cameroon at unification in 1961-adopted an economic system that his
government explained was based on both socialist and capitalist principles. This so-called uniquely
Cameroonian model of development was referred to as "planned liberalism." See, e.g., Fuebeh P.
Fonge, Cultivating an Economic Crisis in Cameroon: The Rhetoric versus the Reality of Planned
Liberalism, in THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE INAFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA 337, 340-344
(John Mukum Mbaku & Joseph Takougang eds., 2004). Ahidjo, architect of planned liberalism,
formally introduced the concept to the country at the inaugural congress of the Cameroon National
Congress ("CNIJ"), the then ruling political party, in Baffousam in 1965. He further elucidated the
concept in two important publications-AHMADOU AHIDJO, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF AHMADOU
AHIDJO (Imprimerie Nationale, 1967) & AHMADOU AHIDJO, ANTHOLOGIE DES DISCOURS, 1957-1979,4

volumes (Les nouvelles 6ditions Africaines, 1980). The heart of planned liberalism was the
establishment of an investment code that favored foreign investment and the setting up of parastatals to
carry out projects that the government believed could not be easily undertaken by private investors.
Planned liberalism created a lot of problems for the Cameroonian economy. First, the generous benefits
offered foreign investors (e.g., generous tax benefits; subsidies for securing human capital; preferential
access to government contracts; subsidized loans from government financial agencies; and easy access
to locally- and foreign-sourced production inputs) placed local entrepreneurs on a competitive
disadvantage. Second, since most of the businesses established by foreign investors were capital
intensive, employed a relatively small amount of labor, most of which was foreign, the local labor pool
did not benefit, at least directly, from most of the investments brought into the country by foreign firms.
Finally, Ahidjo's planned liberalism literally handed over the country's economy, especially the
industrial and manufacturing sectors, to French entrepreneurs, a process that significantly stunted the
development of an indigenous entrepreneurial class. Fonge, Cultivating an Economic Crisis in
Cameroon, supra, at 342-343. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah opted for a development model based on
import substitution industrialization ("ISI"), which was anchored around significant control of the
economy

by the government.

J. CLARK

LEITH, FOREIGN TRADE

REGIMES

AND

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT: GHANA 48-49 (1974). Instead of promoting rapid economic growth and development,
the ISI provided opportunities for politically well-connected civil servants to enrich themselves at the
expense of the rest of the population. As stated by Leith, the regulatory system, which had been
designed to "meet the apparent national needs and to minimize capricious discrimination among
importers was frequently set aside in favor of Mr. Djin and his associates." Id. at 25. Mr. A. Y. K. Djin
was Ghana's minister of trade at the time. H. H. Werlin, who studied Ghanaian political economy under
Nkrumah, revealed that, under the institutional structure set up by Nkrumah shortly after Ghana gained
independence from Great Britain in 1957, "[a] kickback of from 5 to 10 per cent was expected in return
for government contracts. The CPP garnered about 90 percent of its income in this way, amounting to
over $5 million between 1958 and 1966, which Nkrumah freely used for his own purposes. For
example, the properties of A. G. Leventis were purchased in 1962 at an inflated price with the
understanding that $2.4 million would be turned over to Nkrumah for his own use." H. H. Werlin, The
Roots of Corruption-The GhanaianEnquiry, 10 J.MOD. AFR. STUD. 247,252 (1972). Generally, many
post-independence African leaders set up institutional arrangements that enhanced their ability to
oppress and exploit their fellow citizens, as well as satisfy their appetite for primitive accumulation. As
argued by Ihonvbere, Africa's post-independence "dominant classes" were interested primarily in their
own political survival and not in nation building or economic development. Julius 0. Ihonvbere, A
Balance Sheet ofAfrica's Transition to Democratic Governance, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 33, 34 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius

0.

Ihonvbere eds., 2003). According to Ihonvbere, "[t]he dominant classes in Africa have no concrete class
base, lack a serious national project, and remain highly fractionalized and factionalized. In several
ways, they subvert their own regimes and promote an environment that directly challenges possibilities
for regime consolidation, growth, and development." Id.at 34.
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These leaders, however, did not engage their citizens in reconstructing and
reconstituting the post-colonial state through democratic constitution-making to
create more effective and efficient political and economic dispensations. Instead,
they engaged in opportunistic reforms that strengthened their political positions,
enhanced their ability to monopolize both political and economic spaces, and
effectively marginalized those groups within the country that were not related to
them."
As many of the immediate independence leaders argued (e.g., Nyerere and
Ahidjo), what African countries needed were "political systems with strong central
governments so that the several ethnic groups within each country could be kept
together and the necessary environment provided for wealth creation." Many of
these leaders argued that the political arrangement that they preferred, which
would later evolve into the "one-party" authoritarian political system, was the most
effective framework for dealing with the multifarious economic, social, and
political problems that each new country faced.89 Specifically, these leaders opted
for a single-party political system and an economic system in which state
ownership of productive resources and significant levels of state regulation of
private exchange would dominate.
Competitive political systems were considered major obstacles to nationbuilding and peaceful coexistence. For example, in Malawi, President Kamuzu
Banda stated that "there is no Opposition in Heaven. God himself does not want
opposition-that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu [President
Banda] have opposition?" 90 These dictators argued that the one-party political
system would represent "all streams of opinions and societal groups" and that
governance systems with multiple political parties presented myriad opportunities
for the politicization of ethnic, religious, and other social cleavages, rendering
nation building virtually impossible. 9 ' As argued by the former president of Sierra
Leone, Siaka Stevens, multi-partyism is "a system of . .. institutionalized tribal
and ethnic quinquennial warfare euphemistically known as elections [which]

86. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 251-252. See also Le Vine, supra note 50, at 188. Le
Vine writes that in "West Africa such documents [i.e., the constitutions that brought these countries to
independence] were soon abrogated by the new governments, which generally preferred to rule without
the constraints that they embodied." Id.
87. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 251-252.
88. Id. at 252. See also Samuel Decalo, The Process, Prospects and Constraints of
Democratizationin Africa, 91 AFR. AFF. 7,9-10 (1992).
89. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 252. See generally ANNE 0. KRUEGER, ECONOMIC
POLICY REFORM INDEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE KUZNETS MEMORIAL LECTURES (1992) (providing a
critical analysis of the reforms that many developing countries, including those in Africa, undertook in
the post-independence period); JULIUS KAMBARAGE NYERERE, FREEDOM AND UNITY (1966) (detailing
his economic and political agenda, based on socialism and self-reliance or ujamma, for an independent
Tanganyika; note that Tanganyika later united with the island of Zanzibar to form the United Republic
of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964, the country later changed its name to the United Republic of
Tanzania).
90. Decalo, supra note 88, at 10.
91. Id. at 9-10.
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contributes an open invitation to anarchy and disunity." 92 In Nyerere's view,
"where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole,
the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two
or more parties, each representing only a section of the community!"93 Hence,
these leaders of the immediate post-independence period in Africa rejected the
opposition political party as a check on arbitrary and non-accountable rule.
In France's former colonies-that is, the francophone African countriespolitical elites undertook three major types of reforms, "[t]hey 'amended' national
constitutions, enacted restrictive laws, and created elaborate 'security' structures
that were later used to prevent the participation of popular forces in political
markets." 94 As argued by Le Vine, from these post-independence, constitutional
manipulations emerged presidencies that were much more powerful than those
expected of the Gaullist political model (i.e., the highly centralized political system
with a very strong central authority which had been established in all the former
French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, except Guinea, at independence).95 By the
spring of 1963, these reinforced presidencies had been installed in as many as nine
francophone African countries. 96
While the new African countries did not destroy or abandon the legislatures
inherited from the colonial government, the individuals who served in these
institutions (i.e., legislators or parliamentarians) functioned primarily, or in some
cases exclusively, as mouthpieces for the executive, and did not exercise the true
power of legislators.97 In fact, in many of these countries, members of national
assemblies or parliaments did not exercise independent power to enact laws.
Instead, they simply rubber-stamped legislation demanded by the executive branch
of government, as was common in Cameroon, Senegal, C6te d'Ivoire, Guinea, and
Mauritania in the 1960s and 1970s." In some countries, the president sacked
legislators and dissolved the legislatures, and then he would proceed to rule by
decree after the constitution was suspended.99 Yet in other countries, the military
intervened and captured the apparatus of government, subsequently destroyed most
national institutions, and announced military decrees as the single mechanism for
governing the country. 00
92. Id. at 10.
93. NYERERE, supra note 89, at 196.
94. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 252.
95. Le Vine, supra note 50, at 187.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 189 ("In many [African] countries, the parliamentary structures remained in place, but
with only the ruling single-party remaining legal. Typically, the elected legislative assemblies tended to
be relegated to the role of a prebendiary pasturage, and their members usually gave automatic assent to
the initiatives of the 'reinforced' presidencies as in Senegal, C6te d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, and
Cameroon in the 1960s and 1970s.").
98. Id.; MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 252.
99. MBAKU, INSTTUTIONS, supranote 17, at 252.
100. Id. at 252-53. See also Victor T. Le Vine, Parliamentsin FrancophoneAfrica: Some Lessons
from the DecolonizationProcess, in LEGISLATURES INDEVELOPMENT: DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN NEW
AND OLD STATES 125, 146-147 (Joel Smith & Lloyd D. Musolf eds., 1979).
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Military intervention in African politics, argued Le Vine, "epitomized the low
estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during [the] 1963-89" period in
Africa. 01 He went on to state that:
[n]ot only did they commit acts which in themselves amply spoke to
their disdain of the rule of law, but after taking power, they frequently
suspended or discarded existing constitutions, to be removed from sight
as offensive remnants of previous rdgimes, and then (more often than
not in order to help legitimize their own rule) proceeded to write new
ones to suit themselves-for example, Nigeria 1967, 1976, 1984;
Dahomey/Benin, 1968, 1977; Upper Volta/Burkina Faso, 1970, 1977;
Congo People's Republic, 1973; Mali, 1974; the Central African
Empire, 1974; Mauritania 1978, 1981.102
The military elites who have intervened in politics since independence have
rejected constitutions and constitutionalism as the basis for organizing their
societies and resolving conflict. 03 In addition, these military elites have also
rejected the idea that the relevant stakeholders in each country have the right to
determine, design, and adopt their own institutional arrangements. 1" The view
that the constitution is simply an instrument that can be manipulated to secure
benefits for those who control the apparatus of government is not limited to
military officers who have intervened in politics. It is only the exceptional African
leader who has not attempted to manipulate his country's constitution to either
extend his stay in power or enhance that power.'05
Beginning in the mid-1980s, grassroots organizations, as they had done
during the decolonization period, began to make demands, some of them violent,
for a change in the status quo and transition to democratic govemance. 06 This
101. Le Vine, supra note 51, at 190.
102. Id.
103. MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 253.
104. Id.
105. Even as recently as 2011, an African politician was still trying to manipulate his country's
constitution to prolong his stay in power. Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade attempted to change
the national constitution in order to enhance his ability to secure another term in office. He was only
forced to give up the attempt after what BBC News called the "most violent protests of Mr. Wade's 11year rule." Senegal: Abdoulaye Wade Drops Poll PlansAfter Riots, BBC NEWS (June 23, 2011, 2:52
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13887613. Cameroon's 1996 Constitution, which was
approved by Paul Biya, as president, limits the president to two consecutive terms of seven years in
office-that is, fourteen years in total. Yet, in 2008, Biya, who had been President of the Republic of
Cameroon since 1982, set aside the law that he had earlier supported and used his position as leader of
the ruling party to have the constitution changed so that he could continue in office as president. That
year, Cameroon's parliament, which is dominated by Biya's Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
("CPDM") party-the CPDM at the time, held 153 seats in the 180-seat chamber-voted to amend the
constitution so that Biya could contest the presidential elections in October 2011. He easily won those
elections and is now serving as President of the Republic of Cameroon. By the time his term of office
ends in 2018, Biya would have held the position of President of Cameroon for almost forty years. E.g.,
Will Ross, Cameroon Makes Way for a King, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2008, 7:08 AM), http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hilafrica/7341358.stm.
106. See, e.g., Mbaku, Transition, supranote 63, at 104.
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resurgence, of course, was a continuation of efforts that were started during the
colonial period to help Africans drive out the Europeans and then provide their
societies with African-centered governance and economic systems. This time,
however, the interlopers to be chased away were indigenous political elites,
including military officers, who had captured the evacuated structures of colonial
hegemony and proceeded to engage in opportunistic behaviors (e.g., corruption) to
enrich themselves at the expense of their fellow citizens. 0 7 Granted, the prodemocracy organizations that spearheaded the continent's transition to democratic
governance in the mid-i 980s have made significant progress toward deepening and
institutionalizing democracy. However, a lot remains to be done in order for each
African country to provide itself with a constitution that specifically addresses the
five core principles-democracy, stability, human rights, sustainable development,
and social justice-that are considered the heart of, or central to, any set of modem
governance principles.' 0 8
III. WHAT DO AFRICANS EXPECT FROM THEIR CONSTITUTIONS? FIVE IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

An effective constitution is one that is locally-focused, 09 and reflects the
values, customs, traditions, and worldview of the people to be governed by it.
After all, a constitution consists of a set of constraints that individuals living in a
society voluntarily impose on themselves in order to effectively regulate their
socio-political interaction and more importantly, provide mechanisms for
individuals to organize their private lives.110 Such a constitution can only be
obtained if the constitution-making process is democratic-that is, it is bottom-up,
people-driven, inclusive, and participatory."' Nevertheless, any constitution must
reflect certain universally accepted principles of governance such as those
elaborated in the UDHR and other international treaties (e.g., the International
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child,

107. Mbaku & lhonvbere, supra note 53, at 8.
108. See John Mukum Mbaku, Postscript to MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:

CONSTRAINTS TO DEMOCRATIZATION INAFRICA 351 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius 0. Ihonvbere eds.,
2006) (giving a review of developments in Africa's continuing struggle to deepen and institutionalize
democracy).
109. As used here, "locally focused" means that the design of the constitution takes into
consideration the country's specificities, its political economy, any special circumstances (e.g.,
emergence from oppressive colonial rule), and the values, culture and customs, as well as traditions, of
the country's relevant stakeholders. This, of course, can only be accomplished if constitution-making is
bottom-up, people-driven, participatory and inclusive. Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 53. A
major criticism of constitution-making in the francophone countries was that all these former French
colonies based their constitutions on the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic (1958) even though
the circumstances surrounding the writing of constitutions in the African countries "were not in any
way analogous to those existing in France in 1958." LE VINE, supra note 19, at 227.
110. Mueller defines a constitution as "a form of social contract among the citizens defining the
rules within which the society functions." Mueller, supranote 35, at 326.
I11. Mbaku, Governance,supra note 19, at 53.
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and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)."'
Specifically, each country's constitution must deal explicitly with democracy,
stability, human rights, sustainable development, and social justice-these are core
values that should apply universally to all human societies.' 3 Before we discuss
how African countries can make certain that these values are elaborated in their
constitutions, we must first examine them.
A. Five Important Constitutional Principles
Five constitutional principles-democracy, stability, human rights,
sustainable development, and social justice-are considered central to any
constitution. 114 This section discusses each in detail.
1. Democracy
During the pro-democracy struggles of the mid-1980s and early-1990s," 5
Africans began to see constitutions as "a 'power map' on which framers may
delineate a wide range of concerns .

..

. The process of constitution making, which

involves, inter alia, making choices as to which concerns should appear on that
map" has emerged as the central question of political discourse.1 16 More
important, perhaps, is the fact that Africans came to see the constitution as "an
instrument for addressing pressing socio-economic, cultural, and economic
as well as "an embodiment of consensus around
questions"'
constitutionalism."' 18 What was critical in this realization was that while the
content of the constitution is important, process is just as important. There was a
conviction that process-driven constitution-making is superior because it enhances
the ability of all of a country's relevant stakeholder groups to participate fully and
effectively in the choice of laws and institutions.' 19 Constitution-making in the
112.

See Selassie, supra note 47, at 20-27.
113. Id.
114. See John Mukum Mbaku, Postscriptto MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
CONSTRAINTS TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 351 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius 0. Thonvbere eds.,
2006) (giving a review of developments in Africa's continuing struggle to deepen and institutionalize
democracy).
115. Mbaku & Ihonvbere, supra note 53, at 8.
116. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African
PoliticalParadox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY

WORLD 65, 67 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
117. Julius 0. Ihonvbere, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism? Towards a New Doctrine of
Democratization in Africa, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE
CONTINUING STRUGGLE 137, 139 (John Mukun Mbaku & Julius 0. Ihonvbere eds., 2003).
118. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

119. See id. at 138-39. Constitutional expert, Professor Bereket Habte Selassie, argues that in the
constitution-making exercise, emphasis must be placed on "process." Selassie, supra note 47, at 21. He
states that in post-Cold War constitution-making in Africa, "more emphasis was given to process
compared to previous times. This emphasis is related to the democratic imperative as the governing
principle in modern times. For example in a long-running comparative constitutional study in which I
have been involved, cosponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace and the U.N. Development Program
("UNDP") the study was focused on the process more than on the content of the constitution. The
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pre- and post-independence periods was top-down, elite-driven and nonparticipatory. The process-driven approach was expected to be bottom-up,
participatory, inclusive, and people-driven-i.e., democratic-making certain that
the constitution was not designed by a select group of political elites, with the help
of their foreign benefactors, but by the people themselves, with the help of their
elected representatives.120
The democratic approach to constitution-making demands that the public be
provided the facilities to participate fully and effectively in rules selection and
institution building. Such a process, as argued by constitutional expert, Bereket
Habte Selassie, "empowers the public, giving its members a sense of ownership of
the constitution and allowing them to air their views on a range of critical issues
that affect their lives." 1 21
One can see a constitution as an instrument for "creating bridges of
understanding among different segments in divided societies,"l22 such as in today's
African countries. Despite the more than three decades of democratization and
political liberalization in Africa, many of the countries on the continent are still in
the process of transitioning from governance systems characterized by destructive
mobilization by various groups-which are seeking either to minimize actual or
perceived marginalization, or to defend their existing political and economic
positions-to those in which citizens can live together peacefully. 123 A bridgebuilding constitution can provide the foundation for the construction of a political
and economic society that enhances peaceful coexistence, maximizes the creation
of wealth, promotes and sustains entrepreneurial activities, especially among
historically marginalized groups (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, minority ethnic
groups, and those who live on the urban periphery), and guarantees respect for
human rights. Of course, the choice of the issues to be examined during
constitutional discourse, and which should be elaborated in the constitution, must
be based on (1) the values of the country's relevant stakeholder groups-these
values are determined by their historical experiences and can be extracted from
them through their full and effective participation in the process of compacting the
constitution-and (2) universally applicable criteria, which represent core values
that apply universally to all human societies.124
To reiterate, the participatory approach to constitution-making should
enhance the ability of the country to address issues that are critical to effective
rationale behind this focus was the conviction that the recent approaches to process-driven constitution
making are better than previous approaches were," Id.
120. See Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 37.
121. Selassie, supra note 47, at 21.
122. Id. at 19.
123. For a review of developments in Africa's transition to democratic governance since the early
1990s, see KORWA G. ADAR ET AL., THE STATE OF AFRICA 2010/11: PARAMETERS AND LEGACIES OF
GOVERNANCE AND ISSUE AREAS (2010); Mbaku, supra note 108, at 321.
124. See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutionalism and Governance in Liberia: Where is the
Liberty that Brought African-Americans to the West African Coast in 1820?, 35 LIBERIAN STUD. J. 55,
74 (2010).
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governance, such as peaceful coexistence, protection of human rights, citizenship,
property rights, type of governmental regime (unitary or federal), and in the case of
virtually all African countries, ability to structure governance systems in order to
enhance the effective management of ethnic and religious diversity and minimize
25
the tendency of groups to resort to destructive mobilization.'
But, what is democracy? Dahl argues that one of the most important
determinants of a political system that is democratic is "the continuing
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as
political equals."1 26 Within such a democratic system exists institutional structures
that enhance the ability of citizens to effectively articulate their preferences, make
them known to the government and other members of society, and have the
government grant these preferences equal treatment without any prejudice against
those individuals or groups advancing the request. 127 In his definition of
democracy, however, Dahl does not consider issues of the distribution of income
128
and wealth within the polity, what has been referred to as economic democracy.
Regardless of how it is defined, at the very least, democracy must enable
citizens to effectively "negotiate, compromise, engage and hold themselves, and
those they choose to represent them, accountable for action taken."1 29 Thus, in a
country where governance is based on democracy, the state is adequately
constrained by the law (i.e., the constitution) and, among other things, citizens
have the right and ability to petition their government for relief from unjust and
punitive state action, as well as participate fully and effectively in both political
and economic governance.
2. Stability
Within a country, stability is a core value-for each African country, the twin
values of stability and peaceful coexistence are essential for the achievement of
social, political, and economic progress.' 30 In fact, it is difficult to pursue an
effective investment and economic growth program in an environment
characterized by destructive political and ethnic strife.' 31 As argued by Selassie,
125. For an examination of various approaches to the management of ethnicity in developing
countries, see ETHNIcirY AND GOVERNANCE INTHE THIRD WORLD, supra note 4, at 5-7.
126. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).
127. Id. at 2.
128. Cf id.
129. Selassie, supra note 47, at 22 (quoting Jean Bethke Elshtain, Laura Spelman Rockefeller
Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School).
130. Peaceful coexistence of each country's diverse ethnic and religious groups significantly
encourages trade and other forms of voluntary exchange, minimizes the costs and maximizes the
benefits of such exchanges, and hence, promotes engagement in productive activities. However, where
there is, for example, political violence, including that arising from destructive ethnic mobilization,
trade and other types of voluntary exchange are severely limited and wealth creation is stunted. See
generally MBAKU, REFORM, supra note 15, at 91-110 (analyzing, inter alia, the impact of political
instability on economic growth in Africa).
131. In a 1990 study, Mbaku determined that political instability has a significantly negative impact
on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, he also determined that political instability
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"the continued existence of the nation depends on [stability and unity]; and there is
a sense in which the other core values are dependent on them." 32 During most of
the post-independence period in Africa, few countries have been able to achieve
the type of stability that can enhance national integration and nation-building.' 3 3
Instead, many countries have been pervaded by high levels of political instability,
some of which has been induced by violent mobilization by ethnic and religious
groups that are fighting perceived, as well as actual, marginalization-consider, for
example, civil wars in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sudan, as well as post-election
violence in Nigeria and Kenya.134
What then are the conditions that guarantee and sustain stability in a country?
At the very least, the country's institutional arrangements must provide
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflict, as well as guarantee the rule of
law. Within such a system, for example, the law is supreme-no one, even those
who serve in government, including the executive, members of the judiciary and
legislature, is above the law.
Within a democratic system, citizens are
knowledgeable of this fundamental constitutional principle.135 As Dickinson
argues, within a system in which the law is supreme, "every citizen is entitled,
first, to have his rights adjudicated in a regular common-law court, and, secondly,
to call into question in such a court the legality of any act done by an
administrative official." 36
Peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic and religious groups that live in
each African country is a sine qua non for stability. That is, the effective
management of ethnic and religious diversity is critical to the maintenance of
peace and stability. The most effective way to ensure peaceful coexistence is to

weakens what is traditionally a positive relationship between inflows of development aid and economic
growth (i.e., the aid-growth relationship). Finally, Mbaku determined that political instability
discourages the inflow of official development assistance, funds that are usually very critical for
development in poor economies. John M. Mbaku, PoliticalInstability, Flows of Foreign Development
Assistance, Domestic Savings and Economic Growth in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 24 ASIAN & AFR. STUD.
137, 148-50 (1990). See also John Mukum Mbaku, DirectForeign Investment and PoliticalViolence in
Africa, 25 ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 253 (1991) (showing empirically that foreign capital penetration
significantly reduces domestic conflict in the African countries); John Mukum Mbaku, Institutional
Instability and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE
ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI 741 (1993) (showing, empirically, that political instability has a strongly
negative impact on economic growth in Africa).
132. Selassie, supranote 47, at 22.
133. Of course, there are exceptions. Countries such as Bostwana, Mauritius, and Seychelles have
been relatively stable. Although a few others were able to maintain a significant level of stability,
especially in the early years of independence, that stability was secured at the expense of significant
levels of oppression of citizens. This was the case in countries that were ruled by both civilian and
military dictatorships.
134. See JULIUS MUTWOL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA 12-13 (2009);
GEORGE KLAY KIEH, JR., THE FIRST LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR: THE CRISES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 18-19
(2008); RAPH UWECHUE, REFLECTIONS ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR: FACING THE FUTURE 50 (1971).
135. Selassie, supra note 47, at 23.
136. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 35 (1927).
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provide the country with a constitution that guarantees the rule of law. Throughout
most of post-independence Africa, most political elites, as well as the military
elites who have intervened in politics, have behaved with impunity, refusing to
subject themselves to the law.' 37 In fact, many of them have subverted the law in
an effort to monopolize political and economic spaces and enrich themselves at the
expense of their fellow citizens. 138 The effect of the opportunism of Africa's postindependence political and military elites has been pervasive instability-most of
this instability is attributed to (1) military intervention in politics; (2) corruption by
civil servants and political elites; and (3) the political and economic
marginalization of many minority ethnic and religious groups.' 3 9 The latter have
often resorted to violent mobilization in order to improve their participation levels
and minimize further marginalization. 140 The solution lies in providing each
country with institutional arrangements that guarantee the rule of law.
3. Human Rights
The evolution of modem human rights law started with the United Nations
General Assembly's adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948 ("UDHR"),141 and the subsequent adoption, in 1966, of the International
137. See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, Military Coups as Rent-Seeking Behavior, 22 J. POL. & MIL.
Soc. 241, 274-75 (1994).
138. The subversion of rules to maximize the interests of a few politically well-connected
individuals was not limited to military coups. In countries such as Cameroon, Malawi, Zambia, Liberia,
and South Africa, where there were no military overthrow of the government, incumbent ruling
coalitions-made up primarily of either a few ethno-regional elites or racial or religious minoritieswere able to use government structures to enrich themselves at the expense of their fellow citizens.
Liberia, which became an independent country in 1847, suffered a military coup in 1985. The militaries
of the other African countries mentioned above have never intervened in their countries' political
systems. See, e.g., GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN
AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY 269 (1981); BERNARD MAKHOSEZWE MAGUBANE, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE AND CLASS INSOUTH AFRICA 14-15 (1979) (detailing the manipulation
of institutional arrangements by the white minority to oppress the black majority). See also NAOMI
CHAZAN, AN ANATOMY OF GHANAIAN POLITICS: MANAGING POLITICAL RECESSION, 1969-1982 1-2
(1983) (examining the early years of Ghanaian independence, which were dominated by military
coups); DAVID J. GOULD, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD
WORLD: THE CASE OF ZAIRE 50-51 (1980) (detailing the subversion of rules by the Mobutu regime to
enrich a few politically well-placed individuals and impoverish the rest of the people of Zaire).
139. For the influence of corruption on African societies, see MBAKU, CORRUPTION, supra note 25,
at xi. See generally CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASESTUDIES (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C. Chikulo eds., 2000) (discussing combating and
controlling corruption in Africa referencing case studies in Zambia and Ghana, among others). For
military intervention in African politics, see SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA:
STUDIES IN MILITARY STYLE 5-38 (1976); Thomas H. Johnson et al., Explaining African Military
Coups d'tat,1960-1982, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 622, 622 (1984).
140. Examples of violent ethnic mobilization include the Rwanda genocide, Nigeria's civil war,
and the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil conflicts. See MUTWOL, supranote 134, at 50-52, 223-24; see
generally ALFRED OBIORA UZOKWE, SURVIVING INBIAFRA: THE STORY OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
(2003) (providing an account of the war by a survivor of the conflict).
141. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (HI) A, U.N. Doc. AJRES/217(IIl)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),1 42 and International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").143 Of course, virtually all
African countries, even including countries with dysfunctional political systems,
pay lip service to human rights and have constitutions that mention, in some form
or the other, protections for human rights.'" Despite the fact that the constitutions
of virtually all African countries make some allowance for the protection of human
rights, the violation of the fundamental rights of citizens is widespread and
continues unabated.145 In many of these countries, children are routinely denied
access to food and proper nutrition, education, clean water, and health care. They
are subjected, almost on a daily basis, to harm and exploitation- including sexual
abuse-and denied the right to participate fully and effectively in the cultural life
of their communities, which includes the opportunity to be loved and nurtured by a
family and the community.1 46 In addition, various minority ethnic groups are
routinely deprived of the opportunity to participate fully in economic and political
markets, as well as to exercise the right to practice their traditions and culture.147
Throughout Africa, corruption has made it virtually impossible for citizens to
find access to justice, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children, ethnic
minorities, rural inhabitants, and those forced by circumstances to eke out a living
on the urban periphery. These individuals also do not have access to basic services,
such as welfare-enhancing (and in some cases, life-saving) public services such as
police protection, primary education, basic health care, clean water, shelter, and
prenatal care for women.14 8

142. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
143. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
144. For example, Chapter Five of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana is headed
"Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms" and contains the following: "(1) The fundamental human
rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be respected and upheld by the Executive,
Legislature and Judiciary and all other organs of government and its agencies and, where applicable to
them, by all natural and legal persons in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the Courts as provided for
in this Constitution. (2) Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinion,
color, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the
individual contained in this Chapter but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for
the public interest." CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, ch. 5., IM 1-2. In addition, Chapter
Eighteen of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana establishes a Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice, which is charged with making certain that the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution are protected. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, ch. 18, T 218.
145. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE FOR

OURSELVES 18 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 2003) (detailing the struggle to protect fundamental
rights in Africa with specific emphasis on Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Uganda).
146. See, e.g., SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, at Section II (Linda

Richter et al. eds., 2004) (detailing the sexual exploitation of children in various countries in southern
Africa).
147. See, e.g., MAMDANI, supra note 4, 101-02.
148. MBAKU, CORRUPTION, supra note 25, at 110.
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The violation of the fundamental rights of individuals and communities
remains a serious problem for virtually all countries in Africa.149 While
institutions such as apartheid, slavery, and colonialism are usually considered the
biggest violators of the rights of Africans and their communities, it is important to
take cognizance of the fact that even post-independence governments-which
were expected to remedy the effects of historical discrimination and put in place
institutions capable of protecting citizens' rights-continue to violate the rights of
their citizens. 50 Unfortunately, most African countries engaged in institutional
reform processes that were opportunistic, top-down, and elite-driven during the
pre- and post-independence periods, and which failed to produce institutional
arrangements capable of guaranteeing the protection of human rights."s Thus,
even though most post-independence African constitutions made some mention of
human rights, the custodians of the state (i.e., civil servants and the political elites)
were not adequately constrained by the law and as a consequence, they were able
to routinely violate citizens' rights with impunity. The failure, for example, to
constitutionally guarantee the rule of law in these countries allowed many political
elites to consider themselves above the law and hence, engaged with impunity in
behaviors that not only inhibited economic growth and wealth creation (e.g.,
corruption), but also grossly violated the rights of citizens. 152
African governments have to look at all their public policies in light of how
they affect human rights. For example, as argued by former U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, "analysing corruption in the
149. See, e.g., Comm. on Human Rights, Violations of Human Rights in Southern Africa: Rep. of
the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts, 34th Sess., Feb. 22, 1978, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/5(XXXIV), at
pmbl. (Feb. 22, 1978) (providing a progress report of the human rights situation in southern Africa in
1978); Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Children's Rights and Law in African Context: An Introduction, in
CHILDREN's RIGHTS INAFRICA: A LEGAL PERSPECTIvE 3, 3 (Julia Sloth-Nielsen ed., 2008) (arguing
that children are more likely to be victims of human rights violations than adults and that African
children are more likely to be victims than children from other regions of the world).
150. See, e.g., Asifa Quraishi, What if Sharia Weren't the Enemy?: Rethinking International
Women's Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 173, 214-29 (2011) (discussing
Sharia-based women's rights advocacy, with specific emphasis on Nigeria); Sarah L. Dygert, Note,
EradicatingSudanese Slavery: The Sudanese Government andthe Abuse ofIslam, 3 REGENT J. INT'L L.
143, 153-54, 159-62 (2005) (identifying key characteristics of Sudan's version of Islam that have
contributed significantly to the continuing persistence of slavery in Sudanese society).
151. Consider the experiences of France's former colonies in Africa, which gave up democratic
constitution-making and opted for institutional arrangements based on the Constitution of the French
Fifth Republic. See, e.g., LE VINE, supra note 19, at 225-29.
152. See, e.g., MBAKU, CORRUPTION, supra note 25, at 102-09 (examining, inter alia, the impact of
rules subversion by state custodians on African economies). Corruption represents one of the most
important ways in which civil servants and politicians subvert national rules to enrich themselves.
Mbaku states that in Africa: "selling of young girls into prostitution continues as highly corrupt national
enforcement agencies standby and do nothing. The police and the judiciary, compromised by
corruption, are impotent to stop this insidious institution [i.e., corruption], which continues to destroy
the lives of an important portion of the population of these countries. Such blatant violation of the
human rights of poor young people in many countries in Africa has contributed to a rise in HIV/AIDS
infections, guaranteeing an early grave for people whose only crime is that they are poor and live in a
country pervaded by high rates of corruption." Id. at 110-11.
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light of its impact on human rights could well strengthen public understanding of
the evils of corruption and lead to stronger sense of public rejection."
4. Sustainable Development
Since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, sustainable development has emerged as an
important global issue.' 54 Sustainable development can be defined as "economic
growth that is not destructive to the environment."' 55 Under the concept of
sustainable development, a country can make efforts to use all available resources
to improve the welfare of the present generation, but in doing so, it must not
unfairly "interfere with or compromise the living standards of future
generations."l 56 Alternatively, sustainability has been described as "the ability of
an agro-ecological system to maintain productivity in the face of 'natural' and
structural hazards, such as drought or farmer indebtedness." 57
The concept of sustainability, however, can be viewed in terms of the impact
that economic growth has on a country's resource base. Under this approach, a
country is said to achieve sustainable development if it can successfully improve
the quality of life for the poorer majority of the population without compromising
or destroying the nation's resource base. Put another way, "the national resource
base is sustained and allowed to continue to serve as the foundation for effecting
improvements in the standard of living of the citizens for an indefinite period of
time."Iss
Unfortunately, throughout most African countries, "high levels of corruption
and other forms of political opportunism (e.g., rent seeking) have usually interfered
with the government's ability to develop and implement policies that promote and
enhance agro-ecological sustainability.""'9
In fact, the post-independence
approach to the management of environmental resources has been for civil servants
and politicians to devise programs that have enhanced their ability to enrich
themselves, but which have imposed significant costs on the environment.16 Part
of the problem lies in the nature of constitution-making in the pre- and postindependence period-the process was top-down, elite-driven and nonparticipatory, and hence, failed to produce the types of laws and institutions that
would have adequately constrained civil servants and political elites, and prevented
them from engaging in behaviors that are detrimental to effective management of
153. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 8 (2004).
154. John M. Mbaku, Book Reviews, 25 GROWTH & CHANGE 381,381 (1994).

155. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Mbaku, supra note 124, at 77.
157. Michael Redclift, Sustainability and the Market: Survival Strategies on the Bolivian Frontier,
23 J. DEV. STUD. 93, 93 (1986).
158. Mbaku, supra note 124, at 78; see Duane Chapman & Randolph Barker, Environmental
Protection, Resource Depletion, and the Sustainabilityof Developing Country Agriculture, 39 ECON.
DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 723, 733 (1991); Redclift, supra note 157, at 93.

159. Mbaku, supra note 124, at 78.
160. Id.
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environmental resources. Post-independence institutional arrangements in the
African countries did not provide the necessary mechanisms for civil society to
check the exercise of government agency; therefore, civil society and their
organizations were unable to prevent the type of political opportunism that has
been very damaging to the environment, such as bureaucratic corruption.'
It is
important, therefore, for African countries to engage in democratic constitutionmaking to secure institutional arrangements that adequately constrain the state and
enhance the ability of civil society to check on those excesses of civil servants and
politicians that have contributed significantly to agro-ecological degradation.1 62
5. Social Justice
As a principle, social justice refers to the guarantee, usually through the
constitution, of "second generation" rights. 163 First generation rights are those
guaranteed by the ICCPR-they deal specifically with the individual's ability to
participate in the political life of his or her society. These rights include freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion, the right to a fair trial, and freedom of
speech.'6 Some of these are also found in the UDHR. 6 1
Second generation rights deal specifically with economic, social, and cultural
issues and are codified in the ICESCR. These rights include access to the
following: a job; housing and health care; social security and unemployment
compensation; adequate and affordable nutrition, especially for women, infants,
and children; housing in safe neighborhoods; and affordable education, especially
at the primary level.166 However, resource or supply-side constraints affect the
way the government deals with the guarantees provided by the constitution. The
concept of rationing, which is a fundamental principle in economics, is critical to
understanding how countries whose constitutions have guaranteed these social and
economic rights must deal with resource scarcity and the need to meet their
constitutional obligations to the citizenry.167

161. Throughout the continent, the development of private media was stunted and citizens were not
granted any means through which they could petition their governments for relief from government
tyranny. For example, in Cameroon, press censorship was so severe that there were only a few private
newspapers in the country even after nearly thirty years of freedom from France and Great Britain-the
colonial administrators of record. In fact, as late as the 1990s, the Cameroon government was still
confiscating newspapers for publishing the "wrong" news and sending journalists to jail for exercising
their rights to criticize opportunistic government policies. The editor of a newspaper who published an
article about the health status of President Biya was imprisoned. Lyombe Eko, Hear All Evil, See All
Evil, Rail Against All Evil: Le Messager and the Journalism of Resistance in Cameroon, in THE
LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE INAFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA 123, 130-33, 137 (John Mukum
Mbaku & Joseph Takougang eds., 2004).
162. See Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 44-47.
163. Selassie, supranote 47, at 26.
164. ICCPR, supra note 142, arts. 14(1), 18(1), 19(2).
165. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supranote 141, arts. 11, 18-19.
166. ICECSR, supra note 143, arts. 6, 9-13.
167. The concept of scarcity in economics explains that no country has enough resources to meet
all the desires of its population. Specifically, scarcity is defined as "[a] situation in which unlimited
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In virtually all economies, rationing has been used effectively as a device to
deal with scarcity. In market-oriented economies, the rationing of most goods and
services is usually left to the market, with price serving as the main rationing
device. 1s In economies that rely more on non-market approaches to the allocation
of resources, the bureaucracy usually is responsible for most decisions regarding
allocation-the bureaucrats usually design various rationing mechanisms, which
may include price, bribes (to be paid to the gatekeepers), long waiting periods to
receive a service, etc.169 Any rationing device must comply with constitutional
provisions.
In South Africa's Bill of Rights, the following rights are enshrined: the rights
to housing, health care, food, water, and social security. 170 However, the
constitution expressly qualifies these rights in Section 27(2): "[t]he state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realisation of each of these rights."' 7 1 South Africa's highest court,
the Constitutional Court, has addressed the government's obligations to make
certain that these constitutionally guaranteed rights are not violated in view of the
constraints of resource scarcity and the qualifications of Section 27(2) in four
cases: Soobramoney v. Ministerof Health; 72 Government of the Republic of South
Africa v. Grootboom;173 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign; 74 and
75
Khosa v. Minister ofSocial Development.1
The purpose of this section of the paper, however, is not to examine the
"available resource" question, but to remind the reader of its existence-those
countries that constitutionally guarantee social and economic rights must keep in
mind that the government's ability to fulfill its constitutional mandate vis-A-vis
such rights is subject to the resource constraint, a problem that is universal and
applies to all countries, regardless of whether they are advanced industrial
economies, or poor and highly deprived developing countries. Thus, citizens must
see the government's ability to fulfill its constitutional mandate as constantly
evolving and affected significantly by improvements in economic conditionsboth domestic and global.

wants exceed the limited resources available to fulfill those wants." R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY
PATRICK O'BRIEN, MICROECONOMICs 4 (2010). Scarcity is a universal problem and is encountered by
all countries; its existence requires that each country design and adopt some form of rationing device to
minimize arbitrariness and capriciousness in the allocation of existing resources.
168. The use of price as an "allocative" device is discussed in all elementary courses in
microeconomics. See, e.g., id.
169. For example, in "centrally planned economies," the "government decides how economic
resources will be allocated." Id. at 9.
170. CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 49, arts. 26-27.
171. Id. art. 27(2).
172. Soobramoney v. MinisterofHealth, (1998) (1) SA 765 (CC) at para. 11.
173. Gov't ofthe Republic ofS. Aft. v. Grootboom, (2000) (1) SA 46 (CC) at para. 74.
174. Minister ofHealth v. Treatment Action Campaign, (2002) (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 23.
175. Khosa v. Minister ofSoc. Dev., (2004) (6) SA 505 (CC) at para. 53.
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How a country decides to attain social justice should be an issue for
constitutional discourse. Like other critical constitutional issues, it should be put
through rigorous discussion during constitution-making. Such discourse must be
robust and involve the full and effective participation of each country's relevant
stakeholder groups. Thus, facilities-such as language experts and interpreters or
translators-should be provided to all individuals and communities who desire
them so that they can participate fully and effectively in the process of selecting
appropriate laws and institutions for the country.
IV. CONSTITUTIONS, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Significant levels of ethnic and religious diversity characterize most countries
in Africa.176 Such diversity has presented many problems for the governing of
these countries in the post-independence period. Constitutional government and
the practice of constitutionalism are the most effective mechanisms to govern
countries with extremely heterogeneous populations such as those in Africa. 77
The type of constitutional government envisaged here is one characterized by a
separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
Those who serve in government derive their powers from the
government.
constitution-that is, the powers of public sector workers are defined, elaborated
in, and duly constrained by the constitution. But what about the rights of citizens?
As argued by Brennan and Buchanan, citizens' fundamental rights are not defined
or granted by the state. Instead, citizens, either directly or indirectly-through
their elected representatives-establish governments, and grant them the power to
guarantee and protect their rights; these are the rights that the people have defined,
agreed upon, and have subsequently elaborated in the constitution.1 79 In situations
where States already exist, as is the case in Africa today, the people, through a
participatory and inclusive process, can reconstruct and reconstitute them through
a negotiated change of rules.
Constitutionalism is an idea borrowed from English philosopher John
Locke-who is considered the father of classical liberalism-and the founders of
the American Republic.' 80 In a governance system that practices constitutionalism,
the state is constitutionally limited and those who serve in government (i.e., civil
176. For example, Cameroon consists of "more than 250 identifiable ethnic groups." MBAKU,
CULTURE AND CUSTOMs, supra note 2, at 1; Nigeria is said to have as many as 450 ethnic groups.
ETHNIC & CULTURAL DIVERSITY INNIGERIA 6 (Marcellina Ulunma Okehie-Offoha & Matthew N. 0.
Sadiku eds., 1996).
177. See, e.g., Mbaku, Ethnicity, supra note 11, at 59-60 (arguing, inter alia, that the most effective
way to manage ethnic diversity is to provide each country with constitutionally limited government).
178. For an examination of constitutionalism and how it applies to African countries, see Mbaku,
Governance, supra note 19, at 44-46.
179. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supranote 7, at 26.
180. See, e.g., Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 44. See also DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (1988) (detailing the contributions of the British legal tradition
and Federalists to constitutionalism in the United States); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 13 (1989) (examining the historical origins of the fundamental
foundations of American constitutionalism).
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servants and politicians) are well-constrained by the law and if they engage in
extra-legal activities (e.g., corruption), they are subject to prosecution.'8 1 In such a
political system, resolution of conflict (e.g., inter-ethnic conflict or disagreements
between individuals) is resolved peacefully through constitutionally-mandated
procedures. Groups, which suffer from actual or perceived marginalization, do not
resort to violent mobilization to improve their participation in political and
economic markets and minimize further marginalization. Instead, they utilize the
legal system and other constitutionally-mandated mechanisms for the resolution of
conflict to deal with their problems.182
Many scholars' 83 have argued that constitutionalism is "an expression of
culture" and that "there do not exist elements of constitutionalism that are
universal and hence, applicable generally to all societies." 84 Can African
countries, then, benefit from the experiences of the United States with
constitutionalism and constitutional government? Yes, especially if one recognizes
the fact that the "importance of the U.S. experience [with constitutionalism] is not
to be seen in the country's formal constitution, but in the general principles which
are reflected in American constitutionalism and, further, in the practical experience
of making constitutional democracy work."185 Many of the most basic ideas and
principles that undergird U.S. constitutionalism can be found in other cultures, 86
and are either highly valued or have the potential to contribute significantly to
governance in these societies. Three of these ideas stand out: (1) federalism-a
political structure that can help African countries effectively manage diversity; (2)
separation of powers-a constitutional principle which can help African countries
avoid being trapped with arbitrary and tyrannical rule; and (3) judicial review-a
very effective mechanism to enforce constitutional norms, and arguably, one of the
most important contributions of U.S. constitutionalism to governance around the
world. The policy recommendation for African countries is not necessarily that
they immediately construct new governance systems based on the U.S. model, but
that they "recognize the ideas and principles, which for more than 200 years, have
enhanced democratic governance in the United States and allowed the country to
deal effectively and peacefully with governance, as well as economic problems." 8 7
V.

COMPACTING AN AFRICAN CONSTITUTION: THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION

After the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid in South Africa,
many Africans renewed their interest in institutional reforms to bring about more

181. See Mbaku, Governance,supra note 19, at 45.
182. See id. at 45-46.
183. A. E. Dick Howard, Toward Constitutional Democracy Around the World: An American
Perspective, THE NATION WEBLOG, http://blog.nationmultimedia.com/print.php?id=422 (last visited
Dec. 8, 2012).
184. Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 44.
185. Id. at 44-45 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. at 45.
187. Id.
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effective governance institutions in their respective countries.' 8 8 The grassroots
organizations that spearheaded Africa's pro-democracy struggles in the post-Cold
War era recognized democratic (i.e., bottom-up, participatory, inclusive, and
people-driven) constitution-making as the most effective way for each country to
secure appropriate laws and institutions-those that reflected the values of each
country's relevant stakeholders and provided legal mechanisms for peaceful
resolution of conflict.' 89 These institutions were also expected to promote
entrepreneurial activities, especially among historically marginalized individuals
and groups (e.g., women, rural inhabitants, the urban poor, and ethnic minorities),
adequately constrain state custodians so that they cannot engage in opportunistic
behaviors (e.g., corruption and rent seeking), and enhance the peaceful coexistence
of each country's diverse ethnic and religious groups.190 Making certain that all
relevant stakeholders are provided with the facilities to participate fully and
effectively in constitution-making is absolutely necessary in order for the country
to produce institutional arrangements that are acceptable to the people, reflect their
values, and are recognized by them as legitimate tools for governance generally
and the organization of citizens' private lives particularly.' 9'
Making certain that all of a country's diverse population groups are provided
the opportunity to participate in constitution-making and enactment of the laws
that regulate socio-political interaction is very important.
But why is a
participatory and inclusive constitution-making process important for a country?
Such a process significantly improves the chances that: (1) the outcome is a set of
constitutional rules that is relevant to the lives of citizens and the problems they
face; (2) net benefits are maximized-benefits to gainers are maximized and costs
to losers are minimized; (3) the people will understand the constitution and its
provisions, and accept it as a legitimate tool for governance and for organizing
their private lives; (4) the people will claim ownership of the constitution and see it
as a product of their own efforts; and (5) the people will understand the need to
constrain their behaviors.192
The lesson here is that democratic constitution-making is very important for
nation-building, and economic and social transformation. Each African country
should engage in such a process in order to provide itself with institutional
arrangements that enhance the peace and provide the appropriate environment for
the creation of the wealth needed for human development. However, in order for a
country to successfully engage its citizens in democratic constitution-making, it
must first create the environment within which such a process can take place.
Such an environment must promote and enhance "dialogue, public debate,

188. John Mukum Mbaku, Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa: Learningfrom Past
Failures,in POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION INAFRICA: LESSONS FROM COUNTRY
EXPERIENCES 17 (Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere & John Mukum Mbaku eds., 2003).
189. See MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS, supranote 17, at 16.
190. See id. at 16-17.
191. See id. at 16.
192. See Mbaku, Governance,supra note 19, at 46-47.
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accommodation, and political give-and-take. The existence of such an environment
necessarily enhances peace and democracy."' 93
Any African country's decision to engage in democratic constitution-making
necessarily takes the institutional reform process out of the hands of a few ethnoregional elites and situates it within popular forces. Such a development, of
course, can produce significant opposition from center elites, most of whom are
likely to lose their influence and ability to manipulate the rules-making process to
obtain laws and institutions that favor them. Additionally, adopting a democratic
approach to rules-making will enhance the ability of popular forces to bring to the
table for discussion issues that are relevant and critical to the peoples' well-being.
For example, vexing issues of language, nationality, identity and citizenship,
gender, property rights, religious freedom, and resource allocation can be made a
critical part of constitutional deliberations.' 94 These issues are important to
African peoples, but since independence they have never been adequately
examined-they have only been opportunistically treated by urban-based elites and
virtually no effort has been made to provide citizens with the opportunity to
95
participate in the design of laws regulating their own socio-political interaction.1
Most important is that situating constitution-making and rules selection within
popular forces would allow for robust dialogue, not just on issues that are critical
to the country's relevant stakeholders, but also on certain universally accepted core
values-democracy, stability, human rights, sustainable development, and social
justice-and their subsequent entrenchment in the constitution. When citizens
design their own institutional arrangements, they are more likely to accept them
and would make certain that they reflect values that are important to them. Given
the fact that these locally focused institutional arrangements reflect the values of
most of the country's citizens, the latter are most likely to want to comply with
them, a process that can significantly minimize the costs of constitutional
compliance and improve governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pre- and post-independence constitution-making in Africa was a failure, both
in process and outcomes.' 9 6 First, in the francophone countries, constitutionmaking degenerated into the adoption of the French Constitution of 1958 as a
foundation for the institutional arrangements that brought these countries to
independence. This was undertaken despite the fact that the political, economic,
and social conditions then in existence in the colonies were quite different from
those that led to and necessitated the establishment of the French Fifth Republic in

193. Id. at 54.
194. Ihonvbere, supra note 117, at 143.
195. Notable exceptions include post-apartheid South Africa, which engaged in democratic
constitution-making and produced one of the most progressive constitutions in the world today. See
CONSTrruTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 49.
196. See, e.g., Le Vine, supra note 50, at 181.
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1958.'19 Second, although constitution-making in the British colonies appeared to
be participatorier,the actual negotiations that produced the constitutions of the
soon-to-be independent colonies were carried out in the United Kingdom and away
from the African peoples of each colony. 98 In London, the negotiations were
usually carried out between the British Government and urban-based indigenous
elites from each colony.' 99 Given the fact that the resulting constitution was
expected to regulate socio-political interaction among the peoples of the colony,
the negotiations should have been undertaken between all these groups, the real
stakeholders in the constitution-making process and its outcome. Such a truly
participatory and inclusive process would have guaranteed that issues brought to
the table for negotiation were those that were relevant and important to
governance, peaceful coexistence, and economic growth in the post-colony.
The result in both the French and British colonies were institutional
arrangements that failed to provide the enabling institutional environment for
peaceful coexistence and wealth creation. More important, perhaps, is the fact that
the dysfunctional decolonization process that characterized preparations for
independence in virtually all European colonies in Africa deprived Africans of the
opportunities to have the type of robust constitutional discourse that would have
allowed them to thoroughly examine issues critical to post-independence
governance.
Consequently, the constitutions that brought these colonies to independence
did not specifically deal fully and effectively with such important issues as
democracy, stability, human rights, sustainable development, and social justice.
This paper has made a case for each African country to engage its citizens in
democratic constitution-making so that they can deal effectively and fully with
these issues. The end result, in this scenario, would be to craft institutional
arrangements that enhance the ability of African nations in the future to live
together peacefully, and to create wealth to ensure the continued development of
their populations.

197. See LE VINE, supra note 19, at 227.
198. See Mbaku, Governance, supra note 19, at 50-5 1.
199. See id.

CRIMINALIZING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
ERIN CREEGAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

If those who committed torture abroad come to the United States, they can be
prosecuted as torturers, or deported under human rights provisions of U.S.
immigration law. 2 But our ability to criminally punish extrajudicial killingsoften very closely linked to the crime of torture-is less. For example, if a state
official commits an extrajudicial killing by torturing and ultimately killing an
individual, and later comes into the jurisdiction of the United States, punishment
options are limited to those described above.3 Why is this?
There are a few reasons for the difficulty in bringing individuals that have
committed extrajudicial killings to justice. The biggest obstacle is that an
extrajudicial killing is not criminalized under international law in as broad a
manner as torture. Even though torture seems less severe than death, torture is an
action that is never excusable under international law. Yet states are permitted to
intentionally kill individuals in a number of circumstances. They may execute
them after due judicial process, they may incapacitate them in a valid exercise of
law enforcement, or they may target them pursuant to the laws of armed conflict.
Even the term "extrajudicial killing" does not perfectly reflect the situations in
which a state may kill-war and law enforcement operations are both extrajudicial,
yet killing is and should be permitted in both cases.

* Erin Creegan is a Trial Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice, National Security
Division, Counterterrorism Section, and an Adjunct Professor the George Washington University Law
School and the University of Maryland, College Park. The opinions represented in this paper are those
of the author and do not express the positions of the United States Government in any way.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(a)-(b)(2) (2001).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(iii) (2010) ("Inadmissible aliens"):
Any alien who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of (I) Any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18; or
(II) Under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined
in section 3(a) of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350
note), is inadmissible.
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2010) ("Deportable aliens") (invoking the same descriptions from §
1182 to remove already admitted aliens).
3. For another example of an immigration prosecution, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1015(a) (2001)
("Whoever knowingly makes any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating
to ... any law of the United States relating to naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens . . . shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years .... ).
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Nonetheless, even though intentional killing, unlike torture, can sometimes be
lawfully done, there exists a vast class of killings committed by public officials of
states that are done pursuant to or motivated by the same illiberal motives as
torture: to suppress dissent, to eliminate political rivals, and to frighten civilian
populations. These killings should be outlawed and prosecutors given the tools to
fight them.
The primary goal of this paper is to suggest the adoption of a statute that
criminalizes extrajudicial killing, one that may be based on an international
convention. To do so, this paper defines the crime of these killings carefully,
separating them from lawful exercises of force and distinguishing their illiberal
and vindictive nature. First, this paper begins by providing a brief background on
extrajudicial killings and torture, as well as the current failure of international
criminal law to criminalize extrajudicial killings sufficiently. Next, this article
analyzes a crime closely related to extrajudicial killing-the crime of torturenearly three decades after the entry into force of the seminal human rights crime
treaty, the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). This convention may provide the
model for a new international ban on killings. Finally, the article concludes with a
proposed U.S. law criminalizing extrajudicial killings, whether underpinned by an
international convention, or not.
Considering the differences between torture and extrajudicial killings, but
taking account of their many similarities, this article analyzes whether the structure
of the CAT can be adopted to suit the new, heretofore neglected, purpose of
criminalizing extrajudicial killings through the creation of a new convention. This
article determines whether the structure and provisions of CAT, successfully
widely adopted by the international community, can be adapted into a convention
for extrajudicial killing that has a strong likelihood both of being adopted by states,
and effectively suppressing these illiberal killings. In conclusion, this article
considers how to draft a domestic criminal law for the U.S., a statute that grants
both jurisdiction and the ability to allow prosecutors to charge these types of
criminals, whether or not a convention against extrajudicial is created.
II.

THE STATUS Quo: THE CRIME OF TORTURE AND THE FACT OF KILLINGS

Both extrajudicial killing and torture had a place in the ancient world.
Towards the end of the 20th century, however, there emerged a consensus that
torture was not a legitimate tool of the state, and corresponding legal regimes
followed.
However, such legal regimes have not emerged in regards to
extrajudicial killings. A brief history of these crimes is useful in determining
whether extrajudicial killing can be criminalized similarly in the future.
A. CriminalizingTorture
In the ancient world, torture was common. Practices ranged from stoning to
crucifixion to disgusting devices such as the "brazen bull" from Ancient Greece by
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which victims were burned and boiled to death while their screams were converted
into music by a specially designed instrument.4 Torture lasted into the middle ages
of Europe. For example, one of the first times torture was used to suppress
political opinion took place during the Inquisition.5 Medieval trials were by
"ordeal"-rather than testing a conviction with evidence, defendants suffered
certain pain to prove their innocence, and torture was considered an effective, and
legitimate, means to elicit truth and confessions from defendants. 6 Like so many
others of the ancient time, these barbarous practices had difficulty withstanding the
emergence of the modem era: the dawn of the Enlightenment,7 of democracy, and
of greater social justice and technological progress. 8 Torture, as a common
practice, seemed to be going by the wayside.
Yet, strangely, some governments began to utilize torture as a tactic of
modern warfare. Twentieth century democracies, which by definition agree to be
bound to the rule of law and the importance of writing un-crossable lines for
governmental power, discovered a utility for torture. While democracies have
generally chosen not to go to war with each other,9 post-colonial wars and wars of
national liberation in the modem era created an uncertain role for the law of armed
conflict in intrastate conflicts.10 This uncertainty has allowed some democracies to
use torture, relying on facilities for detention and harm that their unconventional
enemies could not replicate."
France admitted to the use of torture in the Algerian War for the
independence of the French colony.' 2 Some of the commonly reported practices
included: sleep, food and water deprivation; exposure to extreme heat or cold;
electric shock; loud noise; forced maintenance of "stress" positions for long
periods of time; water torture; beatings; sexual abuse; humiliation and degradation;

4. JEAN KELLAWAY, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE AND EXECUTION 10-18 (Warren Lapworth ed.,
1st pbk. ed. 2000).
5. ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PENAL: LA PRtVENTION ET LA SUPPRESSION DE LA TORTURE 29 (1977) [hereinafter REVUE
INTERNATIONALE].

6. Id. at 26-27.
7. See generally MARCHESE BECCARIA, OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Edward D. Ingraham
trans., 1764) (consisting of the first modem work of criminology and criminal justice, and one that
strongly advocated torture as both barbarous and completely ineffective).
8. J. JEREMY WISNEWSKI, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE 24-25 (2010) (giving political,
humanistic, juridical, and socio-anthropological views on why torture went into disfavor at this time);
see also AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT ON TORTURE 29 (2nd ed. 1975) [hereinafter AMNESTY].
9. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFFAIRS 205,213 (1983).
10. Id. at 216.
11. WISNEWSKI, supranote 8, at 38.
12. GENERAL PAUL AUSSARESSES, SERVICES SPECIAUX, ALGtRIE 1955-1957 11-13 (2001); see

also THE BATILE OF ALGIERS (Rialto Pictures 1966) (a seminal film publicizing the use of torture in
Algeria).
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Likewise, the republican
use of drugs; and, threats against relatives.' 3
constitutional monarchy of the United Kingdom used torture-or at the very least,
"cruel and unusual treatment,"l 4 -in dealing with Irish separatists of the Irish
Republican Army. Tactics included: "hooding"; wall standing and stress positions;
sleep, food and water deprivation; and, constant loud and unpleasant noise.
The United Kingdom, like many colonial liberal societies, was especially
cruel abroad. The scale of violence used against colonized peoples may seem
more like crimes against humanity than isolated acts of torture that a statute
intends to prevent. However, tactics used by the United Kingdom against Kenyans
during the 1950s included: beatings; electric shock; use of cigarettes on the body;
skin searing; use of pliers on sensitive body parts; rape, including penetration with
foreign objects; and dragging people behind cars.
Likewise, Spain did little to
reform its law enforcement and military apparatuses for dealing with terrorists
even as it emerged from the Franco dictatorship.17 As a result, members of the
Basque separatist terrorist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ("ETA"), continued to be
tortured in the new democratic regime. For example, allegations against the ETA
during the 1980s and 1990s state that 84 percent of Basque activists in prison were
tortured, and large numbers of men in the Basque country were arrested and
tortured, but never charged with crimes. 8 In one case, members of a Basque
newspaper accused police forces of asphyxiating them with plastic bags, and of
forcing them to participate in a simulated execution.' 9
With even democracies finding a utility for torture, it can scarcely be
surprising that illiberal societies, dictatorships, fascist regimes, and communist
states have engaged in even more extreme measures in order to ensure control of
the people, or to force a great societal change based on ideology. 20 Whereas
democracies seem driven to use torture under the stress of separatists, terrorists, or

13. See DARIUS REJALi, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY (2009) (explaining different torture
techniques); see also JOHN T. PARRY, UNDERSTANDING TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE, AND POLITICAL

IDENTITY 99 (2010); REvUE INTERNATIONALE, supra note 5, at 59-60.
14. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. 59 (1978) (comparing acts rising
to torture and lesser intrusions on personal dignity that might constitute other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment).
15. Id. at 35 (explaining that these tactics were so prolific and controversial they came to be
known as the "five techniques").
16. PARRY, supranote 13, at 108.
17. Id. at 117.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 118.
20. Nazi Germany, an emblematic example of an illiberal dictatorship with cruel methods of
repression, used torture against its own citizens. Joseph Stalin, Soviet dictator in the years after the
Second World War, proved little better. Secret police with the power to torment ordinary citizens were
key elements of repression, emulated in many illiberal societies since, such as Iran. Pol Pot, a
Cambodian dictator who massacred thousands in "killing fields," and forced the entire country to
migrate from cities to rural areas, was famous for the use of pulling fingernails off, or driving shoots of
bamboo under fingernails, to compel persons to give information in an interrogation.
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crumbling empires, dictatorships must ply violence constantly in order to maintain
control. Every day is a part of an ongoing, dire national security emergency.
In the later part of the 20th century, a clearer consensus emerged that torture
was not legitimate and that derogation from democratic principles in
emergencies-such as the famous "ticking time bomb" scenario-undermined the
rule of law. 21 It was also accepted that torture was not especially effective as it
produced false intelligence and false confessions. 22 Yet defining and criminalizing
torture internationally did not take place until decades after World War II, a period
of time when torture-like abuses were part of a decolonization strategy. An
inability to qualify and define the phenomena as a discrete legal concept was
certainly part of the problem. 23 Many documents declared the broad belief that
"torture" should not be permitted, whatever the concept might mean. 24
After a number of torture cases became public in the 1960s and 1970s in
Algeria, Latin America, and elsewhere, human rights groups launched campaigns
and begin to scrutinize the problem.25 At this time, there was a wave of new U.N.
General Assembly resolutions reaffirming these principles.26 Most significantly, in
1977 the General Assembly requested that the Commission on Human Rights draft
a binding convention against torture based on the General Assembly's 1975
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.27 In 1978, an
ongoing working group continued the drafting process.28 Between 1978 and 1984,
numerous drafts circulated and there was fierce debate that led to volumes of

21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention on Human Rights art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter ACHR].
22. AMNESTY, supra note 8, at 24; GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INT'L
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 449-53 (2010).
23. AMNESTY, supra note 8, at 33-38.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A, art.
5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man art. 26,
O.A.S. Res. XXX, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM OAS/Ser.LJV/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003) [hereinafter Rights of Man]; ICCPR, supra note
21, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 21, art. 3; ACHR, supra note 21, art. 5. Some treaties are also nonderogable. See e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 21, art.15; ACHR, supra note 21,
art. 27.
25. MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST

TORTURE: A COMMENTARY 3 (2008).
26. G.A. Res. 3059 (XXVII), 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3059 (Nov. 2, 1973); G.A. Res. 3218
(XXIX),
6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3218 (Nov. 6, 1974); G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3452 (Dec. 9, 1975); G.A. Res. 3453(XXX), 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ (Dec 9, 1975); G.A. Res.
31/8, 6, U.N. Doc. AIRES/31/8 (Dec 13, 1976).
27. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention against
Torture].
28. NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supranote 25, at 3-4.
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drafting history. In 1984, the final version of the working group was approved by
the Commission on Human Rights and transmitted to the General Assembly, where
it received relatively speedy signature and ratification by a number of states.29
This treaty, the Convention against Torture ("CAT"), has become one of the most
important human rights treaties because it criminalizes illiberal assaults on the
human body and human dignity.
B. The Fact ofExtrajudicialKillings
Extrajudicial killings have been relatively common since the end of World
War II. However, they are not criminalized as broadly as torture despite their
similar history and prevalence. They are intertwined with the fate of people who
have been "disappeared" by their governments. For example, in Argentina,
liberals and communists who opposed the ruling military junta were executed or
simply "disappeared."0 From the 1970s to the 1990s, during Operation Condor ,
Chile and other countries with military rule also participated in systematized
extrajudicial killings.
Extrajudicial killings are scarcely in the past, and are ongoing in a number of
countries. One of the most widely reported modem cases of extrajudicial killing is
taking place in the Philippines currently. Human Rights Watch reports that,
despite the current president's campaign to end violence, there have been seven
recent extrajudicial killings and three recent forced disappearances. 32 Hundreds of
people, mostly political activists and journalists, have disappeared or been killed.
At least one human rights lawyer has suggested that the killings are widespread
enough to constitute a crime against humanity. 34 In a Congressional hearing on the
subject, Senator Barbara Boxer commented: "[flor too long the Government of the
Philippines has not taken sufficient action . . . to address extrajudicial killings and

bring those responsible to justice."35

29. Id. at 5.
30. Argentina Dirty War 1976-1983, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org
/military/world/war/argentina.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (explaining, among other details, that the
disappeared were known as the "desaparecidos").
31. Robert Plummer, CondorLegacy Haunts South America, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/3720724.stm (last updated June 8, 2005).
32. Philippines: ExtrajudicialKillings, Enforced Disappearances,and Impunity, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/features/philippines-extrajudicial-killings-enforceddisappearances-and-impunity.
33. Kate McGeown, PhilippinesExtrajudicialKillings Continue, Says HRW, BBC NEWS (July 19,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14196401.
34. PHL Police,Military May Face ExtrajudicialKilling Raps Before ICC - Lawyer, GMA NEWS
(Sept. 29, 2011, 8:42 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/233810/news/nation/phl-policemilitary-may-face-extrajudicial-killing-raps-before-icc-lawyer.
35. ExtrajudicialKillings in the Philippines:Strategies to End the Violence, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Relations of the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. 2 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110shrg408l I/pdflCHRG-1 10shrg4081 I.pdf
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In Ethiopia, the threat of separatists from the Ogaden National Liberation
Front ("ONLF") has increased reports of torture and extrajudicial killings. 36
Estimates put between 1,000 and 2,000 civilians killed by members of the
Ethiopian police force or military.37 In the Ivory Coast, the United Nations
discovered mass graves in a center of opposition thinking in the country's business
capital.38 The U.N. documented at least twenty-six cases of extrajudicial killings,
as well as eighty-five known arbitrary arrests and eleven cases of rape by
government actors.39
In Bangladesh, Amnesty International has reported that the Rapid Action
Battalion ("RAB"), a special police force, has committed at least 700 extrajudicial
killings since the group's creation in 2004.40 Amnesty International reports that
the RAB falsely claims a number of these killings were in gun battles or accidents,
rather than intentional killings of civilians. 4 1 There are powerful organized
criminal groups in the country; however, many of the killings do not appear to be
pursuant to law enforcement needs, but rather the actions of a force that has
impunity, and kills after aggressive questioning post-arrest. Torture victims of the
RAB have reported that they were told if they did not falsely confess, they would
be "cross-fired," or, in other words, killed by the police who would claim they had
done so pursuant to a gun battle.42
Showing even further that torture and extrajudicial killings are inextricably
related, death is often a part of torture. A state actor could kill, or threaten to kill,
third parties in order to coerce a person into talking. In fact, in many reports of
torture from victims across the world, the torture victim observed a killing, or a
killing was a part of the torture. Additionally, torture is often so intense that it
results in death, or death is contemplated as the inevitable yet perhaps not fully
sought out, consequence of severe physical torture. In fact, Amnesty International
found that from 1997 to 2000, there were at least eighty known deaths from torture
in addition to the fact that instances of torture were present in 150 countries and
widespread in seventy countries.43
A U.S. case shows that there are instances of killings that simply are not
addressed, leaving the torture statute as one of the only tools for suppressing

36. See Jason McLure, Ethiopia'sDirty War, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 21, 2008, 7:00 PM), http:
//www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/01/2 1/ethiopia-s-dirty-war.html.
37. Id.
38. Daniel Howden, Troops Blamedfor Mass Graves in Ivory Coast, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 13,
2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/troops-blamed-for-mass-graves-in-ivory-coast2336887.htnl.
39. Id.
40. AMNESTY INT'L, CRIMES UNSEEN: EXTRAJUDICIAL ExEcUTIoNS IN BANGLADESH 2 (Aug.

2011), available at http://www.amnesty.orglen/library/asset/ASA13/005/2011/en/cl8ad74b-75fe-4b15b043-5982eebdb27d/asal3005201 len.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. PARRY, supra note 13, at 16.
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illiberal behavior. In United States v. Belfast, the first CAT prosecution in the
U.S., refugees from Sierra Leone that sought refuge Liberia were interrogated by
Liberian soldiers and killed if they did not answer questions satisfactorily." As
one defendant shot some of the refugees, he told the others that they would be
next. 45 One soldier killed one of the refugees by slowly sawing off his head as he
begged for his life.46 Yet only the torturing of two refugees who survived the
encounter could be prosecuted in a U.S. court-the killings they witnessed were
not and could not be prosecuted.47
These figures demonstrated the pervasiveness of extrajudicial killings in the
modem world. While murders by government officials are prosecuted zealously in
countries with a high adherence to the rule of law, such as the United States, other
countries often commit extrajudicial killings with impunity. The need to eliminate
safe havens and make a definitive statement that illiberal killings are just as wrong
as illiberal assaults on the body shows why a convention on the prohibition on
extrajudicial killing is needed at this time. It also shows why the United States
should adopt a statute-perhaps based on such a treaty, but even without one-that
can punish those killers who come within the jurisdiction of the United States.
C. The Incomplete Law ofKilling
There can be no doubt that in various parts of the world, governments have
killed and "disappeared" their own people to maintain power and squelch dissent.
In some instances, they are prosecuted under currently defined international law
paradigms of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and enforced disappearances.
However, an examination of each crime's framework demonstrates that they are
defined too narrowly to provide a sufficient liability framework for extrajudicial
killings, and as a result, a convention specific to extrajudicial killings should be
adopted.
1. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
While international criminal liability is not comprehensive in terms of
covering all forms of large-scale illiberal killings, there are two well-defined
international criminal law paradigms that could provide liability for extrajudicial
killing-war crimes and crimes against humanity. War crimes proscribe certain
kinds of conduct, including summary execution of civilians or combatants, as
illegal when they occur pursuant to the law of armed conflict. 48 Crimes against
44. U.S. v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 794 (1Ith Cir. 2010).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 795.
47. See id. at 799-800.
48. Dating back to the 15th century, war crimes have been tried and punished longer than any
other international crime. See SoLIs, supra note 22, at 28. Currently the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 give the most definitive account of the commonly accepted war crimes. See Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva
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humanity proscribe certain kinds of conduct, including murder, as illegal when
done as part of a widespread attack on a civilian population. 4 9 However, these
paradigms are too narrow to encompass all contexts in which extrajudicial killings
may take place.
The idea of international criminal liability, including war crimes and crimes
against humanity, stems from the notion that the state may be unable or unwilling
to dispense justice. This idea dates back to the Second World War and,
specifically, to the crimes of the Nazis who perpetrated genocide on behalf of the
state, as well as other crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression. Thus, when the state is the perpetrator of crimes-such as is the case
with extrajudicial killings-criminal liability can no longer be prosecuted by the
state.
While states cannot be held directly liable for criminal activity, the
germination of international criminal law begins with the idea that the state can do
wrong.5 There are some actions, taken by a state or its agents, which should beand can be-sanctioned regardless of the laws and policies of that state. Long
before Nuremberg, war crimes were punishable international crimes. 52 Wars have
been a long-recorded feature of human existence and generally, war results in the

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 87 [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. War crimes along a similar formulation are also
proscribed in Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 8, openedfor signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into
force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Statute of the ICC].
49. The proposition that crimes against humanity fall within the scope of international law dates
back to the famous "Martens Clause" of the 1899 Hague Conventions with the statement:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public
conscience.
Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, available at http://www.icrc.org/ibl.nsfTFULJL150?OpenDocument.
Crimes against
humanity were then criminally proscribed for the Nuremberg trials by Control Council Law No. 10.
Allied Control Council, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and
Against Humanity, Law No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtl0.asp
[hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10]. They now are also proscribed in Article 7 of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court. Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7.
50. See Control Council Law No. 10, supranote 49.
51. States themselves cannot have direct criminal liability. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d
Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
43-51 (2001).
52. See SOLIS, supra note 22, at 28.
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incapacitation of one state's government while the victor occupies it. Thus, those
who have broken the international customs of fair play in wartime were subject to
tribunals run by the victor.
Historically, there has also been international criminal liability for
"peremptory norms," or actions deemed so wrong by all the international
community that they are universally punishable as crimes.5 3 Usually these crimes
have some nexus to international concerns, such as the fact that they commonly
occur across international borders or on the high seas. Paradigmatic examples
include piracy and slave trading, which both occurred on the high seas and relied
on international cooperation to ensure the existence of no safe havens for such
criminals.54
The current international criminal law paradigms of war crimes and crimes
against humanity are not sufficient to criminalize extrajudicial killings. Both
paradigms prevent state actors from killing their people, but do not do so broadly
enough. Under the war crimes doctrine, civilians are protected as improper objects
of attack." This holds true in cases of a civil war or a war of national liberation.
Thus, when a state is engaged in an internal armed conflict, its power to kill its
citizens might be circumscribed.17 This means that extrajudicial killings can be

53. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, InternationalCrimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67-68 (1996).
54. See id.
55. This is called either "noncombatant immunity," or the "principle of distinction." See SOLIS,
supra note 22, at 251.
56. See Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that wars of national liberation are considered international for
the purposes of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions regime).
57. There are two conflicting veins in international law on this point. On the one hand, internal
armed conflicts were not historically treated like international armed conflicts. See Rogier Bartels,
Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide Between
Internationaland Non-internationalArmed Conflicts, 91 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROss 35, 45 (2009).
In the past, states were seen as having plenary power within their borders. See id. at 46. Thus internal
killings of traitors or freedom fighters or those with political differences of opinion might be not be
illegal, if purely interstate. See id. Under this model the prohibition on war crimes is not so much a
human rights idea, but an idea about interstate relations. This certainly fits with the relatively early
historical emergence of criminalization of war crimes, far predating other crimes that do have a nexus to
human rights ideas. Nonetheless, even in earlier periods before the emergence of the human rights
movement, and during this era of high sovereignty, there was the idea of belligerency-the notion that
once a rebellion reached a certain level of strength, the conflict had become "international" in the idea
of reciprocal rights between the two entities. Id. at 50-51. The laws of warfare would apply. Id. In
modem times, there is increasing strength to the notion that internal wars be governed by the same law
of armed conflict as international conflicts. Factually, internal conflicts are now much more common,
and humanitarian concerns are the same in internal conflicts as in international ones. Id. at 40. Legally,
the Geneva Conventions established a very minimum baseline for internal armed conflicts in the form
of common article 3, expanded by Additional Protocol II. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610; First Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 3. Many also contend
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prosecuted as a war crime, but only if committed in an armed conflict setting.
Murder is both prohibited in Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions-the
minimum baseline of prohibitions for armed conflict-as well as in the Third
Geneva Convention, with regard to prisoners of war, and in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, with regard to civilians.58
It is a crime under the Geneva
Conventions, as "grave breaches" that all parties must agree to prosecute or
extradite to another country that will prosecute. The same protections yet again
appear in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which expands the
1949 Geneva Conventions regime with new humanitarian protections.59
More narrowly, crimes against humanity may occur only in the context of
widespread attacks on the civilian population. This is a proscribed criminal
definition that has appeared in the charters of international criminal tribunals from
Nuremberg to the present International Criminal Court, but which, unlike other
international crimes, does not have a general treaty that states can sign onto and
agree to criminalize in their domestic law.60 As a result, many countries, including
the United States, lack crimes against humanity criminal statutes, while many have
war crimes statutes based on the Geneva Conventions, a genocide statute based on
the Genocide Convention, and so on.
The crimes against humanity offense is a reasonable way to proscribe states
from killing their own citizens. However, crimes against humanity are useful as a
legal tool only in a narrow setting: when a "widespread" attack on the civilian
population is in progress. 62 This requirement is one that only gets the international

that customary international law places increasingly strong demands on states (and non-state actors) in
conforming their internal war behavior to the requirements of the international law of armed conflict.
See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 22, at 169.
58. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 48,
art. 3.
59. Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Session Two: The U.S.
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, Remarks at The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the
1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
419, 423-29 (1987).
60. Both war crimes and genocide are crimes for which there are treaties defining the crime and
requiring implementation in the states parties' domestic criminal law. Compare First Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 50, Second Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 51, Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 48, art. 130, Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 48, art. 147, and
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 5, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (identifying their respective grave breaches), with Genocide Implementation Act of 1987,
18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006), and War Crimes Act of 1996 § 2401, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(1996) (implementing
them in U.S. law).
61. See id.
62. Compare Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7 ("For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime
against humanity' means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack ....
), with
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 5, U.N.
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community involved when governments killing their people, and when the scale is
so grave that the massacre has risen to the level of international concern. This
seems to be a compromise intended to keep the international community out of a
state's affairs when the scale of violence is sufficiently small such that the state
may be capable of suppressing it, even if the state does not. On the other hand, a
widespread attack on the civilian population in a state suggests a massive
breakdown in the state's administration of justice, one of its central functions, and
thus, suggests why a mechanism for prosecution of such crimes by the
international community would be needed.
Consequently, while both the proscription on war crimes and the proscription
on crimes against humanity provide individual criminal liability for singular
persons who participate in wide-scale violence, neither catches the kind of
behavior that is criminalized in the Convention Against Torture: single, illiberal
wrongs by actors in a position of state authority. Neither crime penalizes torture
committed by a single member of a secret police force who interrogates a
suspected terrorist or separatist by administering a severe beating. Nor does either
crime punish extrajudicial killing by a soldier who takes a number of political
activists from their home in the night, kills them, and buries them as a means of
silencing them. The international community may want to limit the "small scale"
crimes that it takes an interest in, but extrajudicial killings should be one of the acts
for which direct international criminal liability is imposed, even in a single
instance. For example, torture, as criminalized by the CAT, demonstrates how
such a crime may be prosecuted outside of the realm of crimes against humanity or
war crimes. Torture can be a crime against humanity when a number of tortures
are committed on a wide scale, but unlike war crimes or crimes against humanity,6 3
it can also exist in a single instance under the CAT. Without such a treaty for
extrajudicial killings, the breakdown in the state's ability to dispense justice is
great. The state's very own representative has stolen away a person's right to live
with impunity, and perhaps, at the very encouragement of an illiberal government.
2. Enforced Disappearances
Torture and enforced disappearances are both acts that can, along with
murder, be visited widespread on a civilian population and thus, can be crimes
against humanity. However, unlike extrajudicial killings, both crimes are
criminalized through adoption of conventions. A discussion of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (demonstrating that as it was the first international court since
Nuremberg, this Statute does not require the widespread quality-it instead requires that the list of acts
be done to civilians in an armed conflict setting), and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (demonstrating that similar to the
Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, there is reference to the widespread requirement instead
of the armed conflict requirement-which seems to be the preferred prerequisite-and showing that this
issue is now more settled in favor of the definition that was adopted in the Rome Statute).
63. Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7(f).
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("CAED"),M in many ways similar to the CAT, will also inform the proposed
creation of a convention prohibiting extrajudicial killings.
To begin, an "enforced disappearance" is different from murder-while both
murder and enforced disappearances are listed in the statute of the International
Criminal Court, they are listed as distinct attacks on the civilian population that can
rise to the level of crimes against humanity. Furthermore, enforced disappearances
may be described as a crime of the same ilk as torture and extrajudicial killings,
particularly as outlined in the recent Convention against Enforced Disappearances.
The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance ("CAED") is a U.N.-sponsored international human rights treaty
whose object is to prohibit enforced disappearances. 65
An "enforced
disappearance" is a term of art in international law; specifically, it is one of the
prohibited acts that, as part of a wide-scale attack against a civilian population,
constitutes a crime against humanity. 66 The convention began with a 1978
resolution by the U.N. General Assembly condemning secret abductions and
disappearances by government and seeking further review of the problem.67 In
1992, years after the passage of the Convention against Torture, the General
Assembly returned with a resolution, the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Following this, in 2001, the Commission
on Human Rights established an open-ended working group to draft a treaty
against enforced disappearances. 69 The text drew very heavily from the model of
the CAT. The final text was adopted by the General Assembly in December 2006,
opened for signature in February 2007, and entered into force December of 2010.70
Although about ninety states have signed the treaty, only about thirty have ratified
it so far.7 Notably, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany,
and the Netherlands did not sign.72
An "enforced disappearance" is defined in Article 2 of the convention as:
the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by
64. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2006/1 (Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Convention on Enforced
Disappearance].
65. Id. pmbl.
66. Statute of the ICC, supra note 48, art. 7(i).
67. G.A. Res. 33/173,14, U.N. Doc. AIRES/33/173 (Dec. 20, 1978).
68. G.A. Res. 47/133, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992).
69. Human Rights Commission Res. 2001/46, Rep. to the Economic and Social Council on the
Fifty-Seventh Session of the Commission, 57th Sess., April 25, 2001, E/CN.4/2001/L.1 1/Add.5, at 36
(April. 25, 2001).
70. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES, http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src-treaty&mtdsg noiv-16&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.7
States who accede to the convention have the obligation to: investigate acts of
enforced disappearance and bring those responsible to justice; ensure that enforced
disappearance constitutes an offense under its criminal law; establish jurisdiction
over the offense of enforced disappearance when the alleged offender is within its
territory, even if they are not a citizen or resident; cooperate with other states in
ensuring that offenders are prosecuted or extradited, and assist the victims of
enforced disappearance, or locate and return their remains; respect minimum legal
standards around the deprivation of liberty, including the right for imprisonment to
be challenged before the courts; establish a register of those currently imprisoned,
and allow it to be inspected by relatives and counsel; and, ensure that victims of
enforced disappearance, or those directly affected by it, have a right to obtain
reparation and compensation. Like the CAT, the Convention intends to be
governed by a "Committee against Enforced Disappearances" of persons elected
by the member states-parties.
The Convention Against Enforced Disappearances obviously provides a
model for the path, which is proposed here: to use familiar structures from the
CAT regime to fight a related illiberal harm. But the existence of the new
Convention Against Enforced Disappearances does not preempt the need for a
Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings.
Importantly, the enforced
disappearances treaty does not target murders specifically. In fact, it is not even so
expansive as to cover all sorts of illiberal deprivations of liberty by governmental
actors. The Convention addresses a singular tactic wherein thousands of persons
were "disappeared" by the government that was first made very famous by the
Nazi "Night and Fog" decree, or the Argentine "Dirty War." While government
actors continue to use this illiberal tactic, it seems the convention could have been
strengthened if it had been made to include a larger class of governmental
abductions and detentions, as the torture regime attempts to cover a large class of
illiberal government assaults.
Both the enforced disappearances treaty, and the treaty on extrajudicial
killings that this article proposes, seek to expand protection from illiberal
governmental assaults on the body (torture) to other illiberal acts (kidnapping, and
killing, respectively). But both the enforced disappearances treaty and the
proposed one suffer in that deprivations of liberty and life by the government can
be part of the regular and proper functioning of the state, while the imposition of
pain on the body is generally not. The way the enforced disappearances treaty
adapted to this problem was to circumscribe the kind of illiberal kidnapping the
drafters were concerned with down to the single tactic of "enforced
disappearances." But, what about openly jailing dissidents for political crimes?

73. Convention on Enforced Disappearance, supra note 64, art. 2.
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What happens when a government tells the family of a disappeared person that that
person has been imprisoned or killed? Do these actions somehow obviate the
crime of the illiberal abduction? This scarcely seems to make sense simply
because "disappearance" is the more common recent and historical mode of
illiberal governmental abduction and detention.
Related to the questions the narrow scope of the enforced disappearances
treaty is its usefulness. As it includes only one tactic for illiberal deprivation of
liberty, states may simply innovate others. The Dirty War in Argentina, Operation
Condor, and other historically known incidents of widespread disappearances have
already come and gone. However, despite the historical condemnation the tactic
has already received, similar crimes continue as governments become innovative
with their tactics to make such types of disappearances less obvious. Perhaps these
examples weighed heavily on the minds of the crime's innovators, who first turned
attention to the problem in 1978, but not again for fourteen years, and then not
again for nine years. From the first call for some proscription in this area until the
actual time the treaty went into force was a period of more than thirty years.
Perhaps the concept of illiberal abductions needs further normative work; this must
be addressed elsewhere.
Despite the future need for development of the concept of illiberal abductions,
the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances does inform any potential
Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings: the objective in proscribing illiberal
killings must be as comprehensive as possible. Unlike in the CAED, the crime
enumerated in the extrajudicial killing convention must not be limited merely to
the most known, common tactics. It must be defined carefully not to impinge on
the rightful prerogatives and powers of the state, as the CAT and the CAED are,
but it must also be written expansively, and not in a tactic-specific way.
Thus, as we have seen from studying the history above, the CAT was a
normatively powerful tool that crystallized a certain method as to how to prevent
governmental abuses of the person. Using the torture regime as a starting point, a
similar convention prohibiting extrajudicial killings could be successful if the
crime is more clearly defined. Patterning the treaty after the CAT worked for the
ratification of the CAED. However, in order to have a more widely ratified and
more useful treaty than the CAED, we cannot copy the CAT wholesale or narrow
the definition of an extrajudicial killing so much that it is not flexible, adaptable,
and useful. In order to have hope of adoption, the new crime of extrajudicial
killing outlined in the treaty must also not threaten the proper powers of
government, not only because of problems in the application, but also to prevent
perceived threats to governmental power. The next section will describe the type
of provisions that could be included in a draft Convention Against Extrajudicial
Killings modeled after the CAT.
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III. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND How IT
CAN BE ADAPTED TO ExTRAuDIcIAL KILLING
The Convention Against Torture ("CAT") provides a strong legal framework
to inform the creation of a Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings as many
aspects of the crime of torture are similar to extrajudicial killing. CAT's articles
and objectives are used below as a baseline for suggesting the types of legal
provisions needed to prosecute extrajudicial killings.
A. The Definition of Torture
To begin, the definition of torture as outlined in Article 1 of the CAT is:
For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.
The main elements of the definition of torture are the involvement of a public
official, the infliction of severe pain and suffering, intent, and a specific purpose. 74
While the actus reus for a new crime of extrajudicial murder will of course be
different, the intent element is analogous and thus, the proposed convention can
include a similar type of definition. For example, extrajudicial killing would
include intentionally causing the death of the victim rather than intentionally
inflicting severe pain or suffering.
The requirement of a public official should remain the same. This is the
defining characteristic of the crime of extrajudicial killing, and what separates it
from ordinary, privately committed murder for which international concern should
arguably not exist. However, the growth from before 1984 to present of non-state
actors in the international system may give some cause to expand the definition, at
least to cover non-state organizations that have defacto control over a territory or a
population. It perhaps should also be expanded to terrorist groups and any other
group with a political motive, although defining the law thusly may present some
conceptual challenges.
For example, when the CAT was negotiated, some parties advocated a
definition that would include public and private actors. 75 It does not seem that
74. NowAK & MCARTHUR, supranote 25, at 28.
75. AHCENE BOULESBAA,

ENFORCEMENT 23-28

(1999).
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much thought was given to a middle way between including all actors: public and
private, and public officials only. 76 What of those acting "under color of law"?
What of contractors and private security forces? Or, organizations that exercise de
facto control over territory, but have yet to be recognized as a government? The
new convention on extrajudicial killings should address such concerns. This
article's particular recommendation is to include officials acting under "color of
law," and those with actual authority in a territory, regardless of whether they are
"public officials." This is based on the fact that non-state actors with the power to
act for the state acting illiberally also demonstrate the breakdown of the state.
Therefore, international criminal liability is reasonable.
Despite the similar role of the state in the crime of extrajudicial killing as in
torture, the specific purpose is likely to be different. The CAT notes that torture is
utilized often to gain information, to punish, and to intimidate, and lists these
motives as non-exclusive signs that a treatment is torture. Killing might be done
for the second and third purpose, but not the first. A rewriting of Article 1 for
extrajudicial killing purposes would note how extrajudicial killing is done to
punish dissidents, to quell political rivals, and for other illiberal purposes, as part
of a similar, non-exhaustive list. The non-exhaustive nature of the list should be
maintained to maximize the utility of the statute when extrajudicial killings are
utilized differently in the future, but with the same purpose to further illiberal
political motives.
One issue that was not fully defined in the torture regime, which becomes
even more important in a convention against extrajudicial killings, is the concept
of what constitutes a "lawful sanction."7 Thus, the convention may benefit from
an article that clearly defines the constitution of judicial authority. For example,
this could include the famous provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, Article 75, which lays out judicial authority plainly, and has been
accepted by many states already. This is similar to the approach of the definition
in the Torture Victim Protection Act in U.S. law, which defined an extrajudicial
killing not incident to lawful sanction for civil suit purposes.
B. Obligation to Prevent Torture
The obligation to prevent torture found in Article 2 of the CAT is as follows:
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction.

76. Id. (offering some suggestion to that effect from Germany regarding persons with powers of
public officials even if not official).
77. Id. at 28-35.
78. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948) [hereinafter ATCA]. Congress subsequently
defined "extrajudicial killing" in the notes of this Act by approving section 3(a) of the Torture Victim
Protection Act. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat or war, internal political instability or any other public
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.
Immediately, there is a clear need to distinguish torture and extrajudicial killings.
While there is no legitimate role for intentionally committed torture in warfare,
there is a role for public officials to kill others intentionally. This article must
clarify that it does not intend to impinge upon the scope of the law of armed
conflict, a vast and ever-changing body of law that determines when an individual
may be targeted, and what scope of harm may come to her on the battlefield.
However, war and exceptional circumstances should not be invoked as excuses to
allow murders and the persecution of enemies outside of the conflict. As a result,
this article must be phrased carefully to prohibit murders pre-texted on war while
also protecting evolutions in the law of armed conflict. Therefore, the article
should state that it does not apply to killings where the law of armed conflict is in
operation, but that the mere existence of a war or other exceptional conflict cannot
be invoked to justify extrajudicial killings that are not pursuant to the state's war
rights and power. It is important to avoid mention of prohibiting killings "beyond
the battlefield" because our technology, and the organization of enemies, are often
changing. Further, the notion of a bounded geographic zone of conflict could
become obsolete-it may already be obsolete enough in the U.S.'s vision of the
war on terror, whether the position of the U.S. is founded or not-to discourage the
U.S. and others from signing the law.
As stated above, this draft Convention should attempt to include actors who
operate under "color of law" or the authority of a non-state organization that has de
facto control over a territory. As in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions, non-state actors cannot invoke superior orders as a defense, treating
them just as we would any other fighting force. Nor should they be able to invoke
any defense of exceptional circumstances or public authority, just as state actors
are bound. But moreover, for these actors there is also the concern that a duress
defense could be used. For a public official to claim that they were forced to do
the action by their organization should not be a complete excuse, particularly if the
dangerousness or the conduct of the organization is known at the time the person
joins, they voluntarily join, or they have opportunities to safely leave the group
before or after committing the killing.
Generally, duress is not a defense in an intentional killing under current U.S.
law, but this point may be worth clarifying. For example, in a case from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, a soldier argued he was forced under threat of death himself to kill
others.79 While a majority of the Appeals Chamber rejected this as a possible

79. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal, I11 (Oct. 7, 1997).
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defense, a minority was sympathetic to it. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently held that persecutors cannot be denied asylum under the "persecutor
bar"80 because they participated in acts of persecution under duress.81 A similar
type of clarification regarding these defenses should be included in the draft
convention.
C. Non-Refoulement
Article 3(1) of the CAT provides, as to non-refoulemont: "No State Party
shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected
to torture." It might seem at first glance that the need for a non-refoulement
provision in a Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings would not be as important
as such an article found in the CAT. One of the goals of torture in illiberal systems
is to gather information. If an infamous criminal has been extradited to an illiberal
state, there may be much the government wants to know about that criminal's other
crimes, associates, or anything else that might endanger or embarrass the state. If
the crime is a political one, like terrorism, the state may particularly want to gather
information, intimidate enemies, and prevent appearances of strong internal
dissension by torturing prisoners.
However, how should killing a prisoner that has just been received from an
extradition be treated? If it is incident to lawful sanction-for example, a
procedurally fair death penalty-then the convention's prohibitions should not be
implicated. But what if the state simply executes the person once they have them
in custody? It might seem as though this would not happen since a hasty illiberal
execution of an extradited person would draw a strong diplomatic response from
the sending state (whereas with torture, the fact of the torture might be unknown or
disputed). Therefore, it seems an extrajudicial killing would not likely occur or
need as much protection. However, it is certainly the case that states have been
concerned about the mistreatment of extraditees and expellees, or their
disappearance after being handed over from one state to another.82
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
81. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009).
82. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57619 (finding that a person could not be extradited if
they risk mistreatment in the receiving state); Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58004 (finding that a Sikh
separatist could not be deported because Indian guarantees of proper treatment were insufficient);
Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, App. No. 36378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), http://hudoc.ec
hr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -68790 (finding that a Chechen rebel and terrorist could not
be deported to Russia); Baysakov and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 54131/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages /search.aspx?i=001-97437 (finding that Kazakh opposition
activists could not be deported to their home country since the assurances of proper treatment given by
Kazakh authorities were unreliable and Kazakhstan lacks an effective torture prevention regime); see
generally EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACTSHEET-EXPULSIONS AND EXTRADITIONS (2013),
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/211 A6F9C-A4EC-4CF7-AB2E-42E9D49FB2EF/O/FICHESEx
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The rule of non-refoulement is not directly related to the criminal enforcement
of an international legal norm against torture. Rather, it is a proactive provision
that prevents countries from being complicit in the torture that other states might
potentially do. It is speculative, and covers a narrow range of the possible
circumstances that might bring a victim into the hands of his or her torturer.
Furthermore, while a non-refoulement provision seems necessary, it is not without
problems. For example, despite U.S. President Obama's work to close down the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a number of still-dangerous prisoners
cannot be repatriated to their country of origin due to a history of torture in those
regimes. Perversely, torturers who claim asylum in the U.S. could potentially use
the fact that they tortured in the past to show that they should not be repatriated to
a country where they used to be a government actor.
Given the difficulties in squaring the non-refoulement provision with the
needs of a torture or extrajudicial killing convention, could it be excluded perhaps
in favor of a more voluntary provision? Could this requirement explicitly be
waived in cases where the receiving state vows to the sending state that it will not
execute the person? Would this requirement genuinely protect extraditees or
expellees from the most likely kind of killing, one that is pursuant to a hasty trial
under corrupt judges, rather than a clearer extrajudicial killing? Recall that unlike
torture, states may sometimes kill individuals as a part of their function, and that
this makes clear legal provisions more difficult. Further, states already have
agreements not to seek the death penalty as a predicate of some extraditions, and
thus, this is not a likely solution to the problem. 4
Therefore, this paper suggests a more lax wording of the non-refoulement
provision, such as:
All States shall endeavor not to expel, return, or extradite a person to
another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to an extrajudicial killing, or a
lawfully sanctioned killing, by government that is not done pursuant to a
fair and impartial judicial process.
This wording can assist by expanding the sphere of concern beyond what is
criminalized, but giving states some flexibility to fashion new solutions. Unlike
torture, a killing is an easier breach to observe and thus, enforcement of the
provision would be easier than with torture, which could allow a less absolute
standard.

pulsions et extraditionsEN.pdf (providing examples and summaries of cases involving expulsions and
extraditions).
83. KATE JASTRAM & MARILYN ACHIRON, UNITED NATIONs HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES,
REFUGEE PROTECTION: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 18 (2001), http://www.ipu.org/pdf/
publications/refugee en.pdf.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (explaining that Canada could not
extradite persons to places where they might be subject to the death penalty).
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History demonstrates that non-refoulement provisions are important and
necessary, and have as much of a role with killings as with torture. The suggested
changes to the provision in the draft convention in no way seek to expose
extraditees or expellees to an unnecessary risk of extrajudicial execution. If it was
found to do so, it may be that an absolute provision on non-refoulement-as in the
CAT-is the most suitable provision for the Convention Against Extrajudicial
Killings.

D. Obligation to Criminalize Torture
The obligation to criminalize torture, as laid out in Article 4 of the CAT, is as
follows:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under
its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture
and to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation
in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature.
This relatively noncontroversial provision is helpful-having criminal provisions
in each state is what will forge the identity of the crime of extrajudicial killing,
which is now only a vague concept. This type of provision should be included in a
draft extrajudicial killing convention.

E. Jurisdiction
Article 5 of the CAT outlines jurisdiction.
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the
following cases:
1. When the offences are committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
2. When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
3. When the victim was a national of that State if that State
considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where
the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and
it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States
mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised
in accordance with internal law.
This article works in conjunction with Article 7 of the Convention.
1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged
to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in
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the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit
the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that
State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of
evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less
stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article 5,
paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection
with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair
treatment at all stages of the proceedings.
This language illustrates that the CAT is an aut dedere autjudicare treaty-or, an
"extradite or prosecute" treaty. There are an increasing number of treaties in the
international system that utilizes this sort of language. In international law
generally, there are traditional bases under which states can exercise criminal
jurisdiction-acts which occur in some part in their territory (objective territorial);
acts which produce effects in their territory (subjective territorial); acts which are
done by their nationals (nationality); acts which affect their nationals (passive
personality); acts which impinge vital national interests (protective); and, acts
which are of such a concern to the entire international community that it is in the
interests of all states to try and suppress them no matter where they occur
(universal). Aut dedere aut judicare treaties create a kind of agreed universal
jurisdiction, giving any state that has custody of an offender the right to try him or
her. Oddly, these agreements are widely construed to give jurisdiction over
offenders of nationalities of nonparties, and for crimes that occurred in nonparties'
territories.
The new convention against extrajudicial killings should continue to utilize
aut dedere aut judicare language like that of the CAT and numerous other
successful criminal "suppression" conventions. Yet, this may be problematic for
the United States. Although the language of the CAT mandates extending
jurisdiction over every state parties' territory, the United States explicitly declined
territorial jurisdiction in fashioning its domestic law. The U.S. criminal torture
statute explicitly only applies to cases of torture that occur outside the U.S. The
U.S. likely will want any new extrajudicial killings statute to be only applicable
outside of U.S. territory as well. The view may be that the United States already
has excellent rule of law and effectively suppresses illiberal assaults by U.S. public
officials. At the federal level, there is a "Public Integrity Section" at the
Department of Justice whose sole function is to root out cases of corruption; some
states have similar laws. Furthermore, torture cases inside the U.S. are uncommon.
Yet abroad and outside of normal law enforcement role and oversight, the U.S. has
opened its nationals up to criminal liability. Although other states may complain,
the U.S. may want to ratify a convention that includes this same language from the
CAT about territorial, nationality, and custodial universal jurisdiction, but not
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implement territorial jurisdiction. As a result, the provision on jurisdiction
included in the draft convention must be clearly thought-out and accepted.
F. Monitoring Committee
Significantly, Article 17(1) of the CAT provides a provision on monitoring.
There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions

hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of 10 experts of high
moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights,
who shall serve in their personal capacity. The experts shall be elected
by the States Parties, consideration being given to equitable
geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of
some persons having legal experience.
It is expanded at Article 19(1):
The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken
to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention, within one
year after the entry into force of this Convention for the State Party
concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary
reports every four years on any new measures taken, and such other
reports as the Committee may request.
And further expanded at Article 20(1):
If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to
contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically
practiced in the territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that
State Party to co-operate in the examination of the information and to
this end to submit observations with regard to the information
concerned.
When the CAT was negotiated, it was decided to have its enforcement monitored
by a new Committee Against Torture as opposed to the existing Commission on
Human Rights. Very few suppressing Conventions have such a monitoring
mechanism. Usually, these kinds of committees exist for human rights treaties, the
predominant enforcement mechanisms of which are not criminal.85 Because any
Convention Against Extrajudicial Killings would, like the CAT, be similar to a
human rights convention-made to bind and monitor states as well as catch
criminal-it may be appropriate for it to be subject to some kind of monitoring
mechanism.
Unfortunately, reception for the Committee Against Torture has not been
exceptionally positive. A prevailing criticism has been that it is simply too weak
85. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/ HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited
Nov. 8,2012).
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to achieve its goals, 86 and merely repeats the failed monitoring structures of other
regimes, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." This
has not been an incurable criticism; some have noted that stronger monitoring
regimes appear to be more successful, such as the one proposed in the optional
protocol to the CAT,88 or the European monitoring regime. Thus, it does not seem
that the version in the CAT should be adopted as written. There are also those that
argue that the Committee Against Torture does not go far enough, and that the
European model and its follower Optional Protocol ("OPCAT"), including its
much greater monitoring requirements, is more effective.89 While not wishing to
foreclose discussion on this issue and a finding by the international community that
such a system would be beneficial, this paper proposes to use an established legal
body to provide additional, related protections where they seem to be missing, in
the relative absence of any whisperings of support for the idea. It seems that in
order to propose such a measure, the least onerous proposition should be
suggested.
A monitoring regime like the Optional Protocol or the European system could
be adopted, but that might drastically narrow the appeal of the treaty, and thus, its
widespread ratification. The creation of a new committee for extrajudicial killings
seems a bit ambitious for a crime for which there is not a movement with the
impetus of the anti-torture movement. This author, though hoping not to
shortchange her idea's success were ever it to be adopted, thus would certainly not
advocate for the creation of a Committee Against Extrajudicial Killings.
As a result, if a new monitoring committee was not created for extrajudicial
killings, and this convention does not directly mirror the Committee Against
Torture, should it perhaps be monitored by the Human Rights Council, formerly
the Commission on Human Rights, which monitored most such treaties until the
Committee Against Torture decided to forge its own path? The Council already
monitors extrajudicial killings. There is currently a Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, organized under the Human
Rights Council and created through its bureaucracy rather than by treaty. 90 The
Rapporteur studies informally, and currently receives a very low response rate to
its surveys according to its 2010 report. A new convention could give the
Rapporteur a more official relationship with monitoring that is non-mandatory and
informal, but prescribes certain best practices.

86. See, e.g., AMRITA MUKHERJEE, TORTURE AND THE UNITED NATIONS: CHARTER AND TREATYBASED MONITORING 83 (2008).
87. BOULESBAA, supra note 75, at 294.
88. MUKHERJEE, supra note 87, at 107-16.
89. Frank Ledwidge, The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT): A
Major Step Forwardin the Global Preventionof Terror, 17 HELSINKI MONITOR 69, 69-70 (2006).
90. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitraryexecutions, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, www.ohchr.orglEN/Issues/Execu
tions/Pages/SRExecutionslndex.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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The determination of which model to utilize-the existing rapporteur and
voluntary compliance, or a more rigorous regime-may depend on whether the
value of monitoring compliance outweighs the benefit of widespread ratification.
The Optional Protocol was not widely ratified, and if provisions like it were
included in the main body of a convention against extrajudicial killings,
ratifications would likely be low. One suggestion is to revamp the role of the
Rapporteur with voluntary monitoring, and have a more extensive Optional
Protocol to the extrajudicial killings convention for those states that wish to
promote mandatory compliance. Such a compromise may eliminate the use of the
less effective middle option of the Committee Against Torture, ensure more
widespread compliance, and boost the norm against extrajudicial killings, while
promoting a path to growth and greater monitoring in the future.
G. Other Lessons from the CAT
The CAT contains many standard provisions that did not merit substantial
discussion above: the method of choosing and manner of meeting of the members
of the treaty's committee, and the accession and ratification provisions. Also, the
standard language regarding is significant: the investigation of the treaty's crime,
the convention as a basis for extradition to supplement existing treaties, the
training of government personnel about the requirements of the treaty, mutual legal
assistance, and victim complaint and compensation. Some of these ideas can be
adopted into a new convention against extrajudicial killings, while others may not
be necessary. For example, Article 15 of the CAT states: "Each State Party shall
ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made." As described
in this article, one prominent feature of torture is that it is often used to gather
information, and thus, this article has obvious relevance in the anti-torture regime.
Since the object of an extrajudicial killing appears to be to silence, such a
provision can most likely not be adapted from the CAT to the new convention.
Likewise, CAT at Article 10 states:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information
regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included in the
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical
personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the
custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any
form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or
instructions issued in regard to the duties and functions of any such
persons.
This provision again applies more aptly in the anti-torture regime. It seems likely
that proper interrogation techniques have to be strictly trained and enforced to
ensure prevention of torture in many situations; however, law enforcement officers
more readily understand that they are not at liberty to execute civilians, and thus,
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such training is not needed in a similar manner. Nonetheless, the extrajudicial
killings convention should include the recommended training on the parameters of
self-defense and defense of others, and certainly should admonish law enforcement
professionals in their written materials about the severe penalties attaching to
committing such a killing. Thus, Article 10 should to be modified to meet the
needs of the new convention.
H. The Unique Legal Requirements of the Crime ofExtrajudicialKilling
An important role for the new convention, as was important for the CAT, is
the elimination of safe harbors for human rights violators. This convention targets
a relatively specific, illiberal, state-sponsored or state-complicit behavior. Its
jurisdiction will stem from the fact that states are not often effective at suppressing
their own wrongdoing, and that some crimes with a humanitarian or political
dimension are of international concern. However, while the right to life is one of
the most important human rights, the convention is not intended to supply a
number of special rules for how states should exercise capital punishment, if they
choose to have it. It is not meant to provide exhaustive rules about how to fairly
run a judicial system so that the state may take a person's life. Such measures are
important and should be considered elsewhere, such as by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Thus, there should be a limiting article in the convention that clarifies that it is
meant to address killings outside of the judicial process and those committed
outside of the law of war. However, it is perhaps also worth considering adding
language that killings which shield themselves in the judicial process in some way,
but are clearly not conducted through the judicial process, should not be protected
or at the very least are discouraged. Regulation of sham trials and hasty executions
should clearly define the limited scope of intrusion into what constitutes a fairlyreached sentence of death.
Likewise, incidences of public safety killings should be carved out. For
example, a police officer who shoots at a person as they are committing a violent
crime or trying to escape police custody, has a duty to act in protection of public
safety. This killing should receive legal protection. Although both self-defense
and defense of others are forms of public safety killings, this should be clarified in
the text of the convention. Additionally, as with the law of armed conflict and
judicial process, there should be a provision that states that a pre-textual use of a
legitimate police power-such as the right to act in the public safety-will not
shield a potential perpetrator from liability. It must be clear that the mere fact that
a public official claims that a killing was in self-defense, or to protect others, will
not be sufficient to shield a potential perpetrator from inquiry.
Aspirational provisions can be included as to proscribe proper death penalty
sentences. For example, it could admonish states not to tolerate bribery, to provide
for fair trial and at least one appeal, and to provide counsel, among other
recommendations included in detail in Additional Protocol I article 75. It could set
the parameters of self-defense and defense of others, as well as the law of armed
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conflict. Finally, it could recommend required training for members of the
military, judiciary, or law enforcement. However, given the enormity and
diversity of thought on these issues, it is not recommended that these requirements
be imposed as mandatory.
IV. A U.S. CRIMINAL STATUTE ON EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
To enact criminal prohibitions in the United States, a U.S. statute is required
whether the proposed convention succeeds or fails. 91 For the reasons mentioned
above, a law allowing U.S. prosecutors to target and punish those who use the
power of the state or another form of political power to kill others is desirable.
Thus, even without a convention, a statute must be drafted. If a convention is
successfully drafted, it will likely not be self-executing under U.S. law and it will
require domestic legislation is order to criminalize the activity for those who come
within U.S. jurisdiction.
The advantage to a convention is obviously its greater scope of application, as
it will hopefully span many states. Its advantage in the United States is to bolster a
statute that is written with "found-in" or "custodial universal" or "treaty-based"
jurisdiction. This is the form of jurisdiction with the greatest ability to prevent
impunity: it allows the U.S. to punish offenders coming from other regimes to the
United States. Currently, the United States prosecutes former torturers who seek
refuge in the United States once their regime is out of power, but it has limited
ability to prosecute politically motivated murders. 92 A law that allows jurisdiction
over these murders when they occur abroad will have the greatest utility-indeed,
that is the central utility. Thankfully, there are not many politically motivated
murders committed by the state or guerilla groups in the United States. The ability
to end impunity in states where the rule of law is weak relies on there being no
country to which criminals can go for a safe haven. This form of "custodial"
universal jurisdiction is the most expansive besides the disfavored "true" universal
jurisdiction, which allows crimes committed abroad to be tried in absentia with no
territorial nexus.93 "Found in" language is time-tested and reliable, frequently
used, relatively easy to litigate, and very desirable.
While it has long been established that Congress may criminalize
extraterritorial conduct even in the absence of an underlying treaty or support in
international law, this does not change the fact that Congress has been extremely
hesitant to do so. For example, there are about twenty-one crimes for which
Congress has imposed the desirable "the alleged offender is later found in/present

91. However, this does not apply in the highly unlikely circumstance that the treaty is selfexecuting.
92. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(a)-(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2009); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A(a)-

(b) (2004).
93. STEPHEN MACEDO, ET AL., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29, 31

(2001), availableat http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/univejur.pdf
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in the United States" language. 94 Nearly each of these crimes is connected to a
suppression treaty signed by the United States, with the exception of some of the
terrorist crimes, which are predicated under the passive personality bases of
jurisdiction under international law.9 5
Yet, Congress has the authority to write a law with extraterritorial application,
as long as that law complies with due process requirements. It is well-established
that Congress can regulate conduct outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States, 9 6 and "the courts of the United States have repeatedly upheld the power of
Congress to attach extraterritorial effect to its penal statutes, particularly where
they are being applied to citizens of the United States . ..
Generally, statutes are
not construed to have extraterritorial effect absent a clear statement from Congress.
Where Congressional intent for extraterritorial jurisdiction of a statute is clear, that
jurisdiction is not precluded by norms of customary international law.9 8 Congress
is not bound by international law, nor is U.S. law "subordinate to customary
international law."99 In fact, "[i]f it chooses to do so, [Congress] may legislate
with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by
international law."' 00 The role and duty of U.S. courts' therefore is "to enforce the

94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 32(b)(4) (2006) (destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities); 18 U.S.C.A. §
37(b)(2) (1996) (violence at international airports); 18 U.S.C.A. § I12(e) (1996) (protection of foreign
officials, official guests, and internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C.A. § 831(c)(3) (1996)
(prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials); 18 U.S.C.A. § 878(d) (1996) (threats and
extortion against foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C.A. §
1091(e)(2)(D) (2009) (genocide); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1116(c) (1996) (murder or manslaughter of foreign
officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(e) (2006)
(kidnapping only in the case of the kidnap of a foreign official); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (1996)
(hostage taking); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1596(a)(2) (2008) (additional jurisdiction in certain trafficking offenses
for §§ 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, 1591-involving human trafficking and slavery); 18 U.S.C.A. §
1651 (1948) (piracy); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2280(b)(1)(C) (1996) (violence against maritime navigation); 18
U.S.C.A. § 2281(b)(3) (1996) (violence against maritime fixed platforms); 18 U.S.C.A. §
2332f(b)(2)(C) (2002) (bombings of places of public use, government facilities, public transportation
systems and infrastructure facilities); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(d)(1)(C) (2009) (providing material support
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339C(b)(2)(B) (2006)
(prohibitions against the financing of terrorism); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339D(b)(3) (2004) (receiving militarytype training from a foreign terrorist organization); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A(b)(2) (2001) (torture); 18
U.S.C.A. § 2442(c)(3) (2008) (recruitment or use of child soldiers); 21 U.S.C.A. § 960a(b)(5) (2006)
(foreign terrorist organizations, terrorist persons and groups); 49 U.S.C.A. § 46502(b)(2)(C) (1996)
(aircraft piracy).
95. However, it certainly appears that Congress prefers to use custodial jurisdiction when
bolstered by a treaty as opposed to standing on that bases alone for terrorism crimes.
96. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991).
97. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
98. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
99. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law of the
land to norms of customary international law." 01
From a due process perspective, Congress can provide for jurisdiction based
on its constitutional authorities "[tIo define and punish .

.

. [o]ffenses against the

Law of Nations," "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," and pursuant to
the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the Treaty Power.1 02 Some
statutes thus have a firm constitutional basis on the "Law of Nations" clause where
there is also universal or general jurisdiction for those crimes. When the United
States enters a treaty to establish international legal basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction over a crime, Congress may enact legislation as necessary and proper
to effectuate U.S. obligations under the treaty.103
Generally, Congress is only comfortable providing a custodial universal basis
of jurisdiction if the crime is pursuant to an aut dedere aut judicare treaty, or, a
crime for which universal jurisdiction exists very clearly. If the Convention
Against Extrajudicial Killings comes to be, then no more argument need be had
about implementing a custodial jurisdictional trigger-neither under international
law, nor U.S. due process law. But if not, then it is drastically less likely Congress
will proscribe extrajudicial killings which occur outside its territorial, nationality,
and passive personality jurisdiction. This would not be fatal to a statute against
extrajudicial killings, as such a statute could still be written. However, a statute
that only applies to killings done in the U.S., or by or against U.S. citizens, would
have little value and would be redundant with the federal murder statutes the
United States already has enacted. As a result, this provision is of vital importance
if the United States wants to punish offenders over whom it has jurisdiction. If no
convention is drafted, Congress would either need to: abrogate its previous
position that it prefers not to legislate custodial universal jurisdiction crimes
without universality; implement an aut dedere aut judicare treaty, which could
raise due process concerns); or, rely on the fact that extrajudicial killings are
currently illegal under customary international law, and covered by universal
jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction exists for all states to proscribe certain kinds of crimes
that are so heinous and thus, of the concern of all states that they violate
"peremptory norms"-they are not acceptable for any reason in any culture.' 0"
Such crimes have been discussed, such as piracy, slavery, and perhaps terrorism.10 5
Also, it is commonly maintained that torture was already a universal jurisdiction
crime and violation of a peremptory norm before the CAT was written. CAT

101. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004)
(declining to apply alleged customary international law absent U.S. statute to effect that law).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
103. See id.
104. See Bassiouni, supranote 53, at 67.
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
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simply strengthened and outlined it.' 06 The question therefore remains, is a
prohibition on extrajudicial killings already a peremptory norm?
In practice, extrajudicial killings certainly seem to be roundly condemned by
the international community. Numerous international agreements and guiding
documents condemn arbitrary deprivations of life, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 6),107 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (article 3),08 the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man (article 1),109 the American Convention on Human Rights (article 4),o10 the

European Convention on Human Rights (article 2),' and the African Charter on
Human Rights and Peoples' Rights (article 4). 112 Thus, it appears that arbitrary
deprivations of life, at least, have been roundly condemned by human rights law
internationally, regionally, and for some time.
That an extrajudicial killing is a violation of norms of international law
appears to have also received some traction in U.S. law. The Alien Tort Statute
("ATS") may criminalize such acts, and its history is informative of this
As part of the original Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS reads: "The
proposition.
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."ll 4 The object appears to have been to provide remedies for breaches of
customary international law, particularly for foreign merchants who otherwise had
5
It was a largely unused statute for
no standing to sue Americans in U.S. courts.s"
7
6
In
nearly two hundred years,"' until 1980 in the case Fildrtiga v. Peila-Irala.1
that case, two Paraguayans sued a former police officer who tortured and killed a
relative of theirs."' 8 The Second Circuit held that Congress could give jurisdiction
for customary international law, a matter of federal concern, and that customary
international law now included a ban on torture by a government actor." 9 Notably,

106. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
(1982).
113.

ICCPR, supranote 21, art. 6.
UDHR, supranote 24, art. 3.
Rights of Man, supra note 24, art. 1.
ACHR, supra note 21, art. 4.
ECHR, supra note 21, art. 2.
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
See ATCA, supra note 79.

114. Id.

115. John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal:A Paquete HabanaApproach
to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231, 236 (2004).
116. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, InternationalImplicationsofthe Alien Tort
Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 609 (2004).
117. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
118. Id. at 876.
1l9. Id. at 880.
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the court held this before the CAT was in force, looking to sources such as the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, while cautioning that not every provision
in the declaration had ripened into a robust norm of customary international law.
Yet summary executions are among the limited class of violations of customary
international law that have been found actionable under the Alien Tort Statute.120
This is an extremely important finding to import from the civil arena to the
criminal one. If U.S. courts have already found that extrajudicial killings violate
customary international law for the purposes of being vulnerable to civil suit, this
strongly suggests a basis for universal criminalization of extrajudicial killings.
About a decade after the ATS was reinvigorated with this human rights
purpose, Congress elected to expand the reach of the statute by passing the Torture
Victim Protection Act ("TVPA").121 The TVPA is appended as a statutory note to
the ATS. It was enacted in 1992 to provide a cause of action in cases of officially
sanctioned torture and extrajudicial killing. 122 It states:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. 123
The Torture Victim Protection Act, unlike the ATS, is not a jurisdictional
statute.124 The purpose of the Act is to "work in conjunction with the [ATS],
expanding the [ATS's] reach to torts committed against United States citizens (not
just 'aliens') who, while in a foreign country, are victims of torture or 'extrajudicial killing."'l 25 Thus, this act demonstrates something very interesting. First,
Congress wished to extend protections for human rights suits from aliens to U.S.
citizens. But, only in limited cases-those of torture and extrajudicial killings.
These areas of governmental misconduct are of particular concern. As the seminal
case Kadic v. Karaci6 noted, certain violations of the law of nations are illegal
whether they are conducted by state actors or by private actors, including: piracy,
genocide, war crimes, or participation in the slave trade.126 However, this is not
true of torture and summary execution. Those two crimes can only be violations of

120. Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, and
JudicialRestraint, 25 B.U. NT'L L. J. 1, 5 (2007).
121. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as note
to 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
122. Id.
123. Id. at § 2(a), (b).
124. Kadic v. Karad2id, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995).
125. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at 3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
126. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
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international legal norms if public actors conduct them.127 Thus, we see that in
U.S. law there is already recognition of the shared nature of torture and
extrajudicial killings and that extrajudicial killings appear to grow naturally from,
and bear a strong relationship to, prohibitions on torture.
Nor has the United States only acknowledged ATS tort suits against singular
actors. In the case Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, plaintiffs brought suit
against Iran for sponsoring a terrorist attack against American service members
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").12 8 The FSIAl29 is the only
legal basis under which a lawsuit can be brought against a foreign sovereign in the
United States, and provides strict limitations.' 30 Under the FSIA terrorism
exception, sovereign immunity is waived when (1) a foreign state (2) committed
an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
or [provided] material support or resources for such an act if such act or
provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency,
(3) which "caused" (4) "personal injury or death" (5) for which "money damages
are sought."' 3 ' Again, an extrajudicial killing is appended to a U.S. statutory list or
impermissible international crimes. This time, still lumped with torture, it is
invoked with a "terrorism" exception.132 In Murphy, the plaintiffs alleged torture
and extrajudicial killing (as well as provision of material support to terrorists), but
the attack on a Marine Corps barracks to kill its inhabitants was not found to be
custodial torture, but rather an extrajudicial killing, using the definitions of the
TVPA.133 Even in the tort realm, the need for a distinct extrajudicial killing cause
of action, rather than overreliance on showing torture occurred, is demonstrated.
Thus, it seems there is some cause to believe that the view that persons should
not be arbitrarily deprived of life by their governments has emerged as a customary
law concept. There also seems to be a great deal of recognition in U.S. statutory
and case law that extrajudicial killings violate customary international law. In civil
suits, extrajudicial killings are prohibited alongside crimes based on peremptory
norms, for which universal jurisdiction exists.134 These U.S. statutes and cases

127. Id. at 243.
128. Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2010).
129. 28 U.S.C.A. §§1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611 (2006).
130. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2009).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006).
132. Indeed, until 2008, under 28 U.S.C. § 1605, states lacked immunity for any one of these
crimes even when not occurring in the context of state sponsored terrorism. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, PL 110-81, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3 (2008) (providing for a lack of
jurisdictional immunity in certain cases in which money damages were sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act).
133. Murphy, 740 F. Supp. at 70-71.
134. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 121, § 2(a), (b).
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strongly suggest that the U.S. has acknowledged the growth of international law to
define this specific crime. The existence of the Special Rapporteur in the area also
shows its recognized coalescence in the international arena. While it seems it
could successfully be argued that the crime exists and is sufficiently defined in
international law, it may still be in an early stage of recognition. A convention
against extrajudicial killings might serve to flesh out the concept, and make it a
peremptory norm for once and for all, as the CAT appears to have helped to do for
the crime of torture. Without that service, it may be difficult to definitively say
extrajudicial killings are covered by universal jurisdiction and proscribe the crime
in the United States. Nonetheless, this paper strongly argues that the norm has
emerged specifically enough for Congress to proscribe extrajudicial killings
without a treaty on a universality basis.
If no consensus or impetus for a convention can be reached, and Congress
decides to nonetheless move forward and enact a statute proscribing extrajudicial
killings, the United States will be writing a statute with a clean slate. Writing such
a statute without the basis of an aut dedere autjudicare treaty may lessen some
support for found-in jurisdiction, though as previously observed, the courts have
held that Congress nevertheless has the capacity to write such a law. Universality
should nonetheless be proficient for due process and prudentially concerns.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2340A is the U.S. statute that effectuates our obligation
under the CAT to criminalize acts of torture:
(a) Offense-Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction-There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in
subsection (a) if(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c) Conspiracy-A person who conspires to commit an offense under
this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty
of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.
Following the logic given above that the CAT pattern is being used to limit
controversy and run a well-worn path to punish a very related crime, it makes
sense to model the statute criminalizing extrajudicial killings by using similar
language and penalties. Even if the convention were not to be written, signed, or
ratified, the following statute could still be used as a pattern. The author proposes
the following statute criminalizing extrajudicial killing:
Chapter 113C of the U.S. Code should be renamed from "Torture" to
"Torture and Extrajudicial Killings." 18 U.S.C. § 2340D should be
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added after 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340A-C (the statute above, criminalizing
torture, and its supplementary provisions), and titled "Extrajudicial
killing":
(a) Offense-Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit an extrajudicial killing shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, and if death results
to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be
punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction-There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in
subsection (a) if(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c) Conspiracy-A person who conspires to commit an offense under
this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty
of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.
Similarly, this provision identifies that the United States will likely decline to
use territorial jurisdiction for the statute. While the U.S. position is certainly not
that torture is acceptable when it occurs inside the United States, there appears to
be great fear by American lawmakers that torture allegations will be used
incorrectly against law enforcement. That concern is not great enough in the eyes
of this author to have merited extraterritorial-only jurisdiction. It should be
removed from the crime of torture, and certainly should not be added to the crime
of extrajudicial killings.
This provision varies from language matching the U.S. statute criminalizing
torture by increasing the penalty to life for attempts of murder to death where the
killing occurs. For example, 18 U.S.C. § I11, the general federal murder statute,
provides that any person who commits first degree murder is subject to the death
penalty, and any person who commits second degree murder, being of a less
premeditated style, faces a maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The
federal attempted murder statute provides that attempted murder cannot be
punished by more than twenty years.135 These prohibitions also echo the torture
statute that carries a maximum punishment of twenty years, or the death penalty if
death results from the act. It seems the extrajudicial killing statute could easily
mimic both. However, the humble suggestion of this paper is that an extrajudicial
killing is a more severe crime than murder in the ordinary course because of the
betrayal by a public official, and more severe than torture because it is intended to
end the life of the person permanently. Thus, the formulation of the crime
recommended by this paper proposes a maximum of lifetime imprisonment for
attempt. Since extrajudicial killings are intended to cause a more significant
135. 18 U.S.C.§ 1113 (2006).
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harm-the death of the victim-a life punishment, as with other intentional
homicide crimes in the U.S. code where death does not result-particularly 18
U.S.C. § 956, conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals abroad-is appropriate.136
Many may debate the appropriateness of a death sentence as the death
sentence is increasingly unpopular worldwide, is increasingly scrutinized as a
whole by the highest court in the United States, and the federal death penalty has
been rarely recently used. Nonetheless, this punishment is in keeping with the
severity of punishment for similar crimes in the U.S. Code, and particularly, the
Supreme Court of the United States has always preserved the use of death penalty
for a successful, intentional homicide under U.S. law.' 37
The actual act of an extrajudicial killing must be carefully written, as was the
torture statute. In keeping with the plan to model the extrajudicial killings statute
on the torture statute, and house them together in the same portion of the United
States Code, the two definitions could appear together:
In 18 U.S.C. § 2340, "Definitions" paragraph (3) defining the term
"United States" should be renumbered to paragraph (4), and inserting a
new paragraph (3) defining extrajudicial killing:
As used in this chapter(1) "torture" means an act committed by a person acting under the color
of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control;
(2) "severe mental pain or suffering" means the prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration
or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality;
(3) "extrajudicial killing" means an act committed by a person acting
under color of law, or under the direction or control of a non-state

136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 956(a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (2006).
137. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,410 (2008) (striking down the death penalty for
rape of a child while explicitly stating that the court was not striking it down for a number of other
offenses).
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political group which exercises de facto control over the territory or
population in a territory in which the crime occurred, specifically
intended to end the life of another person, when that act is not incident
to lawful sanction, public necessity, self-defense or the defense of
others, or the law of armed conflict;
(4) "United States" means the several States of the United States, the
District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and
possessions of the United States.
The definition of extrajudicial killing, unlike the current statutory definition
of torture, includes our earlier observation that protections against extrajudicial
killing should be expanded when the victims are also harmed by political groups
with de facto political control over a territory or a population to which the victim
belongs. 13 8 The definition also includes our observations that the proscription of
extrajudicial killing includes some elusive considerations, such as the fact that law
enforcement, military, and other government officials are sometimes rightfully
permitted to intentionally take the life of a person on behalf of the state.
Importantly, the form of the proposed statute does not change depending on
whether there is a source convention or not. These features are legal and prudent
under domestic law either way, per the earlier conclusion about universality for the
emergent crime of extrajudicial killings.
This proposed statute is only the criminal statute for the crime of extrajudicial
killing. Many issues taken up in the larger Convention Against Torture include
considerations of civil liability and evidentiary constraints. Immigration law
issues, civil law issues, procedural and evidentiary legal issues are all significant
issues that are not discussed here, but should be carefully considered whether a
treaty is negotiated or it is undertaken to suppress extrajudicial killings as a nation.
One prosecutorial and practical issue related to this formulation is that it tries
to be expansive, and carve out those governmental killings that are permissible,
leaving the rest that are not criminalized. This approach is intended to avoid the
fate of the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances, which proscribes only
one technique and does not cover all kinds, or even many kinds, of illiberal
governmental abductions, kidnappings, and detentions. It would seem in reading
the text that each of these proper purposes must be proved not to have occurred,
which is difficult for a prosecutor. Yet in reality, other kinds of crimes deal with
this same problem by having the carve outs be considered affirmative defenses,
provable by the defendant if they apply.'39 For example, the federal murder statute
proscribes "unlawful killing" leaving the defenses of public authority or self138. In fact, in reforming the statute, drafters should consider expanding the potential violator in
torture as well, to cover these non-state actors. Although this paper is not so presumptuous as to do it
here, there seems no reason not to have symmetry between them in the code.
139. United States v. Santos-Rivera, 183 F.3d 367, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the wellestablished rule of criminal statutory construction that an exception set forth in a distinct clause or
provision should be construed as an affirmative defense and not as essential element of crime).
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defense to be alleged by the defendant.1 40 Likewise, considering the carve outs to
extrajudicial killings as affirmative defenses is an acceptable compromise to give
defendants fair notice of what is illegal while defining a crime in such a way as is
practical and useful to prosecutors.
Similarly, it may be questioned why the definition of extrajudicial killing
advocated by this paper is not directly lifted from the definition that already exists
in the TVPA. The TVPA, in defining extrajudicial killings and torture alongside
each other, provides:
(a) EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING-For the purposes of this Act, the
term "extrajudicial killing" means a deliberated killing not authorized
by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not
include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried
out under the authority of a foreign nation.
(b) TORTURE-For the purposes of this Act(1) the term "torture" means any act, directed against an
individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by
which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful
sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession,
punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for
any reason based on discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm
caused by or resulting from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or
the administration or application of mind altering

140. See 18 U.S.C.§ 1111(a) (2006).
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substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.141
The first consideration to remember is that the TVPA is civil and therefore its
purpose is different. A criminal statute needs to be careful on elements, careful to
give notice, and must properly consider the prosecutorial burden of evidence.
Defining a similar phenomenon differently for different purposes is not new in the
U.S. Code. For example, there are more than one dozen definitions of terrorism in
the U.S. code for various criminal, tortious, immigration, and other purposes.142
Looking to a comparison between the criminal torture statute, § 2340A, and
the definition of torture in the TVPA, they appear to be similar. But there are some
differences. The criminal statute makes clear that only "severe" mental pain and
suffering is enough to trigger prosecution. The criminal statute also omits
references to the exact purpose of the torture, hoping to broadly capture torture
crimes. Importantly, the civil definition of torture omits the element of an official
actor, although the requirement that the offender be acting under "color of law" in
order for the claim to be actionable is elsewhere in the TVPA.143
The civil extrajudicial killing definition captures a broader range of behavior
than the criminal statute may want to do. Based on the definition, the statute
places great emphasis on the requirement that the killing be authorized by
standards that are sufficiently civilized. It may not be desirable to try to litigate
cases criminally in which poorly functioning legal regimes gave death sentences
that did not meet international standards. The real specter is killings not that fall
short on due process, but that are clearly committed with an illiberal purpose.
While tackling both may be desirable, it is questionable whether raising judicial
standards in other countries is a suitable goal to pursue through the criminal law as
opposed to civil suit. This paper discussed whether sham processes and pre-textual
hearings should be prosecuted with this new crime of extrajudicial killings; that
question reappears in this context. However, if the criminal law is kept out of that
trickier area, then much of this statute falls away. The TVPA definition of
extrajudicial killing includes the catchall of what a state has authority to do under
international law. This is a fine caveat and not one that this article is opposed to
per se; it observes the same concern about wanting to define the crime broadly and
list the caveats instead.
Yet this caveat, sufficient for a civil statute, may simply not give criminal
defendants sufficient notice of what conduct is permissible. As a result, the
criminal statute could face void for vagueness challenges. It also might be difficult
to show prosecutors what to prove. By creating a list of more specific caveats, the
criminal statute is less broad and flexible to changes in international law and new,
unconsidered things, but more useful to prosecutors and fair to defendants.
141. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 121, § 3(b)(2)(A)-(D).
142. See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous FederalLegal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of
Too Many Grails,30 J. LEGIs. 249, 249-50 (2004).
143. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, supra note 121, § 2(a)(1).
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CONCLUSION

This article does not oppose taking more time to consider the complex issues
raised by the criminalization of extrajudicial killings. It does not oppose the
international community or lawmakers in the United States from taking time to
flush out the concept of what an extrajudicial killing is, and criminalizing it in a
way that does not rely on the philosophies and mechanisms that underlie the
Convention Against Torture. But it seems that the CAT, prized as it is for its
strong stance against illiberal states that violate human rights, omits a rather
serious practice that is relatively common the world over, and quite intimately
related to torture. Oppressive states, regimes, and de facto powers do not always
torture their victims and release them, leaving them as witnesses. Often, they kill
them outright, or torture and kill them-leaving very little evidence of the one
crime that could potentially be prosecuted. It seems strange that greater cruelty
could remove a human rights violator from international concern and therefore
from our jurisdiction. Even though torture is conceptually simpler and more
cohesive, more must be done to end impunity for human rights violators.
There is nothing wrong with taking more time to consider the nature of what
it is for the state, a state official, or a political organization to kill an individualand to determine which actions are legitimate and which are not. This article has
specifically sought to the limit the concept of what an extrajudicial killing is to
exclude killings that are governed by the law of armed conflict, executions that
pass through the judicial organs of the state, and killings that occur for public
safety reasons. Although the first and last should be dealt with by the discreet
bodies of law that govern them, the second concept, procedural fairness, is not so
easily dismissed. Many of the illiberal executions that occur in the transitional or
corrupted societies of the world do pass through some amount of judicial process
that clearly does not meet an even minimum standard of procedural fairness and
due process. Many of these murders are politically motivated. But, political
motivation should not be a factor. If there is a place in the world where officers of
the state have impunity to execute people for nonpolitical reasons, that impunity
should not continue.
This essay tries to address politically motivated murders that are essentially
the common completion of the act or torture, and fill what might be perceived to be
a rather large gap in our enforcement of criminal sanctions on torture. Yet, more
discussion is warranted. A treaty of the kind suggested here could successfully coopt the well-worn path of the Convention Against Torture, both its international
treaty and its statute as written in U.S. domestic law, to move non-controversially
to legislating against this emergent international crime. Hopefully by doing so, the
international community, or even the United States alone, can begin ending
impunity for illegitimate, state-sanctioned, and political murders.

THE U.S. V. THE RED CROSS: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
NOURA ERAKAT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the International Committee for the Red Cross ("ICRC" or
"Committee") embarked on a momentous project to document and codify
customary international humanitarian law.
Using a broad methodological
approach to the formation of customary international humanitarian law, the ICRC
concluded that there exist 161 rules applicable during international and noninternational armed conflict that are of customary nature. The Study presented a
challenge to the United States' enduring rejection of the applicability of certain
provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II. Those are the legal, and
multilateral, milestones that extended the protections of the laws of armed conflict
to non-state actors engaged in untraditional warfare.
Between the close of the Second World War and 1977, most wars were fought
either between non-state actors and states (i.e., wars of liberation) or within states
(i.e., civil war and unrest). The state-centric character of international law was illequipped to regulate this non-traditional combat. In response, states re-convened
between 1972 and 1973 to legislate new provisions to supplement the meager
lexicon governing non-international armed conflict afforded by the Geneva
Convention's Common Article 3. These advancements constitute the Additional
Protocols.
The ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian Law Study ("Study")
asserts that its documentation of state practice, coupled with obligations, which
states deem to be legally binding, form a corpus of customary law that arguably
challenges some of the U.S.'s outstanding protests. Published in 2005, amidst the
U.S.'s Global War on Terror-which promised to incapacitate an enemy lacking a
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national identity and national borders-the Study was received hostilely by the
U.S. Administration. State Department Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III and
Defense Department General Counsel William J. Haynes II admonished the
Study's findings, asserting that the ICRC's methodological approach to the
formation of customary international law lacked rigor and precision. The ICRC,
they argued, was excessively reliant on the verbal and written commitment of
states at the expense of their actual behavior. As such, an untold number of the
rules it identifies lack the binding character constitutive of customary law, and
international law more generally.
The discord between the U.S. and the ICRC reflects a methodological
divergence in approaches to the formation of customary international law.
Whereas traditional custom-reliant on state operational practice-represents the
law's descriptive accuracy, the modem approach- which looks to the trajectory of
the collective will of states-reflects its prescriptive appeal. The U.S. vividly
demonstrates this divergence in its examination of four customary rules proffered
by the ICRC. Among its illustrative case studies, the U.S. takes issue with Rule
157, that states have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts
over war crimes.
This paper shows that while the modern approach to custom is superior for
the determination of customary human rights and humanitarian law, the
methodological approach does not presuppose a particular outcome. To the
contrary, while the ICRC was correct to apply the modern approach in its Study, its
analysis, based upon its evidentiary findings, was imprecise. Therefore, its
conclusion, regarding the customary status of universal jurisdiction, is arguably
incorrect.
To demonstrate this case, the article uses the U.S.-ICRC debate as a backdrop
and begins by unpacking the U.S.'s critique of the ICRC's Study. It then briefly
explores the traditional and modem approaches to the formation of customary
international law. Next, it makes a normative argument for the application of the
modern approach to customary human rights and humanitarian law. The following
sections demonstrate how, even using the proper methodological approach, the
ICRC's analysis is partly flawed, thereby undermining the applicable scope of
universal jurisdiction to war crimes as asserted by Rule 157. The paper concludes
by drawing lessons, from this debate and case study, about the proper approach to
customary international humanitarian law.
II.

THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS

In 1995, the ICRC began a comprehensive study to examine those laws of war
applicable in international and non-international armed conflict.' The ICRC's
1. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Response to US
Comments, 89 INT'L. REv. RED CRoss 473 (2007) (noting that the Intergovernmental Group of Experts
for the Protection of War Victims recommended that the ICRC, in collaboration with experts in
international humanitarian law ("11-1L"), prepare a report on the customary rules of IHL applicable in
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purpose was two-fold: first, to identify those Geneva treaty provisions that are
binding on non-party states and territories, 2 and second, to supplement the meager
detail available for the regulation of non-international armed conflict.3 In its
Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw Study, completed over ten years and
reliant on research from more than fifty countries, and archives from nearly forty
recent armed conflicts, the ICRC identified 161 rules to be of customary nature.
The ICRC used a classic approach developed by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") to determine the existence of a general customary international
law.5 Customary international law generally requires the presence of two
elements, state practice and opiniojuris, or the belief that such practice is a legal
obligation, as opposed to one reflecting morality, reciprocity, courtesy, or
otherwise. 6 Accordingly, the ICRC relied both on verbal and physical acts of
states as constitutive of state practice so long as they represent official practice.
Though classical in its approach to establishing that a rule is of customary nature,
the ICRC did not require that opinio juris be demonstrated as a distinct and
separate element. Instead, it found that "more often than not, one and the same act
reflects practice and legal conviction."8 So long as the practice is sufficiently
dense, opiniojuris can be found within that practice and therefore its existence did
not need to be demonstrated separately.9 Significantly, the ICRC did not assert
that treaty ratification as a practice also represented legal conviction in what it
describes as a "cautious approach."' 0
In its response to the ICRC Study, the U.S. government took particular issue
with this methodological approach. While the U.S. acknowledged "the same
action may serve as evidence both of state practice and opinio juris," it insists

international and non-international armed conflict. The 26th International Conference of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent endorsed this recommendation in Geneva, which took place Dec. 3-7, 1995.).
2. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS ET AL., CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
VOLUME I: RULES xxxvi (2005) [hereinafter VOLUME 1].

3. Id. at xxxv ("Additional Protocol II usefully supplements Common Article 3, but it is still less
detailed than the rules governing international armed conflicts contained in Additional Protocol I.
Additional Protocol II contains a mere 15 substantive articles, whereas Additional Protocol I has more
than 80.").
4. Henckaerts, supra note 1, at 476-77.
5. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at xxxviii.
6. Id.
7. Id. at xxxix. For a detailed discussion of the ICRC's criteria for selecting relevant state
practice, see id. at xxxviii-xl.
8. Id. at xlvi.
9. Id.
10. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A Contribution
to the Understandingand Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L. REv. RED CROSS
175, 183 (2005) ("The study took the cautious approach that widespread ratification is only an
indication and has to be assessed in relation to other elements of practice, in particular the practice of
States not party to the treaty in question.").
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opinio juris cannot be inferred by practice but must be "assessed separately.""
The U.S.'s concerns reflect its cautionary approach to the relationship between
multilateral treaties and customary law.12 It chided the ICRC's approach, insisting
that opinio juris cannot be established by mere recitation of treaty provisions,
which may "as easily ... reflect policy considerations as legal considerations."' 3
The U.S. explains that to show that a rule is customary, the ICRC must be able to
prove that a state is legally obliged to observe a rule even in the absence of a
related treaty.14 The ICRC, however, did not consider a widely ratified treaty as
definitive but instead only as indicative of custom in the context of broader state
practice.
In regards to assessing practice, the U.S. government accepted the ICRC's
methodological approach but found the humanitarian organization's application
insufficiently rigorous. The U.S. argued that the ICRC did not establish sufficient
density of practice in many cases;' 5 that it gave undue weight to the statements of
non-governmental organizations;16 that it failed to give more weight to negative
practice in several cases; and that it erroneously relied upon state documents and
proclamations, namely upon military manuals and non-binding general assembly
resolutions.' 7 The government argues that while these materials may serve as an
indicator of opiniojuris, they cannot replace the veracity of operational practice.' 8
Finally, the U.S. admonished the ICRC for equating the state practice of specially
affected states with that of relatively lesser-affected states.' 9
Relying heavily upon the ICJ's decision in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in andAgainst Nicaragua,20 and North Sea ContinentalShelf,~2' the ICRC
agreed with the U.S. that the quantity of states is less relevant than their qualitative
value. Accordingly, the quantitative support for a rule is less significant in the case
where all specially affected states offered support. In cases where specially
affected states opposed a provision, the quantitative value of state support is

11. John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A U.S. Government Response to the
International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT'L.
REv. RED CROSS 443,446 (2007).
12. Id. (noting that at the time of drafting, the Additional Protocols reflected far-reaching
principles that reflected the aspiration of states and not what they believed to be a legal obligation
captured in international customary law).
13. Id. at 447.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 444.
16. Id. at 445.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The specially affected state doctrine reflects a principle derived from North Sea
Continental Shelf which held that practice "must include that of states whose interests are specially
affected." North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, I 73 (Feb. 20).
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
21. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger./Neth.), 1969 1.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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arguably inconsequential.22 Still, the ICRC held that in the realm of warfare, all
states have an interest in humanitarian provisions and therefore their practice must
also be given due weight, thereby diminishing the role of specially affected states
in the determination of customary international humanitarian law. 23
The ICRC also held that state practice must be sufficiently similar among
states, but not necessarily identical. The Committee found that contrary practice
did not undermine the existence of a customary rule so long as other states
condemned the practice or the government itself denied it, thereby negating its
official nature. Significantly, the ICRC afforded great weight to verbal state
practice even in the face of repeated violations. In the case that a state wished to
change an existing rule of customary international law, it would "have to do so
through [its] official practice and claim to be acting as of right." 24
Where the ICRC insisted on general adherence and practice to reflect a rule's
customary nature, the U.S. insists upon detail and specificity. Even in the
formulation of its rules, the U.S. notes that the ICRC failed to state rules with
sufficient precision to reflect state practice and treaty obligations.25 The U.S.'s
stringent standards reflect a traditional approach to the formation of customary law
wherein, absent treaty law, binding rules are based on actual, not verbal, state
practice, and demonstrable opinion juris.26 In contrast, the ICRC accepts that a
legal principle can become customary when it achieves general support from the
international community as a collective whole. Like the holding in Nicaragua,it
assumes that state behavior conforms with custom and that non-conformity reflects
a breach rather than a seed for a new rule.27 The methodological divergence
evidenced by the U.S. and the ICRC reflects the two schools of thought underlying
the formation of customary international law: traditional and modern.

22. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at xliv ("[l]f 'specially affected States' do not accept the practice, it
cannot mature into a rule of customary international law, even though unanimity is not required as
explained.").
23. Id. at xlv.
24. Id. at xliv.
25. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 447 ("Thus, many rules are stated in a way that renders
them overbroad or unconditional, even though State practice and treaty language on the issue reflect
different, and sometimes substantially narrower, propositions.").
26. Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REv.
665, 667 (1986) ("Political scientists of the 'realist school' have expressed similar conclusions: power
and national interest, not law, determine government conduct. For the most part, the writings of recent
Secretaries of State, as well as international relations theorists and political scientists, ignore the subject
altogether. International law is thus relegated to the dustbin of idealism.").
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
186 (June 27).
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III. APPROACHES TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: TRADITIONAL AND
MODERN

International law's three primary sources are treaties, customary law, and
general principles of international law. 28 The establishment of customary, or tacit
consent, 29 is based on two elements: practice and opiniojuris.3 The philosophical
underpinnings of the two approaches to identifying whether a principle has
achieved customary status reflect the emphasis placed on each and/or both of these
elements.
A. TraditionalCustom
The two schools of thought, traditional and modern, respectively align with
law's descriptive accuracy and its prescriptive appeal.32 Traditional custom
emphasizes state practice and is driven by the law's descriptive accuracy.
Descriptive law generally describes what the law is or has been. It supposedly
corresponds to reality and therefore, is the content of international law.33 It can be
appealing in international law, where a hierarchal enforcement system is
underdeveloped at best or unavailable at worst. 34 Descriptive law represents a
deductive method to identify customary law, meaning that the law must be inferred
from examples of practice and facts alone.35 Emphasizing the evidentiary
significance of state practice, adherents argue that the international community
intended that custom reflect practice, and not that practice reflect custom. 36 This
formulation assumes that the practice of states is to be considered as an aggregate.
Accordingly, practice should perfectly reflect existing customary law as well as
any shifts it may undergo.
Resultant from the emphasis on state practice, traditional custom develops
slowly.3 It requires courts to ascertain custom by examining many years of state
practice and to find that a rule becomes customary international law when it

28. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 3 T.I.A.S.
[hereinafter "Statute ICJ"].
29. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 78 (B61a Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
Liberty Fund 2008).
30. Statute ICJ, supra note 28, art. 38(1)(b) (defining "international custom, as evidence
general principle accepted as law').
31. BIRGIT SCHLOTrER, DEvELOPMENTs INCUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY

1179
eds.,
of a
AND

THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL AD HOC CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA 36-37 (2010).

32. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditionaland Modem Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758 (2001).
33. Id. at 762.
34. Id.
35. SCHLOTTER, supra note 31, at 16.
36. Trimble, supra note 26, at 709.
37. Id. at 711.
38. Roberts, supra note 32, at 759; see also Katherine N. Guernsey, The North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 141, 143 (2000).
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reflects both uniform state practice over a long period of time, as well as a
conscious acceptance among states that the practice reflects a principle of law.39
Traditionalists therefore, consider treaty law to be more legitimate and
binding than newly-minted or controversial customary rules. 40 This school of
thought has found support among scholars and jurists alike. 4 1 Among said
supporters is Sir Robert Jennings who diverged from his colleagues in deciding
Nicaragua. He took issue with the validity of the ICJ's jurisdiction, which he
argued could not exist in the face of a U.S. multilateral treaty reservation.
Jennings disagreed that customary international law could be applied in lieu of the
relevant treaties where it could not be demonstrated that the treaty either codified
existing customary law or alternatively, that the treaty had given rise to a new
rule.42
This approach conceives of states as active lawmakers who bind themselves
only by explicit consent in ways that do not impede their sovereignty.43 The
Permanent Court of International Justice's decision in The Case of S.S. Lotus
captured this sentiment well when it held:
International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a
view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions on the
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed."
This passage in Lotus arguably stands for the proposition that international
law is regulative and not constitutive of state rights. 45 Coupled with a later passage
39. See Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in
DeterminingPrinciplesofinternationalLaw in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876, 877 (1983);
Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist
Attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 147 (2003).
40. Trimble, supra note 26, at 669 (noting that treaty and customary law are not equally
authoritative and that "the relevance and true role of international law in the world, lies in national
political traditions and structures that support the domestic implementation of the two types of
international law.").
41. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individualsfor Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 301, 303-04 (1999) ("[S]tates create
international norms by reaching consent on the content of a rule. If a state later changes its mind, there
must be another-this time nonconsensual-rule that prevents the state from unilaterally withdrawing
its consent.").
42. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
530 (June 27) ("I am unable, however, to agree with the Court's persuasion that, whilst accepting the
pertinence of the reservation, it can, nevertheless, decide on the Nicaraguan Application by applying
general customary law, as it were in lieu of recourse to the relevant multilateral treaties."). The U.N.
Charter neither codified existing law nor did it, in the intervening years, generate a new rule.
43. Trimble, supra note 26, at 667-68.
44. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 1 44 (Sept. 7).
45. See Luc REYDAMs, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL

PERSPECTIVES 13 (2003).
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in Lotus, 46 it also suggests that a state's rights cannot be circumscribed unless there
exists a customary prohibition on such right.47 These propositions however do not
distinguish modernists from traditionalists as there is no formulation of customary
law that presumes consent on the part of states. 48 The distinction between modem
and traditional custom is not found here but rather in the methods used to identify
custom and the sources upon which commentators can rely.
Due to its insistence on the preeminence of operational state practice, at its
extreme, traditional custom risks standing in as an apology for state behavior
because it accepts principles as legally binding insofar as they reflect the national
interests of states. 49 It is an undemocratic proposition because it suggests that only
those states with the means to act can shape binding and applicable law. At its
core, this violates the premise that states are as equal to one another as are the
persons within each of those states to one another. As opposed to those who
believe that "[a] dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a
sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom,"50 traditionalists advocate that
power indeed produces difference.
B. Modern Custom
If it can be crudely summarized that traditionalists are committed to state
sovereignty, then it can be similarly summarized that modernists are committed to
human rights because of their emphasis on the equality of states and the law's
normative thrust.5' Modern custom espouses the theoretical equality of states and
therefore accepts the notion that each state equally contributes to the formation of
international law regardless of its available means and resources. Like their
traditional counterparts, modernists acknowledge the limitations inherent to an
international community lacking a compulsory adjudication system, but argue that
the necessary treatment for said lack is to be derived from procedural norms. 52
Modern custom insists that the legitimating force of customary law flows from a
commitment to democratic process.5 3

46. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 49 (Sept. 7).
47. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (Van
Der Wyngaert, J., dissenting).
48. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
T 269 ("[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State
concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited .
49. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL., 335, 335 (2000) ("Either international law has been too far from politics and must move closer to
become effective, or it has become dangerously intermingled with politics and must assert its autonomy
to remain potent.").
50. VATrEL, supra note 29, at 75.
51. Roberts, supra note 32, at 762-63.
52. Id. at 762.
53. Id. ("Legal rules are more likely to engender respect in a decentralized system, possibly even
when the outcome is less favorable, if they result from a process perceived as legitimate.").
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As such, the modem approach emphasizes opiniojuris, to which all states can
contribute equally regardless of their disparate power. It relies on a deductive
approach that accepts that legal norms can be derived from general propositions
absent actual facts and practice. 54 This includes reliance upon the attitudes of
states found in multilateral treaties, general assembly resolutions, and state
declarations.
Unlike traditionalists who rely on a more precise approach,56
modernists derive opiniojuris from general practice, or previous determinations of
the ICJ, or other international tribunals.s5
Due to the accessibility of such statements and the speed with which
consensus can be established or a precedent deduced, modem custom can also
develop quickly and, even, instantly.58 As put by Professor Theodor Meron, "[t]he
modem approach . . . relies principally on loosely defined opinio juris and/or
inference from the widespread ratification of treaties or support for resolutions and
other 'soft law' instruments; thus, it is more flexible and open to the relatively
rapid acceptance of new norms."5 9 Taken to its extreme, the modem approach is
divorced from reality for it lacks an immediate connection to state behavior, will,
or interest.6 0
IV.

THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR THE MODERN APPROACH TO CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Notwithstanding the potential shortcomings inherent to each approach, the
modem approach to custom is superior in evaluating international human rights
and humanitarian law due to their specialized nature, the character of an
international society as a collective whole, and the unreliability of operational state
practice. Each of these observations implicates the formation of customary
international humanitarian law. Consider first that human rights and humanitarian
law are universal in scope and constitute non-reciprocal rights. These
characteristics distinguish humanitarian and human rights treaty provisions from
discrete contractual rights, and they should therefore be evaluated with greater
flexibility. Additionally, in the face of rapid globalization, it is anachronistic and
inaccurate to accept that the international community is no more than the aggregate
54. Id. at 763.
55. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
175 (June 27) ("The Court does not consider that ... it can be claimed that all the customary rules
which may be invoked have a content exactly identical to that of the rules contained in the treaties
which cannot be applied by virtue of the United States reservation.").
56. LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (7th ed. 2008) (describing the
establishment of opinio juris by showing "positive evidence of the recognition of the validity of the
rules in question in the practice of states").
57. Id. at 8-9.
58. See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International
Customary Law? 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 35-40 (1965).
59. Theodor Meron, Revival of CustomaryHumanitarianLaw, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 817, 817 (2005);
see generally Langille, supra note 39.
60. Kennedy, supra note 49, at 102, as quoted in Roberts, supra note 32 at 767 (explaining that
international law "has been too far from politics and must move closer to become effective. . . .").
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of approximately two hundred states. Instead, as it concerns human rights and
humanitarian law in particular, international society must be evaluated as a
collective whole, wherein all states are affected by human rights and humanitarian
law violations. Accordingly, this diminishes the value of specially affected states
in the assessment of customary international humanitarian law. Finally, a strict
reliance on operational state practice in armed conflict neither reflects the law as it
is, has been, or should be. As such, the words of states as well as what can be
deduced from their support of "soft law" instruments should be afforded more
weight in the formation of customary international humanitarian law.
Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw Constitute SpecializedRegimes
that can be Interpretedwith GreaterFlexibility

A.

Human rights and humanitarian law constitute a specialized regime, or what is
often referred to as a self-contained regime. The Permanent Court of International
Justice coined the term of art in its adjudication of S.S. Wimbledon.61 There, the
court applied this concept in order to resolve a matter of treaty interpretation
concerning the relationship between "two sets of primary international
In its 2006 Study, "Fragmentation of International Law:
obligations." 62
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,"
the International Law Commission ("ILC") found that such specialized treaty
regimes are not exceptional. Rather they constitute a series of systems and subsystems that resolve conflicts differently than would general international law.
Citing the ICJ's decision in Nicaragua,the ILC explains that within a specialized
regime, a state may only resort to remedies made available within their own regime
of accountability "that [make] other ways of reaction inappropriate." 63
1.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Represent Non-Reciprocal
and Universal Interests

Significantly, human rights treaties do not create reciprocal obligations
between state parties but instead create obligations between states and individuals
to whom they owe a duty.64 More generally, human rights obligations serve an

61. S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, 32 (Aug. 17).
62. Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in
InternationalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483, 491 (2006).
63. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug.
11, 2006, 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006).
64. Bayak Cali, Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation:Human Rights, in THE OXFORD GUIDE
To TREATIES, 524-48 (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012). But see Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 527.
("While human rights have an objective, public-law-like, perhaps even constitutional, character,
technically, they nonetheless formally remain 'reciprocal engagements between contracting States.' It is
crucial to distinguish between reciprocity as a formal characteristic of a norm on the one hand, and
reciprocity as a substantive do-ut-des relationship on the other. Human rights treaties do not involve
such a substantive exchange, since their ultimate beneficiaries are individuals under the jurisdiction of
the state undertaking the obligation. However, since human rights remain 'mutual, bilateral
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interconnected network, which benefits from its collective enforcement." The
treaty context also carves out a specialized treatment of human rights and
humanitarian law. While Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("VCLT") states that a material breach of a treaty will be grounds for
another party to suspend its compliance with the treaty in whole or in part,
subsection 5 makes clear that this does not apply to provisions relating to the
protection of human persons "contained in treaties of a humanitarian character." 66
The VCLT, which otherwise applies trans-substantively, asserts that failure by one
party to observe humanitarian treaty provisions, in particular, does not release
another party from observing its duties.
Specialization, however, does not isolate a treaty regime from general
international law. Just as "[s]ocial systems cannot exist in splendid isolation from
their environment," specialized regimes share a relationship with general
international law at least at the level of interpretation.68 In its decision concerning
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the ICJ endorsed this position and added that the universal character of,
and the extensive participation in establishing, multilateral treaties gives rise to
"greater flexibility in the international practice concerning multilateral
conventions."69 Therefore, the principles of a Convention can be binding on states
even without a conventional obligation since its purpose is purely humanizing and
civilizing and no single state incurs any advantages or disadvantages by being a
party to it. Instead, all states share a common interest in compliance. 70
2.

A Human Rights or Humanitarian Treaty Provision Can Develop
Quickly and Need Not 'Harden'

The specialized regime governing human rights and humanitarian law
together with their universal and non-reciprocal character informs how relevant
treaty provisions should be interpreted. While a contractual treaty provision, of
bilateral character, should harden into customary law, the generalizable nature of
human rights and humanitarian law need not crystallize to be binding upon all
other states. Accordingly, custom can develop over a short period of time and

undertakings' owed to the other state parties to the respective convention, there is no compelling
systematic reason why states should be precluded from bilateral enforcement of human rights.").
65. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 527 ("Unlike international treaties of the classical kind,
the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It
creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the
words of the Preamble, benefit from a 'collective enforcement."' (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 239 (1978)).
66. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
67. Id. art. 58.
68. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 62, at 492.
69. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28).
70. Id. at 23.
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opinio juris can be inferred from state practice so long as such practice is
sufficiently dense.
Oppenheim's proposition that a treaty must either be a derogation, or an
affirmation, of underlying custom suggests that a treaty provision cannot become
custom until it "hardens." 7 1 This view reflects the notion that treaties are contracts
and all contracts must be restrictively evaluated.72 The restrictive view, however,
confuses the provisions that can be generalized and that are intended to be
universally applicable with strict entitlement rights. Whereas reciprocal rights
between two or more states reflect particular interests that should be evaluated like
contractual terms, a universal right can be more flexibly evaluated. Significantly,
at the time of writing, Oppenheim commented that it is not clear whether or not
slavery was acceptable. Shortly thereafter, the ILC found that the prohibition on
the slave trade was 'one of the most obvious and best settled rules of jus cogens'
in that even new treaties could not derogate from it,"73 thereby casting doubt on
such a restrictive approach to the determination of customary humanitarian law.
The ICJ in North Sea adopted the restrictive approach where it stated that
state support for a treaty provision does not satisfy opinio juris, which must be
demonstrated separately in order to affirm a principle's existence as customary
law. The problem is that this does not accurately apply to human rights and
humanitarian law. Professor Anthony D'Amato points out that the article in
question in North Sea represents the right to a specific title, and therefore, as noted
by the ICJ, cannot be altered by implicit consent. 74 In contrast, those rights that are
generalizable are intended to reach beyond their parties and can apply to them
almost instantly.
Professor Jonathan Chamey agrees that while technical and narrow treaty
provisions may not be applicable to third parties, the same is not true for those
generalizable rules regarding human rights obligations. 76 Charney echoes
D'Amato's concern that a specific rule, one that "requires highly technical
methods of implementation . . . [and] require[s] the specificity of an international

agreement, as contrasted with more generalized obligations that are possible to
implement as custom" is less likely to give rise to a customary law.77 In the case
that a rule could not be established absent an international institution or treaty, it is

71. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1110,1132 (1982).
72. Id. ("This is more a statement of a conclusion than a reason, a conclusion that follows from
equating treaties with contracts and then taking a restrictive view of contracts.").
73. Id. at 1133.
74. Id.at 1143.
75. Id. at 1144.
76. Jonathan Chamey, InternationalAgreements and the Development of Customary International
Law, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 983 (1986) ("[I]t is difficult to merge a generalized principle. . . into
international law without the . .. detail that must be negotiated individually. The same is not true for
most of the Vienna Convention's rules relating to international agreements; nor . . . in the case of
human rights obligations.").
77. Id.
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not eligible to become a customary law.
In contrast, "[a]n agreement which
addresses generalized interests and aspirations of the international community may
be more likely to produce new law than an agreement which focuses on specific
state interests.
The notion that generalizable interests may represent aspirations common to
the international community is resonant with the Joint Separate Opinion in the
ICJ's 2002 Arrest Warrant decision ("Joint Separate Opinion").80 There, the ICJ
deliberated whether the Democratic Republic of the Congo's incumbent foreign
affairs minister was immune from prosecution under Belgium's universal
jurisdiction statute from war crimes and crimes against humanity. Without
discussing the legality of universal jurisdiction, the Court found the minister
immune under customary international law. Justices Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal took issue with the Court's scope of inquiry and held that it could not
deliberate the application of immunity without determining whether or not
Belgium had a right to exercise universal jurisdiction. In their Joint Separate
Opinion they found that there indeed exists such a right, as indicated by a trend to
prosecute those offenses that are universally offensive.
The three Justices emphasized that human rights are of general and global
concern. Since they represent interests that are not specific to any state, the
recognition of human rights as customary law is a palatable trend. Consider their
discussion on multilateral treaties:
The series of multilateral treaties with their special jurisdictional
provisions reflect a determination by the international community that
those engaged in war crimes, hijacking, hostage taking, torture should
not go unpunished. Although crimes against humanity are not yet the
object of a distinct convention, a comparable international indignation at
such acts is not to be doubted. 82
The Justices infer from the series of multilateral treaties a particular trend that
bends towards the arc of justice. This leads them to conclude that similar
indignation cannot be doubted where crimes of humanity are concerned
notwithstanding the lack of a treaty articulating such consensual repugnance.
Justice Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buerguenthal recognize that this is not a
unilateral trend, but rather one that reflects a balancing of interests in consideration
of other general international law.8 3 They write that while there is a discernible
78. Id. ("Furthermore, if international institutions are required to be used or established,
customary law is inappropriate.").
79. Id.
80. See Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 837 (Feb. 14)
(Higgins J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
81. Id.151.
82. Id.
83. Id. 75 ("These trends reflect a balancing of interests. On the one scale, we find the interest of
the community of mankind to prevent and stop impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes against its
members; on the other, there is the interest of the community of States to allow them to act freely on the
inter-State level without unwarranted interference.").
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global trend that rejects immunity for human rights violators, "the law of privileges
and immunities . . . retains its importance since immunities are granted to high

state officials to guarantee the proper functioning of the network of mutual interstate relations, which is of paramount importance for a well-ordered and
harmonious international system."8
Even in their final analysis, however, the Justices do not distinguish between
sovereignty and human rights. Instead, they ascribe value to sovereignty insofar as
it promotes international harmony and stability, thus suggesting that political
actors, including states, should celebrate, rather than shun, the law's prescriptive
force. Accordingly, treaty provisions, which represent generalizable interests, like
humanitarian and human rights provisions do, need not harden into custom over a
long period of time. Relatedly, opiniojuriscan be inferred from sufficiently dense
state practice when establishing the existence of a customary international
humanitarian law.
B.

InternationalSociety is a Collective Whole, Not a Sum ofIts Parts,
Thereby Diminishingthe Significance ofSpecially Affected States upon
the Formation of Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw

International society is a collective whole as opposed to a sum of its parts.
The community of nations, or the whole, has particular concerns distinct from each
of its states, or its individual parts. This is particularly true as it concerns matters,
like humanitarian ones, that constitute common interests. The manner in which a
war is fought and regulated is of concern to all nations individually and
collectively, regardless of direct participation. A state's non-participation in armed
conflict does not diminish its potential participation in one in the near or long-term
future. Accordingly, while some states may have more experience with armed
conflict or human rights challenges, this does not make them "specially affected"
insofar as the formation of custom is concerned. This significantly diminishes the
consideration of specially affected states in the formation of customary
international humanitarian law and heightens the value of soft-law considerations.
1. The World is an Aggregate Whole and Not a Sum of its Parts
At the turn of the nineteenth century, it may have been sound to conceive of
the international community as the aggregate of its many states. Then, those
existent states amounted to a little more than forty in number.85 Their underdeveloped collective identity reflected their nascent form.86 Less sophisticated
forms of technology limited the ability to communicate rapidly. In light of these
historic circumstances, it is reasonable to think that their unspoken consensus
84. Id.
85. See PHILLIP MARTIN, EcONOMIC INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION: THE MEXICO-U.S. CASE 3

(2003), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/2003
/en_GB/dp2003-35/ ("There were 190 recognized nation-states in 2000, up from 43 in 1900, and each
has a system of passports to distinguish citizens from foreigners, border controls to inspect persons who
want to enter, and policies that affect the settlement and integration of noncitizens.").
86. Id.
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would develop as the result of strict observance to aggregated state practice over a
long period of time.
However, those few nations have grown to number nearly two hundred states
in the twenty-first century.87 New states have entered the community of nations
accepting, as a matter of precondition, those customary rules upheld by the
palpable collective body.8 8 Technology in the twenty-first century has made
instantaneous communication possible, not just between heads of state, but among
Rapid
and between individual units comprising the global population.
capital,
and
communication has not only facilitated the flow of ideas but goods,
90
89
labor as well. Globalization has birthed global markets, global environmental
conditions, 91 global public health concerns, 92 and in so doing has established a
collective form. The impact of rapid news sharing, together with the collective
form of international society, makes practice less controlling and the possibility for
rapid formation of customary law more possible. Communication technology has
enabled an expedited consensus-formation process. Rapid communicationtogether with a collective international society-have developed the capacity to
espouse a global attitude without having to patiently witness the evolutionary
process reflect those preferences. 93
The lack of a hierarchal order with effective executive powers does not
diminish international society's collective character. 94 To the contrary, even
powerful states, that presumably prefer diplomacy to law, depend on the order
afforded by law.95 The extent to which states desire law and "[t]he amount and
kind of law which the international community will achieve will depend, of course,
on the degree of homogeneity of the political system and the degree of common or

87. Id.
88. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY R. 136, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.15

(1985), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/adms.shtml ("If the Security Council
recommends the applicant State for membership, the General Assembly shall consider whether the
applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the
Charter and shall decide, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, upon its
application for membership.").
89. See Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of
Imposition and Appropriation,51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 475, 548 (2010).
90. See AKIRA IRiYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 18 (2002).

91. Id. at 177-79.
92. See STEFAN ELBE, SECURITY AND GLOBAL HEALTH: TOWARD THE MEDICALIZATION OF
INSECURITY 30 (2010).
93. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 12-13 (2d ed. 1979). I

borrow the term "attitude" from Louis Henkin, who acknowledges its existence and uses it throughout
his treatise.
94. Id. at 24 ("In a society of sovereign states, in the absence of an effective legislature
representing all competing interests and able to accommodate them, nations must be free to pursue their
interests, to work out reasonable accommodations with other. What is called for is the flexibility of
diplomacy, not the straitjacket of law.").
95. Id. at 15 (noting the law formalizes relationships between states, regulates them, and predicts
the consequences of their behavior).
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reciprocal interest."96 Such integrated concerns are most pronounced in regard to
human rights and humanitarian law because of their non-reciprocal nature.
Consider that adherence to law of a normative character often works to enhance
the collective benefit of all states without detriment to any single state.
The Higgins-Kooijmans-Buergenthal Joint Separate Opinion in Arrest
Warrant articulated this when it noted that certain states can act as "agents for the
international community" to prosecute those offenses that are "damaging to the
interests of all."97 Significantly, the Justices note, this is a "vertical notion of the
authority of action," which "is significantly different from the horizontal system of
international law envisaged in the Lotus case."9
Accordingly, international
society shares certain humanitarian values and interests as a collective whole,
distinct from the interest from any one state, or group of states.
2.

The Significance of Specially Affected States is Diminished in the
Assessment of Customary International Humanitarian Law

International society's collective character diminishes the impact of any one
state upon the formation of customary international humanitarian law. Instead, its
position towards humanitarian provisions can be evaluated as a psychological
element among states, regardless of their practice. The ICJ articulated the concept
of specially affected states in its North Sea ContinentalShelfdecision." North Sea
reflects the textbook approach to establishing whether or not a treaty provision
reflects, or gives rise, to customary law. The Restatement Third summarizes North
Sea as saying that "a treaty rule might become 'a general rule of international law'
if there were 'a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
. . . provided it includes that of states whose interests were particularly
affected."' 00 However, there, the ICJ addressed a specific right to entitlement as it
concerned a geographical coast specific to only three parties.' 0 No other state has
the potential to share that specific interest.
In contrast, even those states that are not engaged in armed conflict have the
potential to become involved in such conflict in the short or long-term future.
Although humanitarian law specially affects all states, the doctrine remains
relevant. As acknowledged by the ICRC, a state's persistent objection to a

96.
97.
(Higgins
98.
99.

Id. at 30.
Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, I 51, 61 (Feb. 14)
J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J., dissenting).
Id.151.
North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74 (Feb. 20).

100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S.

§

102 (1997); see also

Craig L. Carr and Gary L. Scott, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary International
Law, 25 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71, 72 (1996) (reformulating this concept and suggesting a threepronged model for the determination of whether a treaty provision has attained customary status. The
authors proffer that a generalizable treaty provision evident in multilateral treaties can attain customary
status if there are (1) a sufficient number of states engaged in the practice; (2) that those states most
affected by the practice are among them; and (3) that the treaty provision is not subject to reservations.).
101. North Sea Continental Shelf (Den./Ger.Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 5-6 (Feb. 20).
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developing norm that specifically affects them can frustrate the crystallization of
such a norm.' 02 Otherwise, the attitude of all states is considerably influential.
North Sea also stood for the proposition that in the absence of protest, a
practice becomes binding customary law so long as it is evidenced by uniformity
among states and acceptance that it is binding upon third states.,0 3 Even though it
was not certain whether the "acquiescence stemmed from a consciousness of a
clear legal duty-as distinguished from a recognition of the reasonableness of the
claim made,"'" the ICJ considered that the lack of protest among states constituted
meaningful opiniojuris. Accordingly, practice is not just found in the practice of
states, but also in their attitudinal response to the behavior of other states.
Moreover, the degree of uniformity in practice need only be general and not
exact. North Sea draws upon the Court's Asylum case to make this claim. 05 In
Asylum, the ICJ rejected Colombia's argument that the Montevideo Convention of
1933 on Political Asylum codified existing custom for several reasons, including
the fact that general uniformity could not be demonstrated among the Latin
American states. 0 6 Notably, the ICJ in Asylum distinguished universal adherence
to a rule from general uniformity in practice. 07 J.L. Brierly also captures this
where he expounds that with regard to the uniformity of practice, the difference "is
not one between uncertainty and certainty in formulation, but merely between a
greater and a less degree of uncertainty."' 0 8
Stated differently, state practice by a handful of powerful states does not
necessarily trump the will of international society. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, former
member of the ILC, and ICJ jurist, cautioned against such excessive deference to
the practice and will of states because the force of international law is "grounded in
a factor superior to and independent of the will of states-a factor which gives
validity to the law created by the will of states. That superior source is the
102. Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the FinalFrontier: The Law of War in Space, 48
A.F. L. REv. 1, 69 (2000); see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary InternationalHumanitarian
Law: Taking Stock of the ICRC Study, 78 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 435, 449 (2010).
103. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1970).
104. Id.
105. Id. ("The Party which relies on a custom . . . must prove that this custom is established in such
a manner that it has become binding on the other Party . . . that the rule invoked . . is in accordance
with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that this usage is the
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial
State.").
106. Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (noting that other reasons
included the limited number of states that endorsed the Convention and the fact that the Convention in
question merely modified an earlier Convention).
107. Id. ("The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so much uncertainty and
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the
official views expressed on various occasions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid
succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice
has been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the various cases, that it is not
possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with regard to the
alleged rule of unilateral and definitive qualification of the offense.").
108. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 62 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 1963).

242

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 41: 2

objective fact of the existence of an interdependent community of states."l 09 Oscar
Schachter adds that if commitment to descriptive law is taken to its extreme,
powerful states would have unfettered latitude to define the rules for themselves
risking acceptance of international society as an '"anarchical order of power' in
which might makes right,""t0 thereby rendering meaningless the preferences of the
collective whole.
In their 1999 address to the American Society of International Law, Bruno
Simma and Andreas L. Paulus attempt to reconcile the traditional approach with
the normative underpinnings of human rights. They argue that adherents to law's
descriptive accuracy acknowledge that there are substantive limits on the influence
of power alone because excessive discretion risks the loss of political authority,
and consequently, political influence."' Moreover, they posit that as other actors
assume greater importance in shaping international norms, the exclusivity afforded
to the will of states in norm creation will conversely shrink.112 Simma and Paulus
acknowledge the potential of the law's transformative force, so long as the claim is
not surrendered to "normativity and the prescriptive force of law.""' Such
surrender is not possible given that state attitudes, even as a collective whole,
reflect a balancing of state interests that is not subsumed by normative values.
Therefore, the value of specially affected states is diminished, and the value of
soft-law instruments is heightened in the formation of customary international
humanitarian law.
C.

OperationalPracticeis an UnreliableSource of Customary
InternationalHumanitarianLaw

In its response to the ICRC, the U.S. argues that nothing can outweigh actual
state practice in the assessment of customary international law.1 4 It contends that
its own military manuals, which the ICRC had cited as evidence of international
custom, neither reflect opinio juris"i5 nor state practicell 6 because they represent a
mix of policy and law. However, strict operational state practice is an unreliable
source of customary law for at least two reasons. First, operational practices are
neither widely available nor plainly known. Second, in cases where a global value
is at stake, consistent practice alone cannot undermine a rule's customary nature.
109. LAUTERPACHT, supranote 103, at 58.
110. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
113, 119 (1986).
111. Simma & Paulus, supra note 41, at 305.
112. Id. at 307.
113. Id.
114. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 445.
115. Id. at 447 ("States often include guidance in their military manuals for policy, rather than
legal, reasons. For example, the United States long has stated that it will apply the rules in its manuals
whether the conflict is characterized as international or non-international, but this clearly is not intended
to indicate that it is bound to do so as a matter of law in non-international conflicts.").
116. Id. at 445 ("Although manuals may provide important indications of State behavior and opinio
juris, they cannot be a replacement for a meaningful assessment of operational State practice in
connection with actual military operations.").
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In its discussions on the customary law applicable to internal conflicts, the
International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia ("ICTY") largely ignored
battlefield practices and relied on verbal statements, declarations, and
resolutions." 7 The ICTY explained that examination of state practice:
[I]s rendered extremely difficult by the fact that not only is access to the
theater of military operations normally refused to independent observers
(often even to the ICRC) but information on the actual conduct of
hostilities is withheld by the parties to the conflict; what is worse, often
recourse to it is has to misinformation with a view to misleading the
enemy as well as public opinion and foreign Governments." 8
In addition to the logistical restraints impeding perfect knowledge of
battlefield operations, states often engage in practices that they believe are illegal.
To accept that such engagement is evidentiary of a customary rule's waning force
would lead to absurd results in light of the unlimited possibilities of war's
gruesome horrors." 9 Professor Schachter suggests that in order to determine
whether or not a rule maintains its customary force, observers should search for
consensus regarding a rule's fundamental character. He explains, "[w]hen a
principle is repeatedly and unanimously declared to be a basic legal rule from
which no derogation is allowed, even numerous violations do not become state
practice constitutive of a new rule." 20
The case of torture is particularly illustrative here. During the Global War on
Terror ("GWOT") states systematically exerted force, described as torture, to
persons in their custody.121 If observers were to accept these operational practices
as controlling, they would have to accept that such widespread practice did not
breach the customary prohibition 22 of torture, but rather, constituted the seed for a
Ostensibly the new rule would make
new international customary rule.
warfare when combatants, by
during
unconventional
the
use
of
torture
permissible
virtue of their unlawful conduct, voluntarily forfeit the law's protection.123 This
conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the fact that, despite the widespread
practice of torture, the international community has not adjusted its collective
117. Theodor Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International
HumanitarianLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 239 (1996).
118. Id. at 240.
119. Schachter, supra note 110, at 130 ("This argument is no more convincing than the assertion
that if a large number of rapes and murders are not punished, the criminal laws are supplanted and legal
restraints disappear for everyone.").
120. Id. at 131.
121. See Lisa Hajar, American Torture: The Price Paid,The Lessons Learned,39 MIDDLE E. REP.
(2009), availableat http://www.merip.org/mer/mer25 1/american-torture.
122. See Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment at 3
(July 20, 2012), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf (explaining that the
"[p]rohibition of torture is part of customary international law and a preemptory norm (jus cogens)");
Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.
3), [2000] 1A.C. 147, 156 (H.L.) (describing the ban on torture as jus cogens).
123. See FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES: CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAWS AND
USAGES OF WAR 18 (1862).
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admonition and prohibition on the use of torture. This is evidenced by the
numerous state-led lawsuits filed against alleged torturers,124 as well as states
condemning the use of torture. 125
This underscores the presumption raised in Nicaragua that states conform
with customary law unless they explicitly express otherwise.126 Accordingly, if
during the course of said practice, states explicitly defended the use of torture and
other states acquiesced to its use, then observers should accept that a seed for a
new rule has been planted. On the other hand, if during the course of torture, no
state defended its use and other states objected to it, then the practice must be
viewed as a breach of customary law thereby affirming its validity and application.
From this example, we can draw four principles. First, there is a presumption
that states comport with international customary law. Second, strict reliance on
operational state practice is an inadequate source of customary international law.
Third, to accurately determine the enduring legitimacy of customary law, observers
must afford due weight to state declarations, resolutions, and statements during the
course of said practices. Finally, observers must account for the negative practice
of states that can be interpreted as acquiescence.
Customary international humanitarian law, in particular, is an attitudinal
position that reflects obligatory norms that have shaped practice as opposed to
habitual norms that have come to represent legal obligations. Due to the
specialized nature of the human rights and humanitarian legal regime, together
with the international community's character as a collective whole, and because of
the unreliability of operational state practice, this is especially true where morally
loaded norms are at issue. Therefore, customary rules can develop quickly without

124. Hajjar, supra note 121 ("In 2005, an Italian court issued indictments for 22 CIA agents who
had kidnapped Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (aka Abu Omar) in Milan in February 2003 and transported
him to Egypt for torture. In 2007, a German court issued arrest warrants for 13 CIA agents involved in
the December 2003 kidnapping of Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen, from Macedonia. He was
transported to Afghanistan where he was tortured and held incommunicado for months ....
in an
attempt to avoid public acknowledgment ... [the CIA] dumped him in a remote area in Albania, from
which he eventually made it back to Germany.").
125. Id. (including the Canadian government apologizing to and paying $10 million to Maher
Arrar, a Canadian-Syrian national who the U.S. rendered to Syria where he endured ten months of
torture and in the U.K., the controversy over Binyam Mohammed, a Guantanamo Bay detainee who
was subject to systematic torture, led to intense public controversy, and to the first criminal
investigation against British intelligence agents for their collusion in CIA torture); see also Jay C.
Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (August 1, 2020), http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream
/2041/70964/00355_020801_001display.pdf (demonstrating that, though the U.S. did not condemn the
use of torture, it went to great lengths to distinguish its treatment of and policy towards detainees from
torture: "for an act to constitute torture ... it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain
amounting torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or suffering
to amount to torture . . . it must result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g.,
lasting for months or even years.").
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27).
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waiting decades for the law to harden; the influence of specially affected states is
significantly diminished; the value of soft-law instruments is heightened; opinio
juris and state practice can be deduced from the same event or articulationl 27 and
can be reflected by the reaction, or the lack thereof, of the international
community; and, in some cases, they can develop instantly from multilateral treaty
provisions. These are not absolute rules; instead they reflect a rebuttable
presumption of sorts. They are general assumptions in the approach to the
customary human rights and humanitarian rules that are still open to challenge
based on the specific nature-permissive, operational, or obligatory-of the rule in
question.
Under this formulation, the U.S. approach to establishing customary law is
rigid and inadequate. It does not consider the proper approach to the formation of
custom with distinct consideration for the nature of human rights and humanitarian
law. In contrast, the ICRC approach, which leans towards, but is not necessarily
modem, is more appropriate. It has the capacity to interpret developing customary
norms based on a balance of opinio juris and state practice. The ICRC avoids
paralysis in its approach by not affording undue weight to operational state practice
and by deriving opiniojuris and state practice from the same incident or act. In the
words of Jean-Marie Henckaerts, co-author of the ICRC Study, there is no
mathematical standard to establish customary law. 128
V.

RULE 157: STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO VEST UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN
THEIR NATIONAL COURTS OVER WAR CRIMES

Notwithstanding the ICRC's correct methodological approach, its analysis as
to Rule 157-which explains that states have the right to vest universal jurisdiction
in their national courts over war crimes 129-is not immune from critique. The
ICRC's failure to properly distinguish war crimes from grave breaches makes
debatable whether the evidence it collated reflects no more than state adherence to
treaty obligations. Moreover, the ICRC does not adequately account for state
protest to universal jurisdiction up to the time of writing. Finally, the intervening
developments between 2005 and 2011 demonstrate a regressive trend that also puts
the ICRC's findings into question. While these findings do not negate the right to
vest universal jurisdiction as a customary right, they do signify that the customary
rule should be more attenuated and precise.
To examine the ICRC's analysis of universal jurisdiction, this section will
begin by unpacking the U.S. critique of the ICRC's analysis. It will then show
127. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
(GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW, LONDON CONFERENCE (2000) ("[M]ost members of the Committee
agreed that, where practice exists which satisfies the conditions set out in Part II and is not covered by
one of the exceptions discussed in Section 17, it is not necessary to prove the existence of an opinio
juris.").
128. Skype Interview with Jean Marie Henckaerts, Legal Advisor to ICRC (Nov. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter Henckaerts Interview]; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Customary International
HumanitarianLaw: Taking Stock of the ICRCStudy, 78 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 435, 449 (2010).
129. Id.
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how the distinction between the treaty provision giving rise to universal
jurisdiction and the universality principle's customary form supports the ICRC's
definition of universal jurisdiction as a permissive right.
Next, it will explore the implications of the ICRC's failure to adequately
demonstrate the distinction between grave breaches and war crimes upon its
conclusions. Finally, it will examine how state protests before and since the
publication of the Study undermine the scope and meaning of universal jurisdiction
as asserted by Rule 157.
Universal jurisdiction is one of the seven bases for jurisdiction identified in
legal doctrine.130 Unlike the other bases for jurisdiction, which establish a direct
link between a state and the right to prosecute an individual, universal criminal
jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the crime. It "is the ability of the court
of any state to try persons for crimes committed outside its territory that are not
linked to the state by the nationality of the suspect or the victims or by harm to the
state's own national interests."'
Former U.N. High Commissioner on Human
Rights Mary Robinson explained that the principle of such jurisdiction
[I]s based on the notion that certain crimes are so harmful to
international interests that the states are entitled-and even obliged-to
bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of
the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or victim.132
Although closely related, it is distinct from the treaty provision obligating
states to extradite or prosecute ("aut dedere aut judicare") someone alleged to
have committed a war crime. 133 According to the ICRC, aut dedere autjudicare
stands for the proposition that states are not to provide safe haven to criminal
suspects. Accordingly, states are required to either surrender the person to an
international criminal court or a national court with the capacity to prosecute such
crimes. Where it fails to do so, it must prosecute the alleged in its national courts
presumably pursuant to universal jurisdiction.134 In contrast, the ICRC contends,

130. REYDAMS, supra note 45, at 21-22 ("Doctrine identifies up to seven principles: (1) the
principle of territoriality, (2) the principle of the nationality of the offender (or active personality
principle), (3) the principle of the nationality of the victim (or passive personality principle), (4) the
principle of the flag, (5) the principle of protection, (6) the principle of universality, and (7) the
representation principle.").
131. AMNESTY INT'L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD SUPPORT THIS
ESSENTIAL INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE TOOL, 10 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter JUSTICE TOOL], available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/015/2010/en/72ab4ccf-4407-42d3-8ctb-46ad6aada
059/ior53015201Oen.pdf.
132. STEPHEN MACEDO, ET AL., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28
(2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive jur.pdf.
133. AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE (AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE) 8 (Feb. 2009) [hereinafter EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE],
available at http://www.amnesty.org/ar/libray/asset/IOR40/001/2009/en/a4761626-f2Oa-1ldd-855f392123cb5f06/ior400012009en.pdf.
134. Id.
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universal jurisdiction in customary law is a permissive right to prosecute a heinous
crime in a state's national courts irrespective of an extradition request.135
The U.S. argues that three methodological errors undermine the ICRC's
conclusion that states can exercise universal jurisdiction in their national courts as
a matter of custom: (1) the lack of uniformity over the definition of war crimes
across states; (2) the failure of state practice cited to establish either an accepted
definition of universal jurisdiction or the existence of "pure" universal jurisdiction;
and (3) insufficient state practice of prosecutions not connected to the forum
state.1 36 The U.S.'s overarching concern reflects its belief that the state practice
and opinio juris collated by the ICRC reflects a treaty rule and not a distinct
customary law.' 3 7 The treaty provision, aut dedere autjudicare, provides that a
state that has the ability to establish custody of a suspect accused of committing a
serious violation of humanitarian law in international armed conflict must hand
over or try the accused as a matter of duty. It is derived from dozens of
multilateral treaties.' 3 8 The Geneva Conventions-as laid out in Common Article
49 of the First Geneva Convention ("GCI"), Article 50 of the Second Geneva
Convention ("GCII"), Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention ("GCIII"), and
Article 146 ("GCIV") of the Fourth Geneva Convention-provide that High
Contracting Parties have an obligation to prosecute, but not extradite persons,
within their territory suspected of committing grave breaches. 3 9
Accordingly, the U.S. Government tries to illustrate that the ICRC's evidence
of state practice and opinio juris simply reflects compliance with the Geneva
Conventions. The authors write:
The nine cases in which States claimed jurisdiction based on customary
rights come from only six States ... . The practice of six States is very
weak evidence of the existence of a norm of customary international law
.... Indeed in many of these cases, States were prosecuting acts that
were committed before the Geneva Conventions were adopted, but that

135. Henckaerts, supra note 1, at 476 ("Permissive rules ... are supported by acts that recognize
the right to behave in a given way but that do not, however, require such behaviour .... [Rule 157] is
such a rule.").
136. Bellinger & Haynes, supranote 11, at 466-67.
137. Id. at 469-70.
138. See REYDAMS, supranote 45, at 44-47 (explaining that before World War II, only three of the
one hundred international instruments with penal characteristics established a universality principle. In
contrast, post-World War II "[s]ome two dozen treaties [were] adopted to criminalize certain conduct
and establish a form of universal repression."). Articles 5 (obligation to establish jurisdiction), 7
(obligation to extradite or prosecute), and 8 (extradition) of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment reflect the three clauses establishing the aut
dedere autjudicareprinciple in the two dozen treaties mentioned in REYDAMS, supranote 45.
139. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
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ultimately were considered grave breaches in the Conventions. Thus,
although the prosecuting States were not in a position to rely on their
treaty obligations as a basis for their prosecutions, the acts at issue
effectively were grave breaches.'
The U.S. Government's emphasis that the criminal violations amounted to
grave breaches, as opposed to a broader category of war crimes, highlights its
contention with Rule 156, "Definition of War Crimes," of the Study upon which
Rule 157 is reliant. The authors allege that Rule 156 lacks precision and is
therefore unreliable as a customary rule. They explain:
These acts include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
A[dditional] P[rotocol] I, other crimes prosecuted as 'war crimes' after
World War II and included in the Rome Statute, serious violations of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and several other acts
deemed 'war crimes' by 'customary law developed since 1977,' some of
which are included in the Rome Statute and some of which are not. 141
Rule 156 coupled with Rule 157 establish that certain serious violations of
humanitarian law constitute war crimes to which international criminal liability
inheres whether committed in international or non-international armed conflict.142
This is particularly troubling to the U.S., which has not ratified the Geneva
Convention's 1977 Additional Protocols.143 The Additional Protocols expand the
applicable scope of laws of war, and their attendant protections afforded to
civilians, combatants, prisoners, and the wounded, to those armed conflicts not of
an international character;144 they characterize wars of national liberation as
international in character;145 they reduce the stringent standards requisite upon
combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians;146 and they expand those
violations considered war crimes. 147
Whereas the ICRC includes these violations and others in its litany of war
crimes enumerated in Rule 156 over which third party states can establish criminal

140. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 469-70.
141. Id. at 466.
142. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 599-600 ("These violations are not listed in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court as war crimes. However, State practice recognizes their serious nature
and, as a result, a court would have sufficient basis to conclude that such acts in a non-international
armed conflict are war crimes.").
143. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P [hereinafter Protocol I];
see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P [hereinafter Protocol
Il].
144. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANIfARIAN LAW
IN WAR 129-31 (2010).
145. Protocol I, supranote 143, art. 1(4).
146. Id. art. 44(3).
147. SOLIS, supranote 144, at 123-30; see also Protocol I, supra note 143, art. 85(2)-(5).
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jurisdiction per Rule 157, the U.S. insists that those violations to which
international criminal liability is attached are limited to categories established by
treaty, which include, but are not limited to, grave breaches identified in the four
Geneva Conventions. The violations common to all four Geneva Conventions are
"willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health."l 48
As such, the U.S. objection to the ICRC analysis can be summarized: the
ICRC's evidence on state practice and opinio juris regarding the prosecution of
war crimes reflects inconsistent compliance with a treaty provision and is not
demonstrative of a new customary law. In order to examine whether the ICRC
correctly evaluated the customary status of the state right to vest national
legislation over universal jurisdiction for war crimes, I will divide my inquiry into
three broad categories: (1) Has an existing treaty provision found in several
multilateral treaties attained customary status and if so, is its customary form
distinct from its treaty articulation?; (2) How does, or does not, the state practice
and opiniojurisdocumented by the ICRC demonstrate the waning relevance of the
distinction between grave breaches and war crimes more generally?; and (3) What
do trends in state practice leading up to the ICRC's 2005 compendium of
customary international humanitarian law, as well as since the Study's completion,
indicate about the right to vest universal jurisdiction in national courts over war
crimes as a customary rule?
A. Treaty Provision versus Customary Rule
Customary law, a form of tacit consent, must be distinct from treaty law, a
form of explicit consent, in order to apply to non-party third states.149 The
customary rule need not be as precise as the treaty provision from which it
developed. Henckaerts agrees with this proposition and explains, "custom is not
like treaty law. It need not be stated verbatim and is therefore not incontrovertible.
The rule can be read more broadly." 50 He explains that Rule 157 suggests that
universal jurisdiction as captured in Rule 157 is a permissive right available to
states to try persons suspected of committing the war crimes enumerated in Rule
156 where a presence link to the prosecuting state is neither necessary nor
dispositive of the rule's existence.' 55

148. DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1047 (2010).

& DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND

149. See Simma, supra note 41, at 305 (stating that a binding treaty provision represents explicit
consent while customary law reflects tacit consent. For that reason, treaties are binding on contracting
parties only while custom is binding on all parties because of habitual conduct based on an objective
factual determination.).
150. Henckaerts Interview, supra note 128.
151. Id.; VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 605-06 ("Practice is not uniform with respect to whether the
principle of universal jurisdiction requires a particular link to the prosecuting State. The requirement
that some connection exist between the accused and the prosecuting State, in particular that the accused
be present in the territory or has fallen into the hands of the prosecuting State, is reflected in the military
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While the U.S. takes specific issue with Rule 157's non-definitive nature,
academic literature supports the notion that customary law cannot be as specific as
treaty law.1 52 Instead, it is observed as a general restatement that is molded by
judicial interpretation. As described by Professor Theodor Meron in his discussion
of the ICTY's Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6 case, "[c]ustomary law evolves through
interpretation and application. Here the science of the law blends with judicial
culture of caution and restraint." 53 Professor Schachter cautions that while all
rules can be made to conform with a particular outcome, it is wrong to assume that
they are without a core meaning.' 54
Despite its purported fluidity, the core meaning of Rule 157 is intact: states
have a right to try a suspect for a heinous offense committed abroad with no link to
another form of jurisdiction. This reflects, but is not identical to, the aut dedere
aut judicare principle captured in several multilateral treaties, which the Study
cites as evidence of state practice.' 5 That treaty provision arguably makes
prosecution a duty. In its earliest iteration, the principle of aut dedere autjudicare
only established an obligation to prosecute when a "request for extradition has
5
been received and denied."s'
A distinction can therefore be made between the
treaty rule mandating prosecution where extradition is requested and denied, and a
permissive rule, as 157 is meant to be, where no request has been made and a thirdparty state takes it upon itself to prosecute a crime on behalf of the international

manuals, legislation and case-law of many States. There is also legislation and case-law, however, that
does not require such a link. The Geneva Conventions do not require such a link either.").
152. See Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory oflnternationalLaw: The DistinctionBetween
Treaty and Customary Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 979-80 (1995) (explaining that treaties
are more conclusive, not universally binding); Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International
Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 104 (1987) ("Customary rules, however, are not static. They change in
content depending upon the amplitude of new vectors [i.e., state interests].").
153. Meron, supranote 59, at 826.
154. Schachter, supra note 110, at 119-20 (explaining that customary rules "are not free of
ambiguity and they may call for factual appraisals as to which reasonable persons can differ. One
cannot expect them to be applied by computers.").
155. See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAw, VOLUME II: PRACTICE 3883-87 (2005) [hereinafter VOLUME II] (discussing
Article VI of the 1948 Genocide Convention; Article 49 of Geneva Convention I, Article 50 of Geneva
Convention II, Article 129 of Geneva Convention III, and Article 146 of Geneva Convention IV;
Article 28 of the 1948 Hague Convention; Article 85(1) of Additional Protocol I; Article 10 of the 1994
Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel; Article IV of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons; Article 15(2) of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons; Article 14 of the 1996 Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Chemical
Weapons; Article 9 of the 1997 Ottawa Convention; Preamble to the 1998 International Criminal Court
Statute; Article 12 of the International Criminal Court Statute; Article 13 of the 1998 International
Criminal Court Statute; and Article 16(1) of the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention).
156. REYDAMS, supra note 45, at 44-45 (stating that this is in specific reference to Article 9 of the
International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency which mandates that the
"obligation to take proceedings is subject to the condition that extradition has been requested and that
the country to which application is made cannot hand over the person accused for some reason which
has no connection with the offence.").
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This distinction is deliberate and explicit, as evidenced by
community.
Henckaert's insistence that:
Rule 157 is not reflected anywhere in a treaty, unlike other rules, [it] has
not been codified, [and] there is no parallel in treaty law.

. .

. Since this

rule ... [is a] right, no one [will be] chided for failure to prosecute and
failure to legislate because it is only a right to do so.' 57
He continues that while there exists insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
there exists an obligation to prosecute, there is enough to demonstrate that there
exists a right to do so.' 58 This emphasizes the rule's permissive nature, which,
unlike other customary norms, is demonstrated by highlighting the lack of protest
to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
The Study's author explains that the number of cases brought by states
reflects this permissive right where there was no objection to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction even where no state expressed a desire to prosecute the
accused. 159 ICJ Judge Van der Wyngaert interprets the Lotus dictum in paragraphs
18-19 as supporting the concept of permissive rules in her dissenting opinion in
Arrest Warrant. The dictum declares that while states cannot exercise their
jurisdiction in another state, it does not follow that:
[I]nternational law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have
taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule
of international law .. .. Far from laying down a general prohibition to

the effect that States may not extend the application of their laws and
the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their
territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards
other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it
160
regards as best and most suitable.
In her analysis, Van der Wyngaert distinguishes permissive and enforcement
jurisdiction. Whereas permissive jurisdiction is the right to establish jurisdiction to
try the crime, enforcement jurisdiction is the right to enforce that decision in
another state. She interprets the Lotus dictum as affording permissive jurisdiction
to State A to prosecute offenses committed in State B, but not to supplant the
judicial system in State B. While sovereignty precludes the exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction, she states "there is no prohibition under international law
to enact legislation allowing it to investigate and prosecute war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed abroad." 1 6 1

157. Henckaerts Interview, supra note 128.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 46 (Sept. 7).
161. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 1 51 (Feb. 14)
(Van Der Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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The U.S. also raises the issue of pure universal jurisdiction, or the right to
prosecute a suspect in absentia when a search within its territory produces no
results.162 It claims that state practice is insufficient to support the claim that
failure to demonstrate that pure universal jurisdiction has attained customary status
undermines the ICRC's findings. This objection, however, is arguably a red
herring given that the U.S. has not limited its protests to universal jurisdiction only
when it has been established in absentia.' 63 In fact, the issue of pure universal
jurisdiction is a distinct inquiry and has no bearing on the customary norm
articulated in Rule 157.
The ICRC's rule establishes that universal jurisdiction exists when no link
between the harm alleged and the forum state exists, regardless of the presence of
the accused in the forum state.'6 Presence of the accused within the forum state
does not undermine the meaning of universal jurisdiction, although it may put the
status of pure universal jurisdiction into question. Henckaerts clarifies that the
ICRC did not attach an element of absentia to the definitional scope of universal
jurisdiction. Instead, the principle represents "the lowest common denominator" of
a jurisdictional basis that is complementary to other bases of criminal jurisdiction
where a link to a forum state exists.'65 The ICRC thus negatively defines universal
jurisdiction as jurisdiction over a crime where no other basis of jurisdiction
exists.166
The ICRC's definition is not unique. The Institut de Droit International
("IDI") has also defined the jurisdiction as one unlike any existing basis for
jurisdiction for which the essence is an "absence of link between the crime and the
prosecuting State."' 67 "Mere presence," the IDI continues, does not "furnish such
a link." 68 Professor Theodor Meron agrees with this definition of universal
jurisdiction and explains:
There is no reason why universal jurisdiction should not also be
acknowledged in cases where the duty to prosecute and or extradite is
unclear, but the right to prosecute when offenses are committed by
aliens in foreign countries is recognized. Indeed, the true meaning of
universal jurisdiction is that international law permits any state to apply
162. Bellinger & Haynes, supra note 11, at 466; see also Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
31 (Feb. 14) (Higgins J., Kooijmans, J., and Buergenthal, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] different interpretation is given in the Pictet Commentary: Geneva Conventionfor the
Ameliorization on the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1952, which
contends that this obligation was understood as being an obligation upon States parties to search for
offenders who may be on their territory. Is it a true example of universality, if the obligation to search is
restricted to the own territory? Does the obligation to search imply a permission to prosecute in
absentia, if the search had no result?").
163. See discussion infra.
164. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 605-06.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 604-05.
167. Sienho Yee, UniversalJurisdiction:Concept, Logic, and Reality, 10 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 503,
505 (2011).
168. Id. at 514.
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its law to certain offenses even in the absence of territorial, nationality,
or other accepted contacts with the offender or the victim.169
Wolfgang Kaleck, a German human rights attorney responsible for bringing
several universal jurisdiction cases within European national courts-most notably
the 2004 case against Rumsfeld and company-attributes the presence requirement
to logistical purposes and not any restrictive rule upon states in their exercise of
universal jurisdiction. He comments:
[I]n the long run, it is difficult to start an investigation when there is no
link in the country. [This is b]ecause you have to work technically and
what can you do when there is no link at all . . . . With the presence

requirement that has to be enforced and has to be taken more seriously
by the government [which is necessary for the discovery process] so as a
policy goal we should adopt this practice to ensure success.170
Kaleck's observation highlights that while presence has become a technical
prerequisite domestically, it does not preclude a broader universality principle.' 7 1
However, the fact that other governments do not take a warrant seriously unless
presence is established also suggests that as the presence requirement develops as
an expectation among other states, it may become a requirement in customary
international law. The Joint Separate Opinion contemplates this possibility, but
insists that great care has been taken to avoid excluding other grounds of voluntary
jurisdiction during the drafting of relevant treaty provisions.' 72 They conclude that
as regards pure universal jurisdiction, state practice is neutral.' 7 3 Regardless, it is a
separate issue and does not have bearing on the ICRC's finding in Rule 157.
In its customary form, universal jurisdiction is a permissive right. Therefore,
its strength as a customary rule is derived from acquiescence among states to a
state's decision to exercise said jurisdiction. Additionally, while the presence
requirement has emerged as a domestic law requirement for the sake of logistics
and international comity, it neither precludes the exercise of a more pure universal
jurisdiction nor is it dispositive of a right to establish universal jurisdiction. These
factors help demonstrate the futility of the U.S.'s assertion that insufficient practice
169. Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554,
570 (1995) [hereinafter Meron Internal Atrocities].
170. Skype Interview with Wolfgang Kaleck, Human Rights Attorney (Nov. 6, 2011) [hereinafter
Kaleck Interview].
171. Id.; see also Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 155
(Feb. 14) (Van den Wyngaert, J., dissenting) (explaining that Justice Van den Wyngaert agrees and
attributes the requirement of the offender's presence in the exercise of universal jurisdiction to domestic
law, which is not necessarily an expression of opiniojurisrequired by international law. She explains
whereas presence may be required in domestic law, there is nothing in international law that similarly
makes it prerequisite.).
172. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. 51 (Higgins, J., concurring) ("See Article 4 (3),
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970; Article 5 (3),
International Convention against Taking of Hostages, 1979; Article 5 (3), Convention against Torture;
Article 9, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; and Article 19,
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.").
173. Id.145.
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of pure universal jurisdiction undermines its customary nature. As a permissive
rule, a principle's customary force is evidenced by the lack of protest to its
invocation. While the ICRC's determination that states have the right to vest
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary right is sound, the same cannot be
said for its analysis on those heinous crimes to which international criminal
liability inheres.
B. Grave Breaches versus War Crimes
The universality principle in customary law encompasses a very broad
definition of war crimes that includes those violations of laws and customs of war
both in international ("IAC") and non-international armed conflict ("NIAC"). This
effectively collapses grave breaches, which can be committed only in IACs,174 with
a broader set of war crimes that can be committed in both international and noninternational conflict into a single category. The U.S. claims that those states
exercising universal jurisdiction are merely complying with the "extradite or
prosecute" treaty obligation pertaining to IACs. Accordingly, the prosecutable
crimes in those cases are limited to grave breaches with few exceptions. To
establish the veracity of Rule 157, the ICRC should be able to demonstrate either
the indistinguishable character of grave breaches and war crimes, and/or that state
practice sufficiently criminalizes war crimes in national legislation or
jurisprudence. In Henckaerts' words, "[i]f we only found support for grave
breaches that would not have been sufficient because it is a treaty obligation. So
we had to look for legislation that goes beyond grave breaches that gives the states
the right to vest national jurisdiction." 7 5
1. Distinct Legal Regimes
Grave breaches are defined in Geneva Convention Common Article
(50/51/130/147) as well as API Article 11 and 85.176 Historically, they have been
defined as "a limited set of particularly serious violations of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 that gave rise to special obligations of the States Parties for
the enactment and enforcement of domestic criminal law." 7 7 The travaux
prdparatoires of the Conventions demonstrate that state plenipotentiaries
deliberately distinguished the concept of grave breaches from war crimes in order
to ensure greater uniformity across states. Whereas war crimes had diverse

174. This takes for granted the U.S.'s objections to the inclusion of grave breaches listed under
Article 85(1) of Additional Protocol I, in particular its criminalization of offenses committed against
protected persons as listed in Article 44 of the Additional Protocol I. It also raises questions about the
nature of armed conflict listed in Article 1(4), which is also an unsettled area of law.
175. Henckaerts Interview, supra note 128.
176. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, How "Grave Breaches" are Defined in the Geneva
ConventionsandAdditional Protocols (last updated Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org
/eng/resources/documents/mise/5zmgf9.htm.
177. Marko Divac Oberg, The Absorption of Grave Breaches into War Crimes, 91 INT'L. REV. RED
CROSS 163, 163 (2009).
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domestic meaning, a grave breach draws its meaning from international consensus
as enshrined in the Conventions and their Additional Protocols.' 78
Unlike war crimes to which international criminal liability inhered, grave
breaches necessitated national legislation to establish liability. The Conventions
considered these violations so serious that states had a treaty obligation to enact
penal legislation, prosecute, or extradite them.' 79 Non-grave breaches of the
Conventions are sanctioned in national law by discretion. They amount to war
crimes if they are serious enough.
Significantly, Article 85(5) of Additional Protocol I described grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols as war crimes,' 80
thereby attaching to grave breaches criminal consequences in international law.' 8'
Among the reasons for maintaining a distinction between the treaty provision and
customary law, however, is that within the confines of domestic law, states are not
obligated to prosecute war crimes but have a duty to prosecute or hand over a
person accused of a grave breach. 182 In his comprehensive article on the matter,
Marko Divac Oberg argues that thirty years since the legislation of the concept of
grave breaches, the "war crimes concept is the more dynamic of the two, to the
point that one may wonder whether grave breaches will disappear from
Nonetheless, he continues, "[t]oday, grave breaches
international law."' 83
provisions, at least those of the 1949 generation, remains privileged as tried and
true black-letter law, compared with the nebulous customary law origins of war
crimes."' 84
The preference for the black-letter character of grave breaches is evidenced in
the jurisprudence and law of international criminal tribunals as well. Consider that
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda ("ICTR") does not
make mention of grave breaches because of the uncontested nature of the Rwandan
conflict as one of a non-international character.'85 The Statute establishes that
prosecutable crimes include crimes against humanity, genocide, and violations of
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, but
not grave breaches.' 86
In contrast, the dissolution of the Yugoslav Republic and the attendant state
and non-state violence meted out within and between the various ethnic groups and
nascent states characterized the conflict as both international and non-international.
178. Id. at 165-66.
179. Id. at 165.
180. Protocol I, supra note 143, art. 85(5) ("Without prejudice to the application of the
Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war
crimes.").
181. Oberg, supra note 177, at 167.
182. Id. at 181.
183. Id. at 164.
184. Id. at 182.
185. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
186. See id. arts. 2-4.
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Accordingly, the Statute of the ICTY'17 includes both grave breaches and war
crimes as possible offenses. It also distinguishes grave breaches from war crimes
in Article 2 and Article 3 respectively.' 88
In Prosecutorv. Tadic,'89 the Appeals Chamber went to painstaking efforts to
characterize the conflict as an IAC, and therefore prosecute the defendant under
Article 2 grave breaches.190 To do so, it had to distinguish its legal reasoning from
the ICJ's findings in Nicaragua where it applied the "effective control" test to
determine whether or not U.S. intervention made the conflict tantamount to an
IAC.191 The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred "in so far as it
acquitted the Appellant on the sole ground that the grave breaches regime of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not apply,"' 92 and held Tadic to be guilty of
grave breaches.' 93
Significantly, in the series of cases that followed, the ICTY abandoned this
practice and analyzed the violations under a NIAC legal regime. The strategic
shift reflected a desire to pursue a less cumbersome approach to establishing
liability for war crimes. Justice Richard Goldstone, who served as the ICTY's first
chief prosecutor, explained that after the appeals decision, the court no longer
referred to grave breaches. Instead, it charged defendants with ordinary war crimes
which apply to international and non-international armed conflicts. Further, the
court had the additional obligation and burden to demonstrate that an international
armed conflict existed.194 Using an Article 3 analysis, the ICTY established
liability for both grave breaches and war crimes. On the one hand, this affirms that
the distinct legal regimes between international and non-international armed
conflict is of enduring relevance. On the other, it also highlights how grave

187. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Sep. 2009),
availableat http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute sept09_en.pdf.
188. Id. arts. 2-3.
189. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in the Appeals Chamber, 11 84, 115, 170
(July 15, 1999).
190. Id. 84 ("It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between two
or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State,
it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in character
alongside an internal armed conflict) if(i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or
alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other
State.").
191. Id. 115 ("The 'effective control' test enunciated by the International Court of Justice was
regarded as correct and upheld by Trial Chamber II in the Judgment. The Appeals Chamber, with
respect, does not hold the Nicaragua test to be persuasive. There are two grounds supporting this
conclusion."); see also id. 1 124 ("The 'effective control' test propounded by the International Court of
Justice as an exclusive and all-embracing test is at variance with international judicial and State
practice: such practice has envisaged State responsibility in circumstances where a lower degree of
control than that demanded by the Nicaragua test was exercised.").
192. Id. T 170.
193. Id. T 171.
194. Telephone Interview with Richard Goldstone, Chief Prosecutor, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia (Nov. 9, 2011).
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breaches can be subsumed by a broader category of war crimes thereby
diminishing the demarcation between the distinct war crimes categories.
A U.S. amendment to its penal code defining war crimes also contributes to
this steady evisceration process. In 2006, U.S. lawmakers amended 18 U.S.C. §
2441 and defined certain violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions as grave breaches. 195 This is striking since the violations listed in the
Common Article do not amount to grave breaches under the Conventions as grave
breaches are defined only in IACs, and Common Article 3 applies only in NIACs.
Additionally, those prohibitions listed in the U.S. Code include torture, cruel or
inhuman treatment, performing biological experiments, murder, mutilating or
maiming, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse,
and taking hostages,19 and are therefore broader than the list of grave breaches
common to the four Geneva Conventions.1 9 7 It is not clear why the U.S. would
object to the inclusion of other war crimes committed in NIAC as grave breaches
but redefine the aforementioned crimes as grave breaches in its domestic law.198
Regardless, the U.S. state practice arguably contributes to the waning relevance of
the distinction between war crimes established by treaty and those established by
custom.
Notwithstanding these interesting developments, grave breaches continue to
constitute a distinct legal regime that is not easily collapsed with a broader
category of war crimes because of the nuances within the 1949 and 1977
generations of grave breaches. Consider the establishment of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"). The Rome Statute distinguishes between war crimes,
Article 8(2)(b), and grave breaches, Article 8(2)(a).' 99 Though the inclusion of all
grave breaches as war crimes indicates an acceptance that grave breaches can exist
outside of the strict confines of IAC, the distinction between those grave breaches
remains a matter of controversy. Of particular note is the fact that the drafters
included grave breaches pursuant to Additional Protocol I under the war crimes
section rather than the section listing grave breaches. 200 Indeed, this categorization
demonstrates the enduring objections to the Additional Protocols as controlling law
and, similarly, the outstanding distinctions between grave breaches and war
195. See War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) ("(c)(3) which constitutes a grave breach of
common Article 3 (as defined in subsection (d)) when committed in the context of and in association
with an armed conflict of an international character.").
196. Id. § 2441(d).
197. LUBAN ET AL., supra note 148 (listing the grave breaches common to the four Geneva
Conventions as: "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health").
198. See R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat Of Prosecution, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/08/AR200608080
1276.html; see also Bellinger & Haynes, supranote 11, at 443. It is of note that Congress amended the
federal law in 2006 in an effort to retroactively protect U.S. soldiers from liability whereas the
Government drafted its response to the ICRC in 2005.
199. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
200. Oberg, supra note 177, at 167.
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crimes. Still, a strong argument can be made that certain practices, including U.S.
national legislation and ICTY jurisprudence, constitute trends indicative of a
fading distinction between the two categories.

2. National Legislation and Jurisprudence
While wholly reasonable to draft a customary rule characterized by ambiguity
to be shaped by judicial tribunals and academics, the distinction between grave
breaches and war crimes merited more discrete treatment in the 2005 Study. The
ICRC does not demonstrate how its evidence of state practice makes the
distinctions between the two categories irrelevant. Contrary to the U.S.'s
contention that the national legislation does not suffice to demonstrate opiniojuris
in support of Rule 157, the legislation is demonstrative of opiniojuris as well as
state practice.
The problem, however, is that the national legislation cited is vast,
encompassing both narrow jurisdiction over grave breaches pursuant to an existing
treaty obligation as well as broad jurisdiction over crimes irrespective of their
character as a grave breach or a general war crime. The spectrum of criminal
categories includes ordinary crimes, such as murder, rape assault and abduction;
and, certain crimes under international law such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and torture.201 Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
examples cited in the Study refer only to jurisdiction over grave breaches or crimes
otherwise established in treaty law.202 Only a handful of states have statutes with
broad application. 203 Belarus is one such state and its statute reads:
The Criminal Code of Belarus [1999] provides for universal jurisdiction
for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, the use of
prohibited means and methods of warfare, violations of the laws and
customs of war and grave breaches of IHL, which are included in the

special section of the Code, as well as for offences under treaties to
which Belarus is a party.204
Jurisprudence evidencing an indistinguishable approach to war crimes
irrespective of their treaty or customary nature can suffice to disregard the
distinctions made between them in national legislation. The ICRC cites thirty-one
cases where universal jurisdiction was invoked, as demonstrated in the chart
below, listing national case law as evidence of state practice. Of those, only twelve
involved claims for violations of laws and customs of war beyond the scope of

201. See JUSTICE TOOL, supra note 131, at 12.
202. See generally VOLUME I, supra note 155, at 3888-3912.

203. Id. at 3896, 3904-3911 (Belarus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom).
204. Id. at 3896.
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grave breaches. 205 Notably, twenty of all listed cases involved cases emerging
from World War II, the conflict in Yugoslavia, and the conflict in Rwanda.206
STAE (YEAR)

CRIME (lAC OR NIAC)

Belgium (2001)

Grave breaches, and AP II
and CA3 (NIAC)

DjajiM

Germany (1997)

Kusljik

Germany (1997)
Germany (1999)

Geneva Convention ("GC")
and grave breaches regime
OC, Genocide (IAC)
Tried Bosnian nationals for
grave breaches art. 146 and
147 of GC IV

Sokolovik
Javor

Germany (1999)
France (1996)

Manyeshyaka

France (1996)

Prosecution of a Rwandan I
priest accused of an alleged
role for massacres in Kigali.
Court of Cassation overruled
lack
of
for
dismissal
jurisdiction citing that France
was obligated to try persons
pursuant
to
Law
of
Cooperation with the ICTR

Grabel

Switzerland
(1997)
Switzerland
(1999)

GCIII, GCIV,

CASE

The Four
Batare

from

Grave breaches regime (IAC)
Dismissed case for lack of
treaty obligation or link to
France

1996 (NIAC)

Niyonteze

Musema

Switzerland
(1997)

Eicbmana
Demjanjuk

Israel (1961)
U.S. (1985)_

API, APII,

customary war crimes

National crimes, did not
recognize
genocide
and
crimes against humanity
(NIAC)
Agreed to surrender detainee
of Rwandan nationality to
ICTR (NIAC
__

G~ustomnary lw
Affirmed Israel's right to try
accused

205. Id. at 3913-26 (Pinochet, Demjanjuk, Niyonteze, Musema, Grabe2, Hiss6ne Haber6, Knesevid,
Eichmann, Kusljid, Munyeshyaka, Four from Butare, and Cvjetokovic).
206. Id. at 3913-26 (Rwanda: Four from Butare, Niyonteze, Munyeshyaka, Musema; Yugoslavia:
Sarid, Javor, Djajid, Jorgid, Sokolovid, Kusljid, Knesevid, Grabe2; WWII: Demjanjuk, Altstdtter,
Sawoniuk, Kuroda, Rohrig and Others, Ahlbrecht, Eichmann, Finta, Polyukhovich).

260

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Yousef

Altstitter
Justice Trial)

U.S. (2003)

(The

U.S. (1947)

Sark

Denmark (1994)

Rohrig and Others

Netherlands
(1950)

"Ahlbrecht

Netherlands
(1947)

Knesevi

Netherlands
(1997)

Sawoniuk

UIK (1999)

Pinochet

Einta

UK (1999)
Canada (1989)

Polyukhovich

Australia (1991)

Cvjetkovi
Schwammberger

Austria (1994)
Argentina
(1989)
Mexico (2001)
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Dismissed suit, terrorism not
customary, no basis for
universal jurisdiction C'JJD
U.S. Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg affirmed validity
of universality principle
GCIII and GC IV,
rture
Upheld
jurisdiction
established in Ahlbrecht by
way of amendment
Wrcrimes and crms
against Humanity comm
during WWII
J
Bosnian Serbs, interpreted
Art. 3 of the Act to give
Dutch courts competence to
try war crimes (including
grave breaches andCA3)
UK War Crimes Act of 1991,
.1tmtorial link---......
Torture,.us cogens
WWII, war crimes and crimes
aga inst hum-anity
..._IC
_j
Customary
war
crimes,
iWWII, IAC
Art. 6 Genocide Convention
Genocide
Obliged to comply with
extradition request by Spain
& based principle on US
J
WWII, prosecute Japanese in
the Philippines

Dismissed
for lack of
jurisdiction, internal conflict

These cases certainly demonstrate that there is general support for a
jurisdiction to try persons even in the absence of a traditional link to the forum
state. They do not demonstrate, however, that such jurisdiction extends to a broad
category of war crimes as captured by Rule 157. State practice seems to indicate a
willingness by states to prosecute those crimes, which are considered an affront to
humanity in toto. However, it is inescapable that such broad condemnation is only
established in cases where the international community has articulated its
collective approbation through the U.N. Security Council, (i.e., ICTY, ICTR) or
atop the platform afforded to victors of war (i.e., Nuremberg, Tokyo). As such, it
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may have been more appropriate to find that universal jurisdiction exists as a
customary right over those crimes condemned by the international community
regardless of their treaty- or customary-based status.
i. Broader Political Context: Trends before 2005
The ICRC's enthusiasm to find that states have the right to vest universal
jurisdiction in their national legislation over war crimes is understandable in light
of the political context at the time of writing. The establishment of the ICTY in
1993, the ICTR in 1994, and the ICC in 2002 marks a dramatic acceleration of
international criminal law's development, unseen since the criminal tribunals
following the Second World War.207 The "atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda shocked the conscience of the people everywhere, triggering within a
short space of time, several major legal developments," namely the promulgation
of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes under Chapter VII authority as well as the adoption
of a treaty-based statute for an International Law Commission.208 The indelible
impact of the tribunals and the ICC on the ICRC is evidenced by their reference in
the Study more than 170 times before the Study began its treatment of
implementation and enforcement of humanitarian law.209
Notwithstanding the decade's unprecedented events, a few notable gaps
undermine the ICRC's analysis. Namely, the Study failed to assess properly the
impact of the ICJ's Arrest Warrant decision and the impact of universal
jurisdiction cases against United States officials in Belgium and Germany,
respectively, prior to 2005.
a. Arrest Warrant (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v.
Belgium)
In 2000, a Belgian investigating magistrate issued an arrest warrant in
absentia to Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombsai, an incumbent Foreign Affairs Minister of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The warrant alleged that he had committed
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols as well
as crimes against humanity. In response, the Congo brought suit against Belgium
in the ICJ challenging the arrest warrant's validity. The ICJ restricted its analysis
to the immunity due to acting state officials and ruled in favor of the Congo. In a
10-6 vote, the ICJ held that the warrant against Yerodia "failed to respect the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo enjoyed under international law; and that
207. See Oberg, supra note 177, at 182; Meron Internal Atrocities, supra note 169, at 568.
Universal jurisdiction developed post-WWII when most violations were prosecuted in international
tribunals and courts of the occupying powers of Germany. Most violations were tried in the courts of
various Allied States though they were not required to do so by international law at the time. The crimes
tried were not even characterized as crimes by any general international treaty at the time. Id.
208. Meron Internal Atrocities, supranote 169, at 554.
209. Robert Cryer, Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars, and the Gavel: The Influence of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLIcT & SECURTY L.
239,240 (2006).

262

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 41: 2

Belgium must cancel the arrest warrant." 210 The Court found that customary
international law of immunities is meant to ensure the effective performance of
state officials on behalf of their respective states. The decision was careful to
distinguish the concept of juridical immunity from suit from impunity for crimes
thereby preserving the possibility that Yerodia can be tried after completing his
term in office. While the 2002 ICJ decision did not diminish the legitimacy of
universal jurisdiction, it arguably had a chilling effect on its invocation. Consider
that the Court's decision, which affirmed the immunity for heads of state
regardless of their alleged crimes, indicates cautionary restraint. 211 In effect, the
Arrest Warrant case worked to resuscitate a discussion of universal jurisdiction's
legitimacy, which was taken for granted until then. The Study notes the case in its
compendium of state practice, and concludes that nothing in the decision impacts
universal jurisdiction's standing as a customary rule. 212 This is odd given that the
case's chilling effect also impacts what states deem legally permissible and
obligatory. At minimum, the ICJ decision informs the scope of universal
jurisdiction, which is arguably more limited than is indicated by Rule 157.
b. Belgium
In 1993, Belgium enacted a law to prosecute grave breaches pursuant to the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. In 1999, it strengthened the
law and expanded it to include genocide and crimes against humanity, even for
sitting heads of state.213 Under Belgian rules, like other civil law countries, private
persons can file criminal complaints with the public prosecutor, which the
prosecutor must investigate.214 While the Belgian Prime Minister supported the
law when the Court of Cassation held that it can be invoked against an accused in
absentia,215 he did not have the same reaction when plaintiffs brought suit against
U.S. officials.
In March 2003, seven Iraqi families filed a criminal case against George Bush
and members of his Administration for war crimes stemming from the deaths of

210. Press Release, International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Beig.), I.C.J. Press Release 2002/4 (Feb.14, 2002), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?pr-552&code=cobe&pl=3&p2=3&p3=6&case=121&k-36.
211. See Yee, supra note 167, at 530 ("The movement for 'pure universal jurisdiction' has been
'trending down' since the conspicuous silence of the ICJ on the legitimacy of that jurisdiction in the
Arrest Warrant case .. . . The subsequent downtrend may have been in no small measure due to the
cautious judgment of that case.").
212. VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 606 ("The judgment of the International Court of Justice turned on
the question of immunity of heads of State and foreign ministers and therefore no decision was taken on
the extent of universal jurisdiction ... but the majority did not contest the right to try to a suspected war
criminal on the basis of universal jurisdiction.").
213. Stephen R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 888, 891
(2003).
214. Id. at 890.
215. Id. at 889-90 (referring to the Court of Cassation decision against Ariel Sharon and Yaron
Almog for their role in a 1982 attack on a Beirut-based Palestinian refugee camp that resulted in the
death of approximately 1,000 civilians).
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dozens of Iraqi civilians killed when a U.S. missile penetrated a Baghdad bomb
shelter in 1991.216 The U.S. threatened to relocate NATO headquarters from
Brussels if Belgium did not terminate its proceedings. Prime Minister Verhofstadt
responded promptly and in April 2003, Belgian parliament amended its law. The
amendments significantly reduced the scope of universal jurisdiction by (1)
requiring passive or active personality jurisdiction; (2) providing immunity to all
acting state officials as well as for all persons on official visits; and (3) restricting
the ability to bring suit to prosecutors and not civilians. 217 The amendments left
Belgian courts available for human rights cases when (1) the requisite tie to
Belgium existed; (2) the other states with links to the crime lacked the capacity to
try the cases; and (3) the accused has no immunity. 218 Notably the law's new
criteria, that there exist a link between the crime and Belgium, undermine its
character as universal jurisdiction even under its broad definition as a negative
rule.
c. Germany
In 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights, along with several cooperating
attorneys including Wolfgang Kaleck, filed a case against Donald H. Rumsfeld,
then U.S. Secretary of Defense and other U.S. officials, citing mistreatment of
detainees at Abu Ghraib and other detention locations in Iraq. 219 Plaintiffs'
attorneys explained that German courts treated the complaint seriously until midJanuary when news of Rumsfeld's imminent visit to Germany sparked public
debate. Rumsfeld threatened to cancel his trip unless German authorities revoked
the warrant.220 Two days before Rumsfeld arrival in Germany for an international
security conference, a German court dismissed the case on grounds of
complementarity. The prosecutor held that there was no indication that the U.S.
would not investigate and prosecute said abuses. 221 Germany's dismissal of the
case on political grounds was readily apparent to everyone involved. As put by
Kaleck:
[The warrant] really molested the U.S. and this was communicated to
the Germans.. . . It was kind of naive of us, and still kind of naive on
the part of the human rights movement, if you deal with such cases you
have to deal with politics. Whereas human rights organizations try to

pretend that they do not have to deal with politics-you have to deal
with politics and [the] reality of power politics to bring such cases, you
are not in a powerless legal sphere. 222
216. Laurie King-Irani, Does Universal Jurisdiction Have a Local Address? Lessons from the
Belgian Experiment, 229 MIDDLE E. REP. 20, 23-24 (Winter 2003).

217. Ratner, supranote 213, at 891.
218. Id.
219. MAximo Langer, The Diplomacy of UniversalJurisdiction: The Role of PoliticalBranches in
the TransnationalProsecution ofInternationalCrimes, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (2011).

220. Kaleck Interview, supra note 170.
221. Id.

222. Id.
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Notably, Kaleck and cooperating attorneys attempted to revive the criminal
suit in subsequent years in Germany, as well as France. Both were dismissed on
similar grounds. Applying the ICRC's own test for identifying the existence of a
permissive rule, the protests by the U.S. and the Congo over the application of
universal jurisdiction should have raised concerns for the ICRC. Buoyed by a
decade rife with contrary evidence, the ICRC may have predicted that the trend,
however mired, pointed towards more robust practice. However, in 2011, it is
plainly clear that the Arrest Warrant case, coupled with the U.S.'s indelible
reprimand of those states who dared to challenge its behavior, have had a
regressive impact on the application of universal jurisdiction.
ii. Broader Political Context: Trends between 2005 and 2011
Since 2005, Germany and other states have invoked universal jurisdiction to
challenge the behavior of powerful states including the U.S., Israel, and China,
eliciting fervent protest by those states. The protests translated into meaningful
political pressure resulting in the termination of the cases as well as amendment of
universal jurisdiction laws. The regressive trend generally resulted in attenuated
universal jurisdiction over crimes across several states. These measures serve as
evidence of opiniojuris and state practice, derived from a single act, and informs
the status of the customary right to vest universal jurisdiction in national courts.
Consider the following cases in Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom,
as well as proceedings within the Sixth of Committee of the U.N. General
Assembly ("Sixth Committee").
a. Germany
In 2006, the U.S. passed the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which
retroactively grants immunity to everyone involved in the enhanced interrogation
techniques.223 Kaleck, along with the Center for Constitutional Rights, revived the
criminal complaints against Donald Rumsfeld, as well as U.S. Attorney General
Gonzalez, John Yoo, and others "accused as the alleged legal 'architects' of the
torture program" on the basis that the U.S. has shown itself unable and unwilling to
investigate and prosecute.224 The new complaint included more evidence and
detail. 225 Significantly, the attorneys filed it after the resignation of Secretary
223. German War Crimes Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld, et al., CTR. CONST. RTS.,

http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/german-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld,-etal [hereinafter CCR] (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
224. Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: UniversalJurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008,
30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 953 (2009).
225. CCR, supra note 223 ("The complaint is being filed under the Code of Crimes against
International Law ("CCIL"), enacted by Germany in compliance with the Rome Statute creating the
International Criminal Court in 2002, which Germany ratified. The CCLL provides for "universal
jurisdiction" for war crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. It enables the German
Federal Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes constituting a violation of the CCLL, irrespective
of the location of the defendant or plaintiff, the place where the crime was carried out, or the nationality
of the persons involved. No international courts or personal tribunals in Iraq were mandated to conduct
investigations and prosecutions of responsible U.S. officials. The United States has refused to join the
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Rumsfeld from the helm of the Department of Defense. 226 The German prosecutor
dismissed the case in 2007. Citing the Code of Criminal Procedure, he claimed
that there was no "legitimizing [domestic] link[age]" to justify German universal
jurisdiction over crimes committed extraterritorially and, therefore, there "was not
a reasonable likelihood of convicting the suspect in Germany." 227 A group of
human rights organizations filed several appeals all to no avail. On April 21, 2009,
the Appeal Court Stuttgart issued the final dismissal citing the appeal as
"inadmissible." 228
b. France
Following the German prosecutor's 2007 dismissal of the revived criminal
complaint, a French attorney, together with the same group of human rights
organizations, filed a criminal complaint against Rumsfeld in France during his
private visit in October 2007.229 The complaint alleged torture and inhumane
treatment of detainees in U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib. 230 The French Public Prosecutor refused to proceed, on the ground that
Rumsfeld was immune under the Arrest Warrant case.231
In a letter, the French prosecutor explained that under the Arrest Warrant
case, officials of high rank, such as the Head of State, enjoy immunities from
criminal and civil jurisdiction in other states during the exercise of their
232
functions.
Although such head of state immunity ceases upon completion of the
accused's official function, the prosecutor carefully notes that this is only the case
for "acts accomplished before or after the period during which the protected person
was occupying his/her post or for acts that, although accomplished during this
period, are not related to the functions carried out." 233 Therefore, the charges
against Rumsfeld cannot be "dissociated from his functions" while he was the
Secretary of Defense.234 The prosecutor notes that unlike Pinochet, Rumsfeld's
International Criminal Court, thereby foreclosing the option of pursuing a prosecution before it. Iraq
has no authority to prosecute. Furthermore, the U.S. gave immunity to all its personnel in Iraq from
Iraqi prosecution. All this added to the United States' unquestionable refusal to look at the
responsibility of those of the very top of the chain of command and named in the present complaint, and
the recent passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 . . . aimed at preventing war crimes
prosecutions against Americans in the U.S., German courts are seen as a last resort to obtain justice for
those victims of abuse and torture while detained by the United States.").
226. Id.
227. Kaleck, supra note 224, at 949, 953.
228. Rumsfeld Torture Cases-Criminal Charges Filed, EUR. CTR. CONST. & HUM. RTs.,
http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/us accountability/articles/complaint-against-former-us-secretary-ofdefense-donald-rumsfeld.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
229. Id.
230. Id. (noting the memo signed by Rumsfeld of enhanced interrogation techniques).
23 1. Letter from Public Prosecutor (ProcureurGindral)to the Paris Court of Appeal to Patrick
Baudouin (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/RumsfeldFrenchCase_%20Prosecu
tors%20Decision 02_08.pdf.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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actions were not marginal to the exercise of his functions as the Secretary of
Defense.235 Moreover, the gravity of those alleged offenses has no bearing upon
official immunity so long as they are central, and not marginal, to the exercise of
his official functions.236 The French prosecutor's judgment significantly truncates
both the scope of universal jurisdiction as well as the scope of prosecutable
offenses based on Head of State immunity.
c. Spain
Spain arguably led the enthusiastic charge of universal jurisdiction's potential
benefits when it issued an arrest warrant for Chile's Augusto Pinochet, delivered
by the United Kingdom, in 1998.233 The extradition never came to fruition as the
U.K. cancelled the extradition proceedings against Pinochet on humanitarian
grounds in 2000. Thereafter, the tide against universal jurisdiction in Spain
accelerated in the face of mounting cases filed against Guatemalans and
Argentineans under its universal jurisdiction statute.2 3 8 Although the Spanish
Supreme Court initially required that there exist a procedural link to national
interest to establish universal jurisdiction, in 2005, the Constitutional Tribunal
overruled this analysis. Instead, it held that "a link to national interest [was] not
required since universal jurisdiction is exclusively based on the substantive nature
of grave crimes affecting the entire international community." 239 This robust
authority constricted rapidly under intense political pressure when Spain filed
criminal suits against Chinese, Israeli, and U.S. officials between 2003 and
2009.240 In all three cases, the affected home countries protested that Spain's
jurisdiction amounted to intervention into the states' internal affairs. 24' Spanish
courts dismissed the cases for complementarity. 242
The Spanish case against three American soldiers for the death of a Spanish
journalist in Iraq is of particular note. The Spanish magistrate asserted that the
soldiers must have known that the hotel was located in a civilian area occupied
only by journalists.243 The U.S. refused to cooperate with the investigation. A
State Department spokesperson stated that "it will be a 'very cold day in hell,'
before American soldiers have to answer to Spanish courts." 244 Other Spanish
cases sought to investigate whether Spain violated its obligations by allowing U.S.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Langer, supranote 219, at 4.
238. Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded UniversalJurisdictionto ProsecuteHuman Rights Abuses
in Latin America, China, andBeyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 495, 496-97 (2007) (explaining that
Spanish courts successfully prosecuted Guatemalan generals for genocide, torture and state sponsored
terrorism against the Mayan people between 1978 and 1986, and has also successfully prosecuted
Argentineans during the "Dirty War").
239. Id. at 510.
240. Langer, supranote 219, at 37-40.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Jouet, supra note 238, at 526.
244. Id. at 527.
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planes to travel through Spain on their way to Guantanamo Bay or for CIA
operatives who traveled through Spain during extraordinary rendition flights. 245
WikiLeaks cables revealed that the U.S. placed extraordinary pressure upon
Spanish courts and judges to drop the case. 246 Universal jurisdiction came to a halt
when the investigating magistrate, Baltasar Garz6n, indicated that he would
investigate alleged violations by Spanish authorities against Basque separatists.
The Spanish courts then accused Garz6n of overstepping his judicial authority,
which constitutes a criminal offense in Spain, thereby ending his decades-long
career as a prosecutor. 24 7 Spanish courts dismissed the cases on grounds of
complementarity in 2011.
The cases, and the diplomatic furor they created, also prompted radical
amendment to Spain's universal jurisdiction law. In 2009, Spanish legislators
amended the law to require that either the accused be in Spanish territory or that
there exist another relevant link between Spain and the case. The new law also
prohibited Spanish courts from invoking universal jurisdiction if another national
court or an international tribunal is investigating the case. 248
d. United Kingdom
After a series of cases brought against former Israeli officials in the British
courts, 249 its Parliament amended the U.K. law to prohibit magistrates from filing

245. Giles Tremlett, Wikileaks: US PressuredSpain Over CIA Rendition and Guantdnamo Torture,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-usspain-guantanamo-rendition; US Embassy Cables: Spanish Prosecutor Weighs Guantdnamo Criminal
Against US Officials, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/usembassy-cables-documents/200177.
246. Tremlett, supra note 245 ("Senator Mel Martinez, a former Republican party chairman, and
the U.S. embassy's charge d'affaires visited the Spanish foreign ministry to wam the investigation
would have consequences." The U.S. targeted various judges and prosecutors including national court
chief prosecutor, Javier Zaragoza. The WikiLeaks cable shows that Zaragoza was a valuable asset to
the U.S. government in trying to stop investigations by Prosecutor Garz6n who was responsible for the
majority of prosecutions under universal jurisdiction in Spanish courts. Zaragoza criticized Garz6n as
hating Americans and seemed to provide the U.S. government with information that Garz6n was
already under scrutiny for "his investigation into human rights crimes committed under Spain's former
dictator General Francisco Franco."); see also Scott Horton, The Madrid Cables, HARPER'S MAG.: THE
STREAM, (Dec. 1, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/12/hbc-90007836. According to
Harper's Magazine, the WikiLeaks cables also showed the U.S. embassy in Madrid was also involved
in political pressure against Spanish courts. "These cables show that the U.S. embassy in Madrid had far
exceeded this mandate, however, and was actually successfully steering the course of criminal
investigations, the selection of judges, and the conduct of prosecutors. Their disclosure has created
deep concern about the independence of judges in Spain and the manipulation of the entire criminal
justice system by a foreign power." Id.
247. See Lisa Abend, Sentencing Spain's 'Superiudge': Why Baltasar Garzdn is Being Punished,
TIME, Feb. 10, 2012, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2106537,00.html.
248. Langer, supra note 219, at 40 (explaining amended Article 23(4)).
249. Noura Erakat, Israel versus Universal Jurisdiction:A Battle for InternationalHuman Rights
Law, JADALIYYA (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/288/israel-versus-universaljurisdiction a-battle-for-.
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arrest warrants for universal jurisdiction cases.250 Since the 2011 amendments
went into effect, only a government minister can authorize an arrest warrant.251
While the amendment further politicizes invocation of universal jurisdiction, it still
preserves that states have the permissive right to do so.
e. African Union Challenge in the Sixth Committee
In light of the failed suits against U.S., Israeli, and Chinese officials, African
countries-which have borne the brunt of international criminal law's
development252 and therefore, are specially affected-challenged the application of
universal jurisdiction. In February 2009, Tanzania, on behalf of the Group of
African States, requested the inclusion of an additional agenda item titled "abuse
of the principle of universal jurisdiction" in the proceedings of the 6 3 d Session of
the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly adopted resolution
A/RES/64/117 and mandated (1) that all states submit reports on their scope and
application of universal jurisdiction to the Secretary-General by April 2010; and
(2) that the Sixth Committee (legal) would consider the issue as part of its
discussions on pressing legal issues.253 While the response to the SecretaryGeneral has been underwhelming, universal jurisdiction has been the subject of
heated debate since 2009.254
Of the 192 member states asked to submit reports to the Secretary-General,
In its 2010 report on Universal
only forty-four states have complied.255
Jurisdiction, Amnesty International demonstrates a gap between the state
submissions to the Secretary-General and their actual practice and legislation. The
international NGO shows that states knowingly withheld information critical for an
authoritative and comprehensive assessment of universal jurisdiction.256 While
this may illustrate shortcomings in the Secretary-General's assessment of the
practice, it does not bode well for the status of universal jurisdiction. The
lackluster and inaccurate submissions may constitute a state practice unto their
own demonstrating a regression away from the robust potential of universal
jurisdiction as a tool to end impunity.

250. Danna Harman, U.K. Moves to Amend UniversalJurisdictionLaw, HAARETZ (Feb. 12, 2010,
1:33 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/u-k-moves-to-amend-universal-jurisdiction-law1.328308.
251. Jonny Paul, U.K. Amends Laws to Protect Israelisfrom Prosecution, THE JERUSALEM POST
(Sep. 15, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=238107.
252. See generally Situations & Cases, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/ENMenus/ICC

(last visited Dec. 2, 2012)
/Situations%2Oand%2OCases/Pages/situations%2Oand%20cases.aspx
(pointing out that of the ICC warrants issued since the tribunal's establishment in 2002, all of them have
involved cases emerging from the African continent). Not a single universal jurisdiction case has been
invoked in an African national court. See Yee, supranote 167, at 522.
253. JUSTICE TOOL, supra note 131, at 5-6.
254. See Yee, supra note 167, at 503.
255. JUSTICE TOOL, supra note 131, at 5.
256. Id.
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Within the Sixth Committee, divergent understandings of universal
jurisdiction have done little to afford clarity on the matter. 257 It is of considerable
significance, however, that not a single state among those who participated in the
Sixth Committee discussion questioned the permissible right of universal
jurisdiction. In the most recent Sixth Committee meeting in October 2011,
participating member states repeatedly and consistently affirmed the critical need
for a universal jurisdiction for the sake of a world where the torturer could find no
haven, but lamented the lack of a more formulaic approach that would offer
predictability. 258 They are primarily concerned with the fact that the tool had
gotten into the hands of individuals, of civil society organizations, and other nonstate actors. Absent tight regulation, these actions could not be filtered to account
for comity.259 This narrative suited those strong states that feared that universal
jurisdiction would become a pathway for the individual to become a full rightsbearing agent under international law. On the other hand, weaker states grew
frustrated that such a jurisdiction would only be wielded against the sovereignty of
the least-developed states for which sovereignty was tenuous.260 All parties
describe the problem as the "politicization" of universal jurisdiction.26 1
While clarity on the definition of universal jurisdiction will not trump the
practice itself, or its availability as customary permissive right, inter-subjective
confusion among states will certainly stunt its invocation. Coupled with legislative
amendments restricting the scope of universal jurisdiction by requiring a link to the
forum state, the trajectory of universal jurisdiction appears to be in regression. In
fact, aware of this current down-trend, human rights attorneys are reluctant to

257. Press Release, General Assembly, Principle of 'Universal Jurisdiction' Again Divides
Assembly's Legal Committee Delegates; Further Guidance Sought from International Law
Commission, U.N. Press Release GA/L/3415 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/News
/Press/docs/20 11/gal3415.doc.htm [hereinafter Sixth Committee].
258. Id. (providing responses to the principle of "Universal Jurisdiction." For example, the Cuban
delegate stated "the principle needed to be discussed to avoid its misuse," and the Sudanese delegate
noted "the scope of its application raised legal reservations. Universal jurisdiction was directly linked to
the sovereignty of States and the principles of international law.").
259. Id. ("Those entities contributing to Section IV of the report raised a variety of issues, including
the need for clear rules governing the application of universal jurisdiction to ensure its reasonable
exercise; the necessity of considering rights and guarantees that mark the limits of State power,
regardless of where a trial is conducted, once the need to exercise universal jurisdiction becomes
apparent; the necessity of devising a framework of reference under international law for the principles
of universal jurisdiction to specify under what conditions the State is internationally competent to
investigate or prosecute extraterritorial offences; and the need to agree on the extent and applicability of
universal jurisdiction within an all-inclusive multilateral arrangement, such as the United Nations.").
260. Yee, supra note 167, at 510, 522 (noting that not a single case was brought in Africa).
261. Sixth Committee, supra note 257 (explaining that it met to deliberate "on its possible misuse
and imposition on State sovereignty'). The Delegate from Sudan summed it up well when describing
that "[t]he application of the principle was directly linked to the Sovereignty of states," and he noted a
double standard in the understanding of the principle and the selectivity of its practice. Id.
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wield the jurisdictional tool,262 though they have not disavowed it altogether.
Kaleck sums it up when he explains:
We all know about the limitations of international criminal justice not
being able to bring cases against super and regional powers and the only
way to hold them to account is to prosecute them in universal
jurisdiction-if it is only used against fallen dictators and low level
officials, we cannot achieve its purpose . . . it didn't develop like we

imagined fifteen years ago but there is some progress. It is important
that the U.S. torture policy and our accusations have been taken
seriously by the majority of the legal community. Even among
governments, they have taken the evidence seriously. 263
The regressive trend in universal jurisdiction since the Study's publication in
2005 indicates that a more attenuated right to vest universal jurisdiction exists than
the Study originally suggested. The precise scope of the right is not as broad or
unqualified as the ICRC stated. Instead, the fact that specially affected states, like
the African Union as a body, have protested its invocation against sitting heads of
states and have emphasized its abuse 264 indicates that the norm may still be in
formation. Moreover, it shows that the customary right to vest universal
jurisdiction over war crimes is robust only when there exists general international
consensus that an act amounts to a crime and that there should be accountability
for this crime.
In the early nineties, and on the heels of an aborted intervention to stave off
mass murder in Rwanda, the international community responded to internal
conflicts with a vengeance.265 In effect, the global movement to respond to
chilling atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ushered in a revival of
international criminal law whose jurisdictional boundaries were not policed by
sovereign markers. 266 To the contrary, for an intermittent decade, it seemed that
human rights and the claims of individual dignity would police sovereignty's
borders.
During that time dozens of states opened their national courts to hear claims
lacking the traditional jurisdictional links (i.e. active personality, passive
personality, territorial, and national interest) in matters concerning those crimes
considered an affront to all of humanity. 267 The mounting jurisprudence, and the
palpable acquiescence to its exercise, underscored an attitudinal position common
to the community of nations that each nation is empowered to act on behalf of the

262. Kaleck Interview, supra note 170 ("We are very ... reluctant to use the tool because the
attitude of prosecutorial authorities all over Europe is that they won't allow us to bring a case without a
link to the country.").
263. Id.
264. LOUISE ARIMATSU, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: AFRICA'S HOPE
FOR JUSTICE? 4-5 (2010), availableat www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 5-6.
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global whole to eradicate impunity for heinous crimes.m Upon this demonstrable
attitudinal position, the ICRC found that states have the right to vest universal
jurisdiction in their national courts over war crimes as a matter of customary
right. 269
The ICRC, however, failed to consider that the momentum to which it was
bearing witness was context-specific. While national courts opened their doors to
hear extra-territorial and extra-national claims, those claims had been rendered
non-controversial by the sweeping endorsement of the U.N. Security Council.
History and politics together established who, where, and what was an enemy to all
humankind, not unlike the historical vectors that made deplorable those Nazi
designs for ethno-national purity while condoning the mass murder of Japanese
civilians in the name of national security. The "enemy of humankind" reflects a
selective humanity, then and now.
As such, the U.S. Government is right to question the status of Rule 157 as a
customary rule.
Though equipped with antiquated modes for identifying
customary international humanitarian law, the U.S. correctly noted that there does
not exist sufficient consensus regarding the scope of war crimes to which
international criminal liability inheres.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the scope, definition, and application of universal jurisdiction generates
ample controversy, its purpose and utility remains uncontested. This speaks to the
permissive nature of the rule as characterized by the ICRC. Unlike other rules,
which create obligations for, or restrictions upon states, a permissive rule stipulates
that no prohibition exists upon state authority. The modern approach to the
formation of customary international humanitarian law is particularly appropriate
as it concerns permissive rules because of the weight that should be afforded to
state attitudes and state protest as opposed to actual state practice alone.
In general, the modem approach is superior in regard to human rights and
humanitarian law because of international society's nature as a collective whole
rather than an aggregate sum of its parts. It is also superior because of the
specialized nature of the human rights and humanitarian legal regimes, and
because of the unreliability of operational state practice. As a result, the methods
inherent to the modern approach, namely a reliance on soft-law instruments as
indicative of opinio juris, the flexibility in identifying a customary norm that has
not hardened, and a diminished reliance upon the practice of specially affected
states, are operative in the assessment of customary international humanitarian law.
To this end, the ICRC was correct in its methodological approach in its Study.
However, its application of the more accurate approach does not predetermine an
accurate outcome.

268. Id. at 7.
269. See VOLUME I, supra note 2, at 604.
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As it stands, the ICRC can confidently argue that states possess a right to vest
universal jurisdiction in their national courts over those crimes benefitting from
universal condemnation irrespective of their international or non-international
character. This is distinct from its broader claim as articulated in Rule 157, which
suggests that states have a customary right to vest universal jurisdiction over war
crimes. As shown here, the approach to customary law does not presuppose a
particular outcome. It is worthwhile to also consider whether choosing between
the traditional and modern approach is relevant at all. Perhaps using other
disciplinary approaches, like sociology or political science, to identify customary
law is more appropriate. Whichever approach is ultimately used, this paper
attempts to demonstrate, in part, that customary law is not subject to mathematical
algorithms and definitive accuracy. To the contrary, customary law is complex
and nonetheless, equally binding on the most powerful and weak states alike.

THE VOLTA CONVENTION: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AN ERA OF
IMPENDING CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVASTATING NATURAL
DISASTERS?
MEGAN MATT-HEWS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Volta Basin is a West African watercourse encompassing six riparian
states, some of the most impoverished nations in the world. The basin region has
recently been plagued with devastating parasitic diseases, floods, droughts, and
water shortages. As the global temperature begins to shift, the rainy seasons in the
basin have become more sporadic and intense, leading to both flooding and
droughts. Recent deluges have spurred conflicts between states, springing from
accusations of dam letting without prior notification. The inundations left
thousands homeless and destroyed thousands of hectares of farmland. These
extreme weather events are projected to increase in occurrence and severity due to
climate change, which will also cause sea level rises, elevated regional
temperatures, and decreased annual rainfall. The cumulative effect of these
imminent environmental stressors will likely cause extreme water stress, food
shortages, economic duress, and, ultimately, transboundary conflict between the
riparian states relating to shared water resources. In the face of impending climate
change disasters and water shortages, the basin states must take swift and
immediate action to avoid their continued status as perpetual victims.
Transboundary water resource management has been nonexistent within the
basin until recently. In 2007, the Volta Basin states signed and subsequently
ratified a convention, the purpose of which is to promote social and economic
growth within the region and to effectively manage the Volta River and its
tributaries. This instrument was the first and most important step in creating a
cooperative effort for the basin's water resource management. Unfortunately, the
treaty is severely lacking in many of its substantive and procedural obligations. If
these states take swift and immediate action within their transboundary water
management program created by the new treaty, the basin states may prevail in

* The author earned her Juris Doctorate from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law
in 2011. Currently, she is an Associate Attorney with the McDivitt Law Firm, specializing in Social
Security Disability Insurance. She teaches International Practice and Procedure as an Adjunct Professor
at the Sturm College of Law, and coaches the University of Denver's Jessup International Moot Court
team. She would like to thank Professor George "Rock" Pring, who taught International Water Law, for
his passionate and energetic efforts to ensure his students understood and appreciated the law.
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protecting their populations and sovereign interests from the impending dangers of
the changing climate.
This paper will begin in Part II with a physical description of the Volta Basin,
including the tributaries of the watercourse and their relation to the riparian states
of the basin. Part III will examine the historical uses of the basin's water,
beginning with the pre-colonial and colonial eras, followed by post-colonial and
modem uses. This section will include a detailed discussion of the various social,
economic, and other pertinent obstacles caused by water issues that affect the
riparian states, particularly those related to climate change. An analysis of the
development of the international legal regime relating to the watercourse will
follow in Part IV. Part B of this section will specifically treat the recently ratified
Volta Convention and analyze its strengths and shortcomings in comparison to the
United Nations' Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses. Then, Part V will argue that the Volta Convention's current
obligations are insufficient to combat the impending natural disasters associated
with global climate change. Finally, Part V concludes that the Volta Convention
has the opportunity to be an effective tool for transboundary water resource
management to protect the basin state populations from the dangers of climate
change, only if substantial changes are made to the treaty.
II.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WATERCOURSE AND BASIN STATES

The Volta River Basin is the ninth largest basin in Africa, covering over
400,000 km2, an extremely sizeable basin when considering that the category for
"large" basins begins at 10,000 km 2. 1 Six riparian countries share the Volta Basin
2
in West Africa: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Mali, and C6te d'Ivoire.
Burkina Faso and Ghana occupy a majority of the basin, 43 percent and 42 percent
respectively. 3 The 15 percent remainder rests within the four remaining riparian
states, of which Togo occupies 6 percent, Benin 4 percent, Mali 3 percent, and

1. M. Andreini, Nick van de Giesen, Annette van Edig, M. Fosu & W. Andah, Volta Basin Water
Balance 3 (Ctr. for Development Research (ZEF), Discussion Paper No. 21 on Development Policy,
2000), availableathttp://www.zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/zef dp/zef-dp2l-00.pdf
2. Boubacar Barry, Emmanuel Obuobie, Marc Andreini, Winston Andah & Mathilde Pluquet,
The Volta River Basin: Comparative Study of River Basin Development and Management 11
(International Water Management Institute, Draft, 2005), availableat http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Asse
ssment/filesnew/researchjprojects/RiverBasinDevelopment and ManagementfVoltaRiverBasinBo
ubacar.pdf; Jonathan Lautze, Boubacar Barry, & Eva Youkhana, Changing Interfaces in Volta Basin
Water Management: Customary, National, and Transboundary 6 (Ctr. for Development Research
(ZEF), Working Paper Series, Paper No. 16, 2006), availableat http://www.zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/
downloads/zef wp/wpl6.pdf. For a map of Africa's water basins, see Map: Water Basins of Africa,
WATERWIKI.NET, http://waterwiki.net/index.php/Map:_WaterBasins of Africa (last modified Apr. 18,
2009).
3. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 11.
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C6te d'Ivoire 2 percent.4 The Volta Basin stretches from its most northern point,
in Mali at 140 30' N, to its most southern point, in Ghana at latitude 5 O'N.
The basin is drained by the River Volta and its four main tributaries: the
Black Volta, the White Volta with the Red Volta as its tributary, the Lower Volta,
and the Oti. 6 The Black Volta's headwaters originate from the Sourou River in
Mali and the Mouhoun in Burkina Faso, which join together in Burkina Faso. The
Black Volta then runs contiguously along the Burkina Faso and Ghana border, and
flows downstream to Ghana, contributing 18 percent of the total annual flow to the
basin. The Sourou dries up for approximately two months a year. The mean
annual flow of the Black Volta at Bamboi is about 200 m3 /s, of which
approximately 57.4 percent originates from Ghana, and its mean annual runoff is
7,673 x 106

m3.7

The White Volta's headwaters begin as the Nakanb6 River in Burkina Faso
and the river travels south into Ghana. Its mean annual flow is approximately 300
m3 /s and its mean annual runoff is 9,565 x 106 M . The main tributaries of the
White Volta are the Red Volta and the Sissili, each with their source in Burkina
Faso. Both the Red Volta and Sissili dry up for approximately two months a year.
These tributaries contribute 20 percent of the total annual flow in the Volta Basin.
The Lower Volta flows predominately within Ghana, occupying an area of
2
59,414 km2, but also enters into Togo briefly, yet only encompassing 3,237 km
within Togo. The three other basin tributaries converge into the Lower Volta
before emptying in to Lake Volta, contributing to the Lower Volta's mean annual
runoff of 9,842 x 106 M3 .9
The Oti River comprises only 18 percent of the total catchment in the Volta
basin,10 but because the Oti's sub-basin has steep topography and comparatively
4. Id.; Global Change and the Hydrologic Cycle in the Volta Basin, The Volta River Basin,
GLOWA VOLTA, http://www.glowa-volta.de/volta-basin.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
5. Barry et al., supranote 2, at 11.
6. Ben Y. Ampomah, Bernadette A. Adjei, & Eva Youkhana, The Transboundary Water
Resources Management Regime of the Volta Basin 5 (Ctr. for Development Research (ZEF), Working
Paper Series No. 28, 2008), availableat http://www.zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/zef wp/wp
28.pdf; Nick van de Giesen, Marc Andreini, Annette van Edig & Paul Vlek, Competitionfor Water
Resources of the Volta Basin, 28 IAHS PUBL. 199, 201 (2001), availableat http://www.glowa.org/del
literaturliste/dateien/competition in volta basin.pdf; Mac Kirby, Devaraj de Condappa, Mohammed
Mainuddin, Judy Eastham & Mark Thomas, Water-Use Accounts in CPWF Basins: Simple Water-Use
Accounting of the Volta Basin 7 (CGIAR Challenge Program on Water & Food, Working Papers, BFP
Series No. 04, 2004) [hereinafter CPWF], available at http://192.156.137.192/bitstream/handle/10568
/10192/CPWFBFP WP_04.pdfsequence-3. For a map of the Volta Basin, see Global Change and
the Hydrologic Cycle in the Volta Basin, The Volta River Basin, GLOWA VOLTA, http://www.glowavolta.de/voltabasin.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) [hereinafter GLOWA Volta Map].
7. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 43, 69, 70.
8. Kwabena Kankam-Yeboah, Philip Gyau-Boakye, Makoto Nishigaki & Mitsuru Komatsu,
Water Resources and Environmental Management in Ghana, 9 J. FAC. ENVTL. SCL & TECH. 87, 91
(2004).
9. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 42, 68.
10. Hans Peter Arp & Karsten Baumgirtel, Case Study: The Consequences of the Akosombo
Dam, The Science and Politics of Large Dam Projects Seminar 3 (Oct. 31, 2005) (unpublished case
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higher rainfall than the other countries in the basin, it contributes 30 percent to 40
percent of the Volta River system's annual flow." The Oti River originates in the
Atakora mountain range of Benin at an altitude of 600 m and its tributaries and
basin primarily rest in Togo, Burkina Faso, and Ghana.' 2 After leaving Benin, the
river travels into Burkina Faso, then moves southwest to form the border between
Burkina Faso and Benin, before dropping into Togo, and then Ghana.' 3 Due to the
high level of rainfall it receives, the river does not dry up in the winter season and
has an annual average flow of 100 to 300 m3/s, with a maximum flow of 500

m3/s.14

The main tributaries of the Volta Basin discharge into Lake Volta, located in
Ghana, and the total annual runoff from the Volta and its tributaries is
approximately 56.4 billion m3 of water.' 5 The Volta Lake is the largest man-made
lake in the world, created as a reservoir by Akosombo Dam.' 6 Its surface is near
8,500 km2, the average depth is about 18.8 m and the greatest depth is 90 m, with a
shoreline of about 5,500 km.' 7 The lake's total volume at full supply level is
approximately 150 billion m .

The climate within the basin can be divided up into three basic zones: humid
tropical, tropical transition, and dry tropical.' 9 The humid tropical climate, which
is characterized by two distinct rainy seasons, is the most southern zone within the
basin, encompassing the southern regions of CMte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and
Benin.20 The northern parts of CMte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin occupy the
tropical transition zone, as well as the southern tips of both Burkina Faso and

study for The Science and Politics of Large Dam Projects Seminar, Swiss Fed. Inst. of Tech. Zurich)
(on file with author).
11. T. Petr, The Volta River System, in THE ECOLOGY OF RIVER SYSTEMS 163, 165 (Bryan Robert
Davies & Keith F. Walker eds., 1986); Arp & Baumgartel, supra note 10, at 3. For more detailed
information on the hydrology of the Volta Basin and topographic maps, see Gerlinde Jung, Regional
Climate Change and the Impact on Hydrology in the Volta Basin of West Africa (Jan. 2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Augsburg), availableat http://www.glowa.org/de/literat
urliste/dateien/doc thesis jung.pdf.
12. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 43.
13. See GLOWA Volta Map, supra note 6.
14. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 43.
15. CPWF, supra note 6, at 7; Nelson Obirih-Opareh, Socioeconomic and Political Impact of
Transboundary Water Management of the Volta Basin, in THE HYDROPOLITICS OF AFRICA: A
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE 175, 177 (Marcel Kitissou et al. eds., 2007).

16. van de Giesen et al., supra note 6, at 199.
17. Barry et al., supra note 2, at I1.
18. Id.
19. See Jacques Lemoalle, CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food,Global Trends in the
Volta Basin, Volta Basin Focal Project Report No. 3, 7 (2007), available at
http://cpwfbfp.pbworks.com/flBFP+Volta Lemoalle+(2007).pdf; Barry et al., supra note 2, at 16.
20. Lemoalle, supra note 19, at 7.; see also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT

BOOK: AFRICA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html (last visited
May 5, 2012) [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACT BOOK] (discussing the climate of each riparian state
within the Volta Basin). To access the climate information for each riparian state, select the name of the
state from the drop down menu on the website and select "geography" under the subject headings.
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Mali.
The tropical transitional zone has two less distinct rainy reasons.
Burkina Faso and Mali occupy the dry tropical zone, and further extend into the
Sudan, Sudan-Sahelian, and Sahelian zones. 23 The dry tropical climate consists of
two seasons: a longer dry season and a shorter wet season, which peaks in
August. 24
The predominant sources of water in the basin are rainfall, streams, rivers,
lakes, groundwater, and man-made water storage facilities, such as dams and
reservoirs.25 The mean annual rainfall in the Volta Basin ranges from 1400 mm in
the southern part of the basin to 400 mm in the north.26 The majority of the mean
annual rainfall in the basin occurs during the rainy season, which peaks in July and
August each year.27 Due to climate change, however, the rainy seasons are
shifting, becoming shorter, and more sporadic. 28 The basin region is plagued by
droughts in the dry season and increasing variability in the rainy season, which is
progressively augmenting water stress.29
The mean average annual evaporation of the basin ranges between 1400 mm
and 3015 mm, 30 a relatively high level of evaporation in comparison to the level of
precipitation the basin receives. The high level of evaporation is potentially
increasing the rate of desertification in the region; particularly in Burkina Faso
where the minimum rate of evaporation is 1900 mm/yr.3 1 Total annual input into
the Volta Basin from precipitation is approximately 407,600 mcm. 32 The net
runoff from the basin is 38,900 mcm/yr, approximately 10 percent of the total
input from precipitation.
This rate of runoff indicates that a comparatively
reduced rate of recharge from surface water is occurring in the region, perhaps due
to evaporation, storage of the water by man-made facilities, and other factors.
Groundwater is not a significant resource in the basin, mostly due to the low
primary porosity of the region's sediment, known as the Voltaian Formation.34

21. See CIA WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 20.

22. Barry et al., supranote 2, at 16.
23. Id.; see also Lemoalle, supranote 19, at 7.
24. Lemoalle, supra note 19, at 7; Barry et al., supranote 2, at 16.
25. Barry et al., supranote 2, at 67.
26. CPWF, supra note 6, at 7. For a chart outlining average annual rainfall and evapotranspiration
in the riparian countries of the Volta Basin, see Barry et al., supranote 2, at 22.
27. CPWF, supra note 6, at 7.
28. Eva Youkhana & Wolfram Laube, Cultural, Socio-Economic and Political Constraints for
Virtual Water Trade: Perspectivesfrom the Volta Basin, West Africa 5 (Ctr. For Development Research
(ZEF), Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13, 2006), availableat http://www.zef.delfileadmin/webfiles
/downloads/zef wp/wp1 3.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 22.
31. Id.; United Nations Environment Programme, Western Africa and FreshwaterResources, THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.eoearth.org/article/WesternAfricaandfreshwa
ter-resources.
32. CPWF, supra note 6, at 19.
33. Id.
34. Kankam-Yeboah et al., supra note 8, at 91.
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Groundwater and aquifers occur marginally from "the development of secondary
porosity as a result of jointing, shearing, fracturing and weathering" of the
sedimentary formation.35 Unfortunately, use of shallow aquifers in the region,
when accessed by boreholes and hand-dug wells, is usually more detrimental than
beneficial for the consuming population because the aquifers are often
contaminated by domestic and agricultural waste. 36
Population growth and concentration are a mounting concern within the basin
because of the direct relationship between population and water stress. In 2005, it
was estimated that within the next forty years, the current population of 20 million
within the Volta Basin would increase by more than 80 percent." In relation to the
rest of Africa, the basin is densely settled, "possessing roughly three times the
mean population density of Sub-Saharan Africa." 38 The density in the basin ranges
from 8 to 104 persons/km 2 and three major cities, Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso,
and Tamale, each contain a population over 100,000 people.39 Currently, the water
demand of the population, estimated at 1.7 billion m3 per year, is not being met and
it is projected by the United Nations Environment Programme that water use could
increase by as much as 583 percent within the basin over the next twenty years.40
Other issues that significantly affect modern use of the basin include:
infestations of aquatic weeds, high rates of water-borne diseases, increased
earthquakes, and climate change. 41 The creation of Lake Volta spawned the
invasion of several species of aquatic weeds that have persisted and negatively
impacted navigation, fishing, power generation, and the proliferation of waterborne diseases.42 Stagnant pools of water created by the watercourse alterations
for Akosombo Dam have become breeding grounds for the hosts of highly
infectious parasitic diseases, such as schistosomiasis (bilharzia), onchoceriasis
(river blindness), and malaria.43 Finally, seismic activity in Ghana has increased
since the construction of Akosombo Dam and Lake Volta because of the added

35. Id.
36. F. Anim, F. K. Nyame & T. K. Armah, Colhform Status of Water Bodies from Two Districtsin
Ghana, West Africa: Implicationsfor Rural Water Resources Management, 12 WATER POL'Y 734, 743744 (2010).
37. UNITED NATIONS ENvIRONMENT PROGRAMME, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY AND
RESILIENCE ALONG INTERNATIONAL WATERS: AFRICA 56 (2005), availableat http://www.transbound

arywaters.orst.edu/researchfUNEPAtias/HydropoliticalVulnerability %20ResilienceAfrica.pdf
[hereinafter UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY]. For more detailed reference regarding Volta
Basin population statistics, see Barry et al., supra note 2, at 32.
38. Youkhana & Laube, supranote 28, at 6.
39. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 33-34.
40. UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY, supra note 37, at 56.

41. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 151-54; UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY, supra note
37, at 56-57.
42. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 151.
43. See Ronald Graham, Ghana's Volta Resettlement Scheme, in 2 THE SOCIAL AND
ENvIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS: A REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN ECOLOGICAL ACTION

GROUP (ECORPA) 131 (Edward Goldsmith & Nicholas Hildyard eds., 1984).
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stress of the lake on the underlying rocks." It has reached a level where Ghana is
experiencing regular tremors.45 Finally, climate change is significantly impacting
the basin region with shifts in the rainy season, the occurrence of droughts and dry
spells, escalating regularity in floods, and increased desertification. 46 These
various issues will be discussed in more detail in Section III.
III. HISTORY OF HuMAN USE OF THE VOLTA BASIN
This section will discuss both pre-colonial and colonial uses of the riparian
basin and the conflicts created by the various uses, and then address the basin in
the modem era. The inherent tension between the colonizers and colonized
resulted in a regression towards certain pre-colonial usages and forms of water
source governance once colonialism in the region ended. Therefore, it is
appropriate to examine the historical uses and conflicts in the basin as necessarily
informative to a discussion of current practices.
A.

Uses and Conflicts in the Basin During the Pre-Colonialand Colonial
Eras

Pre-antiquity, at least fifty indigenous ethnic groups shared the Volta Basin
and political chiefdoms governed the water management practices.47 These ethnic
groups, the most prominent being the Akan, Dagomba, Mossi, and Boba, were
distinct in their political, economic, social, and cultural identities. 48 At times,
differing uses of the Basin for agricultural and other purposes created conflict
among these ethnic groups.
The traditional economies of these indigenous groups largely focused on
agricultural activities, both subsistence farming and cattle herding, while some

44. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 154.
45. Paulina Ekua Amponsah, Seismic Activity in Ghana: Past,Presentand Future,47 ANNALS OF
GEOPHYSICS 539, 542 (2004).
46. Nick van de Giesen, Jens Liebe & Gerlinde Jung, Adapting to Climate Change in the Volta
Basin, West Africa, 98 CURRENT SCI. 1033, 1034-35 (2010); van de Giesen et al., supranote 6, at 199201; see IUCN REG'L OFFICE FOR WEST AFRICA, REDUCING WEST AFRICA'S VULNERABILITY TO
CLIMATE IMPACTS ON WATER RESOURCES, WETLANDS AND DESERTIFICATION: ELEMENTS FOR A
REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR PREPAREDNESS AND ADAPTATION 11-20 (Madiodio Niasse, Abel Afouda &

Abou Amani eds., 2004).
47. Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 7-8; Eva Youkhana, Charles Rodgers & Oliver Korth,
Transboundary Water Management in the Volta Basin 5 (2006) (unpublished article, Extended Abstract
for the III International Symposium on Transboundary Water Management), availableat http://www.
zef.de/fileadmin/webfiles/downloads/press/transboundary water management volta.pdf (last visited
May 5, 2012) [hereinafter TWM Symposium]; see generally JOHN G. JACKSON, INTRODUCTION TO
AFRICAN CIVILIZATIONS (1970) (discussing the history and development of African people and their
civilization).
48. Yaw Opuku-Ankomah, Youssouf Demb616, Ben Y. Ampomah & Lopold Som6, HydroPoliticalAssessment of Water Governancefrom the Top-Down and Review ofLiteratureon Local Level
Institutions and Practices in the Volta Basin 1-2 (Int'l Water Mgmt. Inst., Working Paper No. Il l,
2006), available at http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/publications/WorkingPapers/working/WORIl l.pdf,
TWM Symposium, supranote 47, at 5.
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tribes were nomadic. 49 In Ghana and Burkina Faso, the predominant use of water
was for cereal cultivation.50 In addition to cereals such as millet, pre-colonial
Ghanaian tribes farmed yams, peppers, beans, other vegetables, and certain species
of rice.5 The Volta Basin river system was the main source of transportation for
trading these crops and other goods.52 Several indigenous groups in Burkina Faso
were nomadic livestock herders and the movement of these transhumant breeders
often created conflicts with the subsistence farmers over water consumption."
Additionally, tribal groups in the south relied heavily upon fishing as their
economic activity. 54
Traditional land tenure systems within the region varied between ethnic
groups, but most centered on a communal approach to land ownership where
individuals cultivated the land even though its ownership was governed by the
tribe.55 Acquisition of land within the basin occurred using the "first-comer"
approach where sovereignty over land was obtained by merely occupying the land
first.5 6 "Late-comers" were accepted and acquired land ownership rights if the new
tribe recognized the "first-comer's" original sovereignty.5 7
Pre-colonial water rights within the basin paralleled the traditional land tenure
system. Water ownership was seen as collective and all families and individuals
had a right to utilize the resource freely.58 Interestingly, because the water from
the basin's rivers was viewed as holy, most tribes had strict regulations protecting
the integrity of the resource. 59 Tribal chiefs and priests were responsible for
protecting the sanctity of a river's water and, accordingly, they promoted water
utilization practices that were environmentally beneficial and sustainable. 0 It was
even forbidden to use the water on certain days of the week for specific activities,
such as clothes washing and fishing.' Many of these traditional land and water
tenure systems continue to operate today, particularly where local and regional
governments have failed to implement national water regulation practices.62
Conflicts between lineages and clans over water rights did occur in the Volta
Basin,6 3 although the details of those disputes and subsequent resolutions were not
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
comers:

Opuku-Ankomah et al., supranote 48, at 3.
Id.
Barry et al., supranote 2, at 143.
Opuku-Ankoman et al., supranote 48, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See Barry et al., supra note 2, at 52, 55, 156; see also Carola Lentz, First-comersand LateIndigenous Theories of Land Ownership in the West African Savanna, in LAND AND THE
POLrrIcs OF BELONGING IN WEST AFRICA 35, 35-56 (Richard Kuba & Carola Lentz eds., 2006).
56. Lentz, supranote 55, at 35-39.
57. Id. at 37.
58. TWM Symposium, supra note 47, at 5.
59. Id.
60. Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 7.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id. at 7-8; Barry et al., supranote 2, at 52, 55, 156.
63. TWM Symposium, supra note 47, at 6.
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recorded and most historical information from the basin has been acquired from
narratives and anthropological excavations." As discussed earlier, the basin's
indigenous groups were diverse and water ownership practices were varied,
creating conflicts between tribes and within factions of the tribes themselves.6 5
Most disputes concerned ultimate sovereignty over the territory and not allocation
of land or water use rights, and consequently, even during periods of dispute,
farming and herding activities continued largely uninterrupted.66
The colonial era began in the late nineteenth century when French, British,
and German forces invaded the Volta Basin region.6 7 The basin was divided into
the British Gold Coast (later renamed Ghana), several French states (Burkina Faso,
C6te d'Ivoire, Mali, the Togolese Republic, and Benin), and German Togoland
(later annexed into Ghana). During the colonial period, local traditional land and
water tenure practices were superseded by British and French legislation, the two
most important pieces being the Gold Coast's Rivers Ordinance of 1903 and the
Forests Ordinance of 1949.69 The colonial water management system directly
contradicted the indigenous system, as it focused on state ownership and
government controlled water rights. 70 Although the colonial government regulated
water resource allocation at the intra-state and interstate level generally, local
indigenous authorities maintained significant control of water management at a
community level, as long as no conflict with colonial authorities existed.7 1 Daily
management of water resources was often left to the tribal leaders, and
accordingly, many of the traditional indigenous water management practices
persisted.72 In the French colonies of the Volta Basin, regulation of water use
remained predominately with tribal chiefdoms because of inconsistency in the
colonial policies. 73
Uses within the basin during the colonial period endured as primarily
agricultural, but navigational uses and fishing thrived as well.74 Some local
farmers were forced to transition from traditional farming for subsistence purposes
to growing cash crops, such as peanuts.7 5 The new development in water use
under the colonial rule was utilization of the basin's water resources for
industrialization purposes. The colonial governments initiated water conservation
64. Lentz, supra note 55, at 38.
65. Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 8.
66. Lentz, supra note 55, at 54.
67. Opuku-Ankomah et al., supra note 48, at 4.
68. Id. at 4-5; see also CIA WORLD FACT BOOK, supra note 20 (discussing the history of each
state within the Volta Basin).
69. Lautze et al., supranote 2, at 9.
70. Ampomah et al., supra note 6, at 6.
71. Id.; Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 9.
72. Ampomah et al., supranote 6, at 6; Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 9.
73. Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 9.
74. See Jennifer Hauck & Eva Youkhana, Claim and Reality of Community-based Water
Management at the Example of Rural Fisheriesin Ghana 6-7 (Ctr. for Dev. Research (ZEF), Working
Paper Grp. No. 28, 2008), available at http://www.irsa-world.org/XII/papers/28-2.pdf
75. Id. at 7.
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programs and, subsequently, the building of dams, weirs, reservoirs, and dugouts. 76 The water obtained from these projects was used for domestic purposes,
livestock, and irrigation projects."
B. Post-ColonialEra Uses and Conflicts
Today, the predominant use of the Volta Basin's water is agriculture, as is
typical of most African basins.78 In Ghana, 62.3 percent of the population relies on
the Volta Basin for agricultural needs, and in Burkina Faso, that percentage rises to
92.4 percent.79 The majority of the population in the Volta Basin is rural and they
earn their livelihood by exploitation of natural resources.80
In order to irrigate the land for agricultural and livestock industry purposes,
the basin countries built a large number of dams in recent years. Specifically, over
400 dams and small reservoirs were constructed in Burkina Faso during a short
span of time, but over 2,100 are in operation within the country, totaling 4.6 km3 in
storage volume. Estimated water demand for irrigation in Burkina Faso is
323,000,000 m3/yr and, for domestic water, is approximately 103,500,000 m /yr.
In Mali, the only major dam is the Pont-Barrage of Baye, but in Togo, five major
dams store 16,862,400 in3 . Cte d'Ivoire only has a few dams as a minority
riparian within the basin.
Additional uses of the basin's water include: raising livestock, fisheries,
forestry, domestic, and industrial. 82 Due to exponential population growth,
domestic and industrial uses within the basin are on the rise and are expected to
continue in an aggressive growth pattern.
Water demands in the Volta Basin84
are not currently being met because of inadequate infrastructure of water supply
systems, misuse of water, flood irrigation practices which cause evaporation and
seepage, overconsumption, and degradation of water supply. 85
Water stress in the basin is aggravated by inefficient use of the water
resources. The reliance of Ghana and Burkina Faso on subsistence and cash crop
farming as the main economic activities is 70 percent and 90 percent
respectively.86 The majority of farmers in the region continue to use flood
irrigation, which causes substantial losses of water from both evaporation and

76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY, supranote 37, at 55-56.
79. Id. at 56.
80. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 32.
81. Id. at 13, 65, 73, 133-35.
82. Id. at 65-67, 137.
83. UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY, supranote 37, at 56.
84. For more detailed information and statistics relating to the discussion in this section relating to
irrigation water demand, total consumptive water demand, and domestic versus industrial water demand
within the Volta River Basin, see Barry et al., supra note 2, at 137-38.
85. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 138-39; UNEP, HYDROPOLrICAL VULNERABILIfY, supra note
37, at 72.
86. Youkhana & Laube, supra note 28, at 7.
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seepage.87 Additionally, the Volta Basin's water supply systems for industrial and
domestic purposes lose an estimated 50 percent during transmission from
leakage.88
Effectiveness in water use and water quality issues may be difficult for the
basin states to combat, being among the poorest countries in the world.89 The
country with the highest per capita Gross National Product ("GNP") is C6te
d'Ivoire at $710; however, the GNP of Mali is disturbingly low at $190 per
capita. 90 In Burkina Faso, the majority of the population lives below the poverty
line, most likely due to a lack of marketable natural resources and arid land that is
difficult to cultivate. 9 '
International water disputes marginally emerged in the basin in 1962 with the
start of construction of the Akosombo Dam in Ghana and its reservoir, Lake
Volta. 92 The construction of the dam was spurred by a significant international
demand for aluminum in 1945. By 1946, American, British, South African, and
Canadian companies were embroiled in a bitter competition for securing
concessions in Africa for bauxite and electricity. 94 In 1956, after the United States
agreed to loan Ghana money for the Akosombo Dam project, with the condition
that American companies be awarded the building contract, a pair of U.S.
companies, Kaiser and Reynolds, won the contract with Ghana to harness the
Lower Volta River's power for aluminum processing.95 The Ghanaians touted the
proposed construction of the dam as the symbol of Ghana's progression into the
20th Century and an avenue to certain prosperity.
It appears, however, that Ghana not only failed to realize either progression or
prosperity from the construction of Akosombo Dam, but, in fact, the dam was
detrimental to Ghana and only the aluminum companies gained financially. The
project required that over 80,000 villagers be resettled. These villagers lost their
subsistence, as many were farmers and the new villages required those displaced to
farm different crops. 98 The resettled villagers were required to grow cash crops

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY, supra note 37, at 72.
Id. at 56.
Barry et al., supra note 2, at 37.
Id.

ABIR BEN SLIMANE, CGIAR CHALLENGE PROGRAM ON WATER & FOOD, VULNERABILITE DE
L'AGRICLTURE PLUVIALE DANS LE BASSIN DE LA VOLTA: ANALYSE DE L'IMPACT DE LA VARIABILITt
DES PLUIES ET LE RISQUE DE SECHERESSE SUR LE RENDEMENT ET LA GESTION DES EXPLOITATIONS
AGRICOLES, VOLTA BASIN FOCAL PROJECT REPORT No. 13, 22 (2008), available at

http://cpwfbfp.pbworks.com/flBFP+Volta Ben+Slimane+(2008).pdf.
92. See Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 14.
93. Graham, supranote 43, at 132.
94. Id.
95. Id.; KWAKU OBosU-MENSAH, GHANA'S VOLTA RESETTLEMENT SCHEME: THE LONG TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF POST-COLONIAL STATE PLANNING 13 (1996).
96. DAVID HART, THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT: A CASE STUDY INPOLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY 76
(1980).
97. Graham, supra note 43, at 134.
98. Id. at 135-38.
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and to practice a cooperative program of farming with mechanical equipment.99
The cooperative program failed, the cash crops destroyed the soil conditions, and
the mechanical equipment broke down, but the government did not provide repairs
or spare parts for the equipment. 100
Most disturbingly, inadequate housing or lack of housing forced many of
those displaced to become homeless altogether. 0 1 A majority of villagers received
only a fraction or none of the compensation they were promised for their homes
and farms, and compensation that was distributed arrived ten years after the
resettlement or later.102 Moreover, nearly all of the resettled population became
infected by a variety of parasitic diseases proliferated by the newly created Lake
Volta. 03 In his economical study of the successes and failures of the dam, David
Hart prepares a careful calculation of the gains and losses from the Volta
Resettlement Scheme that was initiated to facilitate the dam's construction.'0
Hart's research indicates that when subtracting the costs of the resettlement
project, the money spent to combat the onslaught of diseases created by the
reservoir, and the lost compensation for farmers from the net profit of electricity
sales, the dam's construction was in fact an economic loss to the Ghanaian people
on a macro level.' 05
Water degradation and related health issues are a primary concern in the
basin.106 A majority of the health issues in the Volta Basin arose from the
construction of the Akosombo Dam.10 7 The reservoir created by the dam, Lake
Volta, increased the amount of stagnant water pools in the new habitats below the
dam and the lake promulgated new vegetation with flooded woodlands as its
bed.108 The result was a devastating onslaught of three treacherous diseases:
malaria, schistosomiasis (bilharzia), and onchoceriasis (river blindness).' 0 9
Malaria is a parasitic disease carried by mosquitoes that infect the red blood
cells."10 The first symptoms of malaria include fever, headaches, and vomiting, but
if left untreated, the disease will become fatal by disrupting the blood supply to

99. OBosU-MENSAH, supra note 95, at 102-115.
100. Id
101. ROBERT CHAMBERS, SETTLEMENT SCHEMES
ORGANIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 205-06 (1969).
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104.
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HART, supra note 96, at 82-83.
Id. at 90-97.
Id. at 82-83.
See id. at 102. For additional specific analysis relating to the various effects of the Akosombo

Dam as it directly relates to Ghana, see THE SUSTAINABLE INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOLTA

BASIN INGHANA (Volta Basin Research Project, Chris Gordon & Julius IC Amatekpor eds., 1999).
106. Barry et al., supra note 2, at 139; UNEP, HYDROPOLITICAL VULNERABILITY, supranote 37, at
73.
107. See Graham, supra note 43, at 191.
108. Id. at 136-37.
109. Id. at 136.
110. WHO, MALARIA, http://www.who.int/topics/malaria/en/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).

2013

THE VOLTA CONVENTION: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL?

285

vital organs.'
As of 2005, the infection rate on a per household basis remained at
88 percent, making it the most significant water-borne disease in the basin."12
Schistosomiasis is a parasitic worm disease, often transmitted by snails, such
as those infesting Lake Volta." 3 Prior to the construction of the dam, infection
rates in the region were 1 percent to 5 percent.1 4 After the dam's construction in
1966, the rates of infection rose to alarming figures, ranging from 80 percent to
100 percent in some villages. 5
Onchoceriasis, or river blindness, is another parasitic worm disease, which
has plagued Ghana and the entire Volta Basin." 6 The disease is transmitted by
"black flies" that infect human hosts with a parasitic worm, resulting in a host of
embryos, or microfilariae, that spread throughout the body, but concentrate in the
skin and eyes." 7 The microfilariae in the eye cause blindness,"' 8 and infection
levels reached 90 percent within some areas after the creation of Lake Volta." 9
The prevalence of river blindness in the basin prompted international action, which
led to a United Nations program and corresponding treaty, both of which will be
discussed later.
Transboundary disputes were negligible within the Volta Basin, despite the
potential conflict fodder of the Akosombo Dam, until the 1990s.1 20 During a
period of drought in the region in 1998, Ghana suffered from a serious power
shortage because of reduced water levels in Lake Volta's reservoir.12' Despite the
apparent link between the drought and the power shortage, Ghana accused its
upstream neighbor, Burkina Faso, of unreasonably withdrawing water from the
Volta River and obstructing the watercourse with dams.122 In an attempt to resolve
the dispute, Ghana offered to supply Burkina Faso with energy from the
Akosombo Dam, in return for Burkina Faso's discontinuing its construction of its
upstream dams.123 Burkina Faso refused to relinquish its sovereignty over the
upstream waters and continued its dam building program in order to produce its

111. Id.
112. Barry et al., supranote 2, at 139.
113. Id. at 150.
114. Graham, supranote 43, at 137.
115. Id.
116. Andr6 Rougemont, The "River Blindness" Control ProgrammesOCP and APOC in Africa: A
CriticalReview, I AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 253, 255 (2006).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Barry et al., supranote 2, at 149.
120. Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 16.
121. Id.
122. Id.; Annette van Edig et al., Transboundary, Institutional, and Legal Aspects of the Water
Resources Commission in Ghana 4-5 (2001) (unpublished paper for the Ctr. for Dev. Res. (ZEF)),
available at http://www.glowa.org/de/literaturliste/dateien/aspects-of wrc-in ghana.pdf (last visited
May 5, 2012).
123. van Edig et al., supra note 122, at 5.
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own hydroelectric power.' 24 Two major water storage facilities were constructed
in Burkina Faso recently-Bagr6 on the White Volta and Kompienga on the Oti.125
The most recent transboundary disputes in the Volta Basin are between Ghana
and Burkina Faso, although additional potential conflicts between more of the
riparian states will likely surface as climate change causes increased droughts and
floods. Anxiety is building in Ghana as Burkina Faso attempts to industrialize by
building hydropower dams within the basin, especially as Ghana completes its
plans for a dam intended at Bui Gorge on the Black Volta. 126 Burkina Faso's
construction of the Bagr6 Dam and Kompienga Dam already affect the
hydroelectric production at Lake Volta, and three more construction projects have
been proposed on the upstream waters.' 2 7
The most significant transboundary effects of Burkina Faso's hydroelectric
development relates to flooding caused by Bagrd Dam's operations. In 1999, when
Burkina Faso opened the dam's spillways, the resulting flooding, combined with
torrential rains, caused an outbreak of cholera in Northern Ghana and left 9,000
people homeless.128 The letting of dam spillway waters without prior notification
by Burkina Faso is a continued accusation from Ghana over the last decade and has
occurred as recently as 2009. In 2007, devastating floods crippled East and West
Africa. 129 In Ghana, the White Volta River's banks burst and thousands of
hectares of farmland were destroyed and an estimated 400,000 people were
displaced.130 Even though the floods similarly affected Burkina Faso, Ghana
accused their upstream riparian neighbor of exacerbating the situation by
intentionally opening Bagr6 Dam's spillways. 31 Burkina Faso's officials denied
Ghana's accusations that opening the dam's floodgates aggravated the floods.132

124. Id.; TWM Symposium, supra note 47, at 7.
125. TWM Symposium, supra note 47, at 7.
126. van de Giesen et al., supra note 6, at 202-03; TWM Symposium, supra note 47, at 7; see
Helena Selby, Ghana: Bui Dam Resettlement - Livelihoods and Institutional Challenges,
ALLAFRICA.COM (Nov. 18, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories/200911190545.html.
127. Charles Rodgers et al., The GLOWA Volta Project: A Framework for Water Resources
Decision-Making and Scientific Capacity Building in a Transnational West African Basin, 21 WATER
RES. MGMT. 295, 300 (2007), available at http://www.glowa-volta.de/fileadmin/template/Glowa/Down
loads/Rodgers2007 The GLOWAVolta Project.pdf.
128. TWM Symposium, supra note 47, at 7.
129. WHO, HEALTH ACTION IN CRISES, HIGHLIGHTS No. 178, at 1-2 (2007), available at

http://www.who.int/hac/donorinfo/highlights/highlights_178_8_14oct07.pdf, African Floods Prompt
Aid Appeal, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/7005969.stm (last updated Sept. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter BBC, Aid Appeal].
130. BBC, Aid Appeal, supra note 129; Bonaboto-UK, Call for International Assistance for
Northern Ghana Flood Victims, GHANA WEB (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHome
Page/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=130964; Will Ross, Floods Devastate Northern Ghana, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/6996584.stm (last updated Sept. 15, 2007) [hereinafter BBC, Floods].
For a satellite photograph taken of the Volta Basin before the floods in June of 2007 as compared to the
basin after the flood in September of 2007, see Floods in West Africa, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY,
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=19082 (last visited May 5, 2012).
131. BBC, Aid Appeal, supra note 129; BBC, Floods,supra note 130.
132. BBC, Aid Appeal, supra note 129.
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More recently, in 2009, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, and Mali were all
victims of torrential flooding in the Volta Basin.'33 In Benin, Togo, and Mali, the
number affected was 20,000, 7,500, and 20,000 people respectively.' 34 Once
again, Ghana claimed Burkina Faso aggravated the situation by intentionally
releasing dam waters in an annual spillage.' 35 Yet as before, Burkina Faso officials
denied Ghana's accusation and maintained that the annual letting of Bagrd Dam
was not intended to harm Ghana and that it similarly affected Burkina Faso
citizens.' 36
In a recent study, the United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP")
announced that the Volta Basin is in critical status for impending climate change
because of their socioeconomic situation as an impoverished region, the increasing
temperature within the region in combination with a decrease in annual rainfall,
increased rainfall variability and unreliability, reduced groundwater, reduced crop
production, and increased disease rates from malaria, measles, and meningitis. 37
The study further described the basin in poor status in regards to their institutional
capacity to deal with water resource management, particularly for addressing
issues arising from climate change.1 38
Africa is considered to be "one of the most vulnerable continents to climate
change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of
'multiple stresses', occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity."' 39 In
addition to the concerns mentioned in the UNEP study, climate change is also
catalyzing other problematic issues in the Volta Basin, including: an acceleration
in the rate of desertification in the region; extreme weather events such as droughts
and floods; and rising sea levels which causes land erosion, negatively impacts
tourism, reduces the types and quantity of fish for fishermen, and threatens local
inhabitants living in coastal cities.

133. WHO, WEST AFRICA FLOODS, SITUATION REPORT NO. 1, at 1-2 (2009), availableat http://

reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/7C96B 1DF32EFD4508525763200613760Full Report.pdf [hereinafter WHO, No. 1]; WHO, WEST AFRICA FLOODS, SITUATION REPORT NO. 2, at

1-2 (2009), available at http://www.who.int/hac/SituationreportWestAfricaVersion2.pdf [hereinafter
WHO, No. 2].
134. WHO No. 1, supranote 133, at 1; WHO No. 2, supra note 133, at 2.
135. See WHO No. 2, supra note 133, at 2; see also Ghana: Spillage of Bagre Dam is Not
Intentional, ALLAFRICA.COM (Sept. 21, 2009), http://allafrica.com/stories/200909220073.html
[hereinafter ALLAFRICA.COM, Spillage].
136. ALLAFRICA.COM, Spillage, supra note 135.
137. U.N. ENv'T PROGRAMME, ASSESSMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY FRESHWATER VULNERABILITY

INAFRICA TO CLIMATE CHANGE 93 (2009), availableat http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdflAss
essment of TransboundaryFreshwaterVulnerability revised.pdf.
138. Id.
139. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 435 (M.L. Parry et
al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications-and-data/publicationsipcc fourthass

essment reportwg2 report impacts adaptationand_vulnerability.htm [hereinafter IPCC 2007].
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The average annual temperature in Western Africa is expected to rise due to
climate change, although a combination of factors in the multitude of studies
creates a wide range of predictions. An empirical study by Gerlinde Jung
estimates an increase in temperature within the Volta Basin ranging "from loC in
the maritime South to 1.50 C in the continental North" by the year 2039.140 One
prediction suggests that Burkina Faso will experience a 0.8 0 C increase in average
temperature by 2025, and 1.70C by 2050.141 In Ghana, an increase of "1.0 to 3.00 C
by the 2060s, and 1.5 to 5.2 0 C by the 2090s" is expected.142 As an effect of
climate change, the rate of desertification in Africa has accelerated and is expected
to continue to do so, with some studies calculating the area of arid and semi-arid
land in Africa to increase by 5-8 percent (60-90 million hectares) by 2080. 143
Projections estimate reduced annual rainfall in the Volta Basin due to climate
change. Specifically, several studies suggest up to a 20 percent decrease in rainfall
in Western Africa and the Volta Basin by 2080-2099.'" The effects of decreased
rainfall in the region range from amplification of drought risks and evaporation, to
reduction of agricultural production and water availability for consumption.1 45 As
a majority of the population within the riparian countries depends on subsistence
agriculture, the effects of drought can be particularly devastating. For example, in
Ghana, "[i]nsufficient rainfall during the major cropping season during the last
major severe drought in 1982-1983, affected more than 12 million people."l 46
Extreme weather events in the Volta Basin are expected to rise in frequency
and intensity throughout the twentieth century, including droughts and floods.14 7
Despite the increase of water produced during floods, the inundations actually
augment water stress due to a reduction in the ground absorption of water, which
in turn creates more surface runoff.148 As discussed above, Burkina Faso and
Ghana have recently suffered from several droughts and floods. In total, Burkina
Faso has experienced eleven major floods between 1991 and 2009, and a 1994
deluge that affected over 650,000 people was immediately followed by a drought
in 1995, which destroyed maize production and affected approximately 75,500

140. Jung, supra note I1, at 110.
141. WORLD BANK, BURKINA FASO DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT: COUNTRY NOTE 2 (2011),
availableat https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2752/AAA600ESWOWHIT
Oaso0DRMOFinalOReport.pdf?sequence=1 [hereinafter WORLD BANK, BURKINA FASO].
142. WORLD BANK, CLIMATE RISK AND ADAPTION COUNTRY PROFILE: GHANA 4 (2011), available
at http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/doc/GFDRRCountryProfiles/wbgfdrrclimatechange
country_profileforGHA.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK, GHANA].
143. IPCC 2007, supra note 139, at 448.
144. Id. at 443; WORLD BANK, GHANA, supra note 142, at 4.
145. WORLD BANK, BURKINA FASO, supra note 141, at 1-2.
146. WORLD BANK, GHANA, supranote 142, at 6.
147. See IPCC 2007, supra note 139, at 444; Alfred Awotwi, Assessing the Impact of Land Cover
and Climate Changes on Water Balance Components of White Volta Basin in West Africa 23 (Dec.
2010) (unpublished Master's Degree project, Department of Land and Water Resources Engineering
Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)), availableat http://www2.lwr.kth.se/Publikationer/PDFFiles/
LWR EX_10 26.pdf.
148. See Awotwi, supra note 147, at 26-27.
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people.149 Ghana ranks as one of the highest "amongst African countries most
exposed to risks from multiple weather-related hazards"15 0 as evidenced by a
drastic increase since 1986 in extreme rainfall patterns with maximum rainfall
occurring in a 24-hour period.''
As might be expected, these droughts and floods in the basin region, as well
as the rising sea levels and progression of desertification, have negatively affected
agricultural production, and will continue to do so. By 2100, it is estimate that in
Western Africa climate change will cause agricultural losses between 2 percent
and 4 percent of GDP.'52 By 2080, estimates project that "wheat production is
likely to disappear from Africa" and "a significant decrease in suitable rain-fed
land extent and production potential for cereals" will occur.'5 3 Since the 1970's,
Burkina Faso has suffered from five major food shortages resulting from
successive droughts.154
Rising sea levels are projected to severely affect the basin's populations.
Along the Ghana coastline, "[s]ea level rise is projected at 5.8 cm, 16.5 cm and
34.5 cm by 2020, 2050, and 2080, respectively."' 55 Forty percent of West Africa's
population lives in coastal cities and the inundation of the coastal land could
destroy inhabited territory with large concentrations of the poor and vulnerable.' 5 6
Along the coast, "highly productive ecosystems (mangroves, estuaries, deltas,
coral reefs), which form the basis for important economic activities such as
tourism and fisheries" will likely be impacted.' 5 7 Coastal agricultural is at risk of
flooding and soil salinization due to the rising ocean, including shallots in Ghana,
and palm oil and coconuts in Benin and C6te d'Ivoire.' 5 8
The cost of mitigating these climate change effects likely constitutes the most
colossal hurdle for these impoverished nations. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change ("IPCC") estimates that the developing countries in Africa suffer
US $35 billion in direct losses from natural disasters on an annual basis.159 The
September 2009 floods in Burkina Faso exceeded US $130 million in immediate
damages alone.160 Agricultural losses cost approximately US $3.5 million from the
1992 floods in Burkina Faso and US $126 million for those in 1994.161

149. WORLD BANK, BURKINA FASO, supra note 141, at 3.
150. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FACILITY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION AND RECOVERY: DISASTER
RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS FOR PRIORITY COUNTRIES 17 (2009), available at http://www.unisdr.
org/files/14757_6thCGDRMProgramsforPriorityCountrie.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK, DISASTER].
151. WORLD BANK, GHANA, supra note 142, at 5.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

IPCC 2007, supra note 139, at 447.
Id. at 448.
WORLD BANK, BURKINA FASO, supra note 141, at 3.
WORLD BANK, GHANA, supra note 142, at 5.
IPCC 2007, supra note 139, at 450.
Id.; see also WORLD BANK, DISASTER, supra note 150, at 18.
IPCC 2007, supra note 139, at 450.
Id. at 457.
WORLD BANK, BURKINA FASO, supra note 141, at 3.
Id.
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In sum, the quantity of hurdles the basin states must overcome concerning the
watercourse in the near future and the gravity of these obstacles emphasizes the
imperative need for an effective transboundary water resource management
program for the Volta Basin.
IV. LEGAL REGIME

Even a limited review of research in this area highlights the dearth of
international law development relating to governance of water resources in the
Volta Basin until only a few years ago.162 The Volta River and its tributaries
officially became a transboundary water system upon the imposition of the newly
formed colonial boundaries and the codification of the use of the basin's waters in
1906 with the "Exchange of Notes between France and Great Britain relative to the
Boundary between the Gold Coast and Soudan."' 63 The notes described the
watercourse in detail and delineated the borders between the colonies.' 6
Interestingly, the colonial powers left the indigenous inhabitants' rights to use the
basin's water and arable land undisturbed and, in addition, the villagers were
extended the option of moving their village to the other side of the border if they
were discontent with their newly assigned colonial power.' 65 Shortly thereafter, in
an agreement, the United Kingdom and France reaffirmed the villagers' right to
freely use the Volta Basin's water. 66
A. HistoricalDevelopment ofInternationalWater Law in the Volta Basin
After the basin states gained independence from their colonial powers in the
1960s, no transboundary water management system existed in the basin until 2008,

162. For a discussion outlining the reasoning behind the delay in transboundary water resource
governance instruments and mechanisms, particularly as compared to other African basins, see
AFRICAN WATER FACILITY, AWF SUPPORT FOR CREATION OF THE VOLTA BASIN AUTHORITY: A CASE
STUDY 5-6 (2010), availableat http://www.africanwaterfacility.org/fileadmin/uploads/awf/publications
-reports/Volta%20Basin%2OAuthority/o20%2OCase%2OStudy/o20Report.pdf [hereinafter AWF CASE
STUDY]. Addressing the various domestic, non-governmental, and inter-governmental organizations, as
well as the multitude of regional projects which oversee transboundary water governance within the
Volta Basin, is outside of the purview of this paper. For a detailed summary of these entities, see Eric
Antwi Ofosu, Sustainable Irrigation Development in the White Volta Sub-Basin 15-40 (Dec. 13, 2011)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Delft University of Technology), availableat http://www.google.com
/url?sa-t&rct-ij&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDgQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Frepositor
y.tudelft.nl%2Fassets%2Fuuid%3A7al4d929-c29f-4137-a613-600bbf78c520%2FUNESCOIHE_PhD
OFOSUTHESIS.pdf&ei=XPN5UNy2GZGByAG5IGgBw&usg-AFQjCNHlclb5k4g9ZgrK4knJNmw
Q937rA.
163. See generally Exchange of Notes Between France and Great Britain Relative to the Boundary
Between the Gold Coast and French Sudan, Fr.-Gr. Brit., Juy 19, 1906, 97 B.F.S.P. 31, available at
http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/37ENG.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id. art. l1l-IV.
166. Agreement Between France and Great Britain Relative to the Frontier Between French and
British Possessions from the Gulf of Guinea to the Niger (Southern Nigeria and Dahomey), Fr.-Gr.
Brit., art. III, Oct. 19, 1906, 99 B.F.S.P. 217, availableat http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/tfdddocs/42ENG
.pdf.
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although a few regional cooperation efforts were initiated, usually funded by nongovernmental organizations.' 67 Only two international agreements in the Volta
Basin existed before the 21st Century directly involving multiple riparian states
and specifically discussing management of the basin.168 Neither of these
instruments, however, concerned uses of the basin's water. Instead, an agreement
signed by Togo, Benin, and Ghana in 1962 was for the purpose of purchasing
electricity generated by Akosombo dam from Ghana.' 69 Likewise, in 1973,
although an international agreement was signed by all six riparian states, the
instrument concerned implementation plans to control the spread of onchocerciasis
in the Volta Basin. 17 This treaty was signed in conjunction with a comprehensive
World Health Organization sponsored program to combat the assault of
onchocerciasis in West Africa. 171
The first step to transboundary water development in the basin occurred in
1971 when Ghana and Burkina Faso (known then as the Upper Volta) set up a joint
transboundary commission known as the Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation Between Ghana and Upper Volta. 172 The purpose of the commission
was not specifically to manage the Volta Basin, but rather collaboration for
political, economic, and social issues affecting both states.173
The commission set up five committees to complete five primary tasks: (1) to
draft a convention regarding demarcation of the Ghana and Burkina Faso border;
(2) to ameliorate trade relations between the two states; (3) to promote cooperation
regarding education, science, technology, information, and sports; (4) cooperation
in the exchange of information and the creation of programs relating to health
issues; and (5) to cooperate on irrigation and water-borne illnesses issues, as well
as transportations issues.174
Then, Ghana's energy shortage in 1998 and flood of 1994 ignited an
international movement to establish a more permanent transboundary water
authority between Ghana and Burkina Faso, as well as the other riparian states. 7 1
Non-governmental organizations sponsored a variety of regional initiatives in an
attempt to assist the riparian states in forming a transboundary water management

167. See infra Part IV.B.1.
168. See Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 10.
169. Id.
170. Id.; Agreement Governing the Operations of the Onchocerciasis Control Programme in the
Volta River Basin Area, Nov. 1, 1973, 1126 U.N.T.S. 197. The World Health Organization funded and
promoted the agreement and subsequent program. The parties to the treaty were: Benin, Ghana, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
171. Rougemont, supra note 116, at 258-59. For a detailed explanation of the WHO program, see
generally HELEN BYNUM, SUCCESS IN AFRICA: THE ONCHOCERCIASIS CONTROL PROGRAMME IN WEST

AFRICA, 1974-2002 (2002).
172. Ampomah et al., supra note 6, at 7, 20-23 (referencing the Permanent Joint Commission
Report from 1971 and attached to that article as Annex 1 [hereinafter PJC Report]).
173. Id.
174. PJC Report, supranote 172.
175. Ampomah et al., supra note 6, at 8.
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program, as well as to promote sustainable development.' 76 The World Bank, the
United Nations Development Program, and the Swedish International
Development Agency established the Global Water Partnership ("GWP") in 1996
to promote integrated water resource management around the world.1" GWP
fostered the formation of the West African Water Partnership in 2002, of which all
six Volta Basin riparian states are partners, whose goal is to promote and
implement regional water management programs that are targeted to improve
living conditions and alleviate poverty.' 78
Green Cross International ("GCI"), with its sub-regional base in Burkina
Faso, also undertook a program in the Volta Basin "to remove the obstacles to
integrated and cooperative water management, and resolve related conflicts . . .
.179 GCI, in conjunction with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), held two regional conferences to promote
discussion and exchange of information amongst the basin states, with the ultimate
goal of encouraging the states to create a regional agreement and integrated
management plan. 80
One of the most successful programs, initiated by the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research, was the Global Change and the Hydrologic
Cycle ("GLOWA") research program that undertook the GLOWA Volta Project
("GVP") in May of 2000 to assess the sustainable development potential of water
GVP ended in May 2009, but
resources among the riparian states in the basin.
its vision is continued with a follow-up project: "Sustainable Development of
Research Capacity based on the GLOWA Volta Project." The new project ran
from June 2009 to November 2010 and sought "to strengthen the human capacity
and the research infrastructure, and to promote the dissemination of research
results."' 82
Additionally, the "Addressing Transboundary Concerns in the Volta Basin
and its Downstream Coastal Area" project was sponsored by the United Nations
Environment Program, as the implementing agency for the Global Environment

176. See Barry et al., supra note 2, at 129-32.
177. About GWP, GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, http://www.gwp.org/en/About-GWP/ (last
visited May 5, 2012).
178. History, GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, http://www.gwp.org/en/About-GWP/History/ (last
visited May 5, 2012).
179. OrganizationandActivities of InternationalInstitutions in Geneva, [2004] 18 INT'L GENEVA
Y.B. 342, U.N. Sales No. GV. E/F.04.0.17; Green Cross Internationalreceives "Save the World
Award, " GREEN CROSS AUSTRALIA, http://www.gcint.org/news/green-cross-intemational-receives%E2%80%9Csave-world-award%E2%80%9D (last visited May 5, 2012).
180. UNESCO, FROM POTENTIAL CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATION POTENTIAL: WATER FOR PEACE:
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION OF WATER RELATED CONFLICTS 13, availableat http://webworld.une

sco.org/water/wwap/pccp/pdf/brochure 2.pdf.
181. Welcome to the Glowa Volta Project, GLOWA VOLTA, http://www.glowa-volta.de/ (last
visited May 5, 2012) [hereinafter GLOWA VOLTA]; GLOWA Volta: Overview, GLOWA, http://www.gl
owa.org/eng/volta-eng/volta-eng.php (last visited May 5, 2012).
182. GLOWA VOLTA, supra note 181.
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Facility in 2002.183 The project focused on the development of a regional
framework for addressing transboundary resource development and concerns in the
basin. 184 These international organizations and others effectively blazed the trail
for the formation of a regional transboundary water management institution in the
Volta Basin.
B. Modern InternationalWater Law and Practicein the Volta Basin
This section will first address the history of the recent Volta Convention.
Then, a brief overview of international transboundary watercourse law will follow.
Finally, in context of the legal framework governing shared water resources, the
Volta Convention's substantive and procedural obligations will be analyzed with
particular attention to the sufficiency of these obligations in light of the potential
conflicts between the riparian states and water stress in the basin.
1. The Volta Convention and Its Conception
On April 13, 2004, the governments of Ghana and Burkina Faso
acknowledged their common environmental and water issues upon signing the
"Ghana-Burkina Joint Declaration."185 This agreement also recognized the
importance of involving the other four riparian states in a collaborative
committee.
The six riparian states of the Volta Basin began the process of
forming a transboundary water management institution, the Volta Basin Authority
("VBA").18 ' The formation of this body was inspired by the 2002 Johannesburg
World Summit on Sustainable Development where the Niger and Volta basins
were designated as the West African basins to receive financial aid from the EU
Water Initiative for a transboundary water resource management program.' 88
Subsequently, a Volta Basin Technical Committee ("VBTC") was established
in July of 2004 to include all six riparian states in the planning process of forming
a Volta Basin transboundary water resource management program. 189 The
Ministers in charge of water resources in each riparian state signed a
"Memorandum of Understanding" in 2005, which agreed to create the VBA.1 90 In
2006, the VBTC and Ministers adopted a resolution for the signing and subsequent
ratification of a treaty and statutes for the VBA. 9 ' On January 19, 2007, the

183.
184.
185.
Basin in

Ampomah et al., supra note 6, at 9.
Id.
J. Henry Owusu, Conflict and CooperationAmong the Riparian Countries of the Volta River
West Africa, in WATER RESOURCES CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 187, 208-09 (Dhirendra Vajpeyi ed., 2012) (referencing the Ghana-Burkina Joint
Declaration, Ghana-Burk. Faso, Apr. 13, 2004).
186. Id. at 209.
187. Ampomah et al., supranote 6, at 14.
188. Id. at 13; Lautze et al., supra note 2, at 12.
189. Anpomah, et al., supranote 6, at 13.
190. See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish a Volta Basin Auth. (Dec. 6, 2005) (on file
with author).
191. Ampomah et al., supranote 6, at 14.
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"Convention on the Status of the Volta River and the Establishment of the Volta
Basin Authority" ("Volta Convention") was signed by the all six riparian states at
Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso.192 The Volta Convention came into force on
August 14, 2009, upon Burkina Faso's deposit of its ratification instrument as the
fourth state to do so. Only C6te d'Ivoire has not yet ratified the treaty. 93
The Volta Convention's threefold purpose is to recognize the Volta River as
an international watercourse, create substantive and procedural obligations for the
riparian states, and to establish the Volta Basin Authority ("VBA") and its
mandate. In order to implement the obligations of the convention in a "rational
and sustainable" approach,194 the treaty provides that the mandate of the VBA is
to:
(1) Promote permanent consultation tools among the parties for the
development of the basin; (2) Promote the implementation of integrated
water resources management and the equitable distribution of the
benefits resulting from their various utilizations; (3) Authorize the
development of infrastructure and projects planned by the stakeholders
and which could have substantial impact on the water resources of the
basin; (4) Develop joint projects and works; and, (5) Contribute to
poverty alleviation, the sustainable development of the Parties in the
Volta Basin, and for better socioeconomic integration in the subregion.195
The Volta Convention established five permanent administrative organs to
implement the VBA's mandate: "(a) The Assembly of the Heads of State of
Government; (b) The Council of Ministers in charge of Water Resources; (c) The
Forum of the Parties involved in the Volta basin development; (d) The Committee

192. Convention on the Status of the Volta River and the Establishment of the Volta Basin
Authority, Jan. 19, 2007 [hereinafter Volta Convention]. Although this treaty has not yet been published
in a traditional treaty source, it is available in English and French on the Volta Basin Authority website.
Sixth Meeting of the VBA Experts Committee, VOLTA BAsIN AUTHORITY, http://www.abv-volta.org/
(last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (follow "About VBA" hyperlink; then follow "Mandate and Objectives"
hyperlink).
193. Amilioration de la gouvernance de l'eau dans le bassin de la Volta, Entrie en vigueur de la
convention de I'ABV: le Burkina Fasopose le dernieracte [Improving Water Governance in the Volta
Basin, Entry into Force of the Convention of the ABC: Burkina Faso Poses the Last Act], UICN,
http://www.iucn.org/fr/propos/union/secretariat/bureaux/paco/programmes/prezoh/pagevhomepaco/
(last visited May 5, 2012) (discussing the date the Volta Convention went into effect and that Burkina
Faso was the fourth state to deposit its instrument of ratification, thereby bringing the convention into
force); see also Review, About VBA, VOLTA BASIN AuTHoRrrY, http://www.abv-volta.org/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2012) (listing all the dates each riparian state ratified the Volta Convention: Mali, Apr. 24,
2008; Ghana, Nov. 5, 2008; Togo, Apr. 30, 2009; Burkina Faso, Aug. 14, 2009; and, Benin, June 9,
2009).
194. Volta Convention, supra note 192, art. 3.
195. Id. art. 6.
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of Experts; [and,] (e) The Executive Directorate of the Authority."' 9 6 Additionally,
the Council of Ministers may establish other administrative organs if necessary. 9 7
The six riparian states signed the Statutes implementing the VBA on
November 16, 2007.198 The VBA Statutes were only recently made publicly
available on its website, but the VBA has begun to trek forward in fulfilling its
mandate by hosting and participating in a variety of workshops and conferences
that address sustainable development and water use concerns relating to
agriculture.' 99 The VBA Statutes enunciate their primary objectives as: organizing
and reinforcing consultations between the riparian states, harmonizing national
policies, undertaking research and study activities related to the socio-economic
development of the basin, to promote cooperation, and to create institutional
mechanisms for sustainable development of the basin. 200 The specific tasks of the
VBA and how the Convention will be implemented are not treated in the Statutes.
Instead, the provisions are vague and, in some instances, merely reiterate many of
the general principles outlined in the Convention itself.
On December 29, 2009, the basin states met in Lom6, Togo to ratify the
charter for the VBA that "recommends that the countries sharing the basin come
up with laws on water management while reducing environmental problems that
can have cross-border implications like soil erosion, flooding, water borne diseases
and coastal erosion." 201 The interim Deputy Director General for the management
of the basin, Yao Attikpo, announced that, "[t]he charter will give more details and
will provide for practical legal measures that will ensure concrete management." 202
The VBA Charter has either not been completed or is not publicly available. It
appears to be the former based on a strategic plan for 2010-2014 released by the
VBA announcing that the organization intends to draft a water charter for the
riparian states that would create legislative type laws with more specific standards
and rules than those laid out under either the Volta Convention or the VBA
Statutes.203

196. Id. art. 8.
197. Id.
198. Statutes of the Volta Basin Authority (VBA) 11, Nov. 16, 2007, availableat http://www.abvvolta.org/ [hereinafter VBA Statute] (follow "About VBA" hyperlink; then follow "Mandate and
Objectives" hyperlink; then "vba-statutes-en-version").
199. See, e.g., News, About VBA, VOLTA BASIN AUTHORITY, http://www.abv-volta.org/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2012).
200. VBA Statute, supra note 198, at 2-3. The Volta Basin Authority only recently posted its
Statute on its website, although its site is regularly under construction and not always available
electronically. All riparian states have ratified the VBA Statute, except for C6te d'Ivoire. AWF CASE
STUDY, supra note 162, at 13.
201. Six Countries Meet in Togo to Ratify Volta Basin Charter,TOGO, RtPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.republicoftogo.com/layout/set/print/content/view/full/5636.
202. Id.
203. VOLTA BASIN AUTHORITY STRATEGIC PLAN 2010-2014, at 10 (Jan. 2011) (on file with author
or this source can be located on an internet search engine by using the full title name for direct
download, but it is not available for download on a traditional webpage). A diligent and nearly
exhaustive search for a "VBA Charter" has failed to produce any results to date. Accordingly, it is
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2. Introduction to the Law Relating to International Watercourses
Before dissecting the text of the Volta Convention, it is important to briefly
introduce the law relating to international water courses, including the scope of
customary law and traditional treaty provisions within the regime, in order to better
inform this analysis.
The law of international watercourses is distinct from the law of the sea or
principles ensconced in international environmental law conventions addressing
certain water related concerns, such as obligations regarding clean water,
maintenance and protection of the oceans, anti-whaling, and the preservation of
wetlands. This particular legal regime governs bodies of water which lie within, or
traverse through, two or more states, and is divided into two primary concerns:
navigational related uses and non-navigational uses.204 The Volta Convention and
this article address only the latter. Non-navigational uses of a watercourse include,
inter alia,human consumption, providing water for livestock, irrigation, disposing
of waste, and the generation of power.
The earliest known treaty concerning delineation of water boundaries and
allocation of shared water resources originates from the Mesopotamian city states
of Umma in 3100 BC.205 Since that time, international agreements regarding
transboundary watercourses have proliferated, both pre- and post-Peace of
Westphalia.206 Stephen McCaffrey, former U.N. Special Rapporteur for the
International Law Commission's draft articles on the law of the non-navigational
uses of international watercourses, which later became the 1997 U.N. Convention,
divides the development of international watercourse law into four doctrinal
stages: absolute territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, limited
territorial sovereignty, and community of interests. 207
The absolute territorial sovereignty principle, as developed primarily under
the United States' "Harmon Doctrine," articulates that a state's sovereignty over
watercourses in its territory is absolute to the extent that a state may use a
watercourse in its territory in any manner, even to the detriment of another riparian
state. 208 The absolute territorial integrity doctrine mandates a nearly polar opposite
of the sovereignty principle, which requires that a state not use a watercourse in
any manner that interrupts the natural flow of the source or negatively affects

logical to conclude that no such finalized charter yet exists, especially when the strategic plan has slated
the drafting of such a charter for the future. It appears as if the "ratification" of the charter announced in
the cited source above is likely a meeting where the six riparian states agreed on the drafting of a
charter, or perhaps an outline of proposals. Attempts to receive additional information from written and
emailed inquiries sent to the Ghana and Burkina Faso consulates have, to date, been fruitless.
204. See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 34-37 (2d ed.

2007).
205. Id. at 59 (citing ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 1-2 (rev.

ed. 1954)).
206. See id. at 59-63.
207. Id. at 111-70.
208. Id. at 112-14.
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another state sharing the water resource.209 The third axiom discussed by
McCaffrey of limited territorial sovereignty, which he describes as the prevailing
modem doctrine, encompasses equality between all riparian states of a watercourse
with each state possessing equal rights to use of the resource, but accompanied
with a corresponding duty not to use the water in a way that affects the other
states' equal usage rights. 210 Finally, the "community of interests" principle is
derived from ancient Roman law that prescribes water to be treated as common
property between nations and the public, not subject to private ownership. 21 1
The International Law Commission ("ILC"), charged with the codification of
customary law as well as progressive development of international law, 212 was
tasked with the study, codification, and progressive development of the law of nonnavigational uses of international watercourses. 21 In 1994 the ILC adopted, and
submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations ("U.N."), thirty-three
draft articles on the subject.214 The Working Group of the Whole of the Sixth
Committee established a Drafting Committee for purposes of transforming the
ILC's draft articles into a treaty. 21s On May 21, 1997, the UN General Assembly
adopted The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigable Uses of International
Watercourses ("U.N. Watercourse Convention").2 16 The U.N. Watercourse
Convention requires 35 instruments of ratification be deposited before it will enter
into force.2 17 To date, only 28 states have ratified the treaty.218
The principles articulated in the U.N. Watercourse Convention primarily
reflect customary law and "[e]ven the provisions of the Convention that do not
reflect current law are likely to give rise to expectations of behavior on the part of
riparian states that may, over time, ripen into international obligations." 219

209. Id. at 126-27.
210. Id. at 135-36.
211. Id. at 147-51.
212. Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/174(II) (Nov. 21, 1947).
213. G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV), U.N. Doc. AICN.4/244/Rev.1 (Dec. 8,1970).
214. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
[1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, T 218, 222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2)
(paragraph 222 lays out the text of the ILC's "Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and Resolution on Transboundary Confined
Water").
215. Summary of Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, INT'L L. COMM'N,
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/summaries/8_3.htm (last updated June 30, 2005).
216. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses, G.A. Res.
51/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 700 (not yet in force)
[hereinafter U.N. Watercourse Convention].
217. U.N. Watercourse Convention, supra note 216, art. 36(1).
218. Chapter XXVII 12 Environment, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
InternationalWatercourses, UNITED NATIONs TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en (last updated June 11, 2012).
219. MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 376 (internal citation omitted). To determine the customary
nature of each specific article within the U.N. Watercourse Convention, it is important to determine
whether the ILC has supported the drafted article with sufficient state practice and opinio juris to
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Accordingly, the provisions of the U.N. Watercourse Convention can be
instructive in assessing the sufficiency of other international watercourse
agreements.
Within the U.N. Watercourse Convention exist two primary types of
obligations: substantive and procedural.
Substantive obligations are those
concerned with achieving specific outcomes, while those of a procedural nature are
intended to act as the means to achieve those outcomes. 220 The substantive
obligations embodied in the U.N. Watercourse Convention are: equitable
utilization, the duty of "no harm," and the obligation to protect and preserve
international watercourses. 221 The Convention's articles encompass the following
procedural obligations: the general duty to cooperate, the obligation of prior
notification and related obligations, the duty of consultation, and the obligation to
exchange data and information on a regular basis. 222
The duty of equal use prescribes that states sharing a watercourse must
equally allocate the resource and use only its designated apportionment.223 The
requirement of equitable utilization is a fundamental customary principle in
international watercourse law, as reaffirmed in the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") decision in the Case Concerning the Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project.224
The case involved a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the failure of
Hungary to complete construction of a dam on the Danube River, which it was
required to do by treaty.225 Hungary defended its breach by citing environmental
concerns and, accordingly, Czechoslovakia (as the predecessor state to Slovakia)
built another dam further upstream as a replacement, which diverted the Danube
and affected the water Hungary received as the downstream riparian. 22 6 The ICJ
found that Hungary, despite its own breaches, retained a "basic right to an
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international
watercourse."227
This principle imposes an affirmative duty on states "to take reasonable steps
to conserve and augment the water supply of an interstate stream." 228 Under the
U.N. Watercourse Convention, this obligation is codified under Articles 5 and 6.
Article 5 articulates that:

demonstrate a crystallized norm as opposed to one which is merely emerging or aspirational. This
evidence is assessed primarily in the draft articles' commentaries or, alternatively, within the travaux
prepatoires.
220. VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 17 (2003).
221. MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 383.
222. See id. at 464-80.
223. Id. at 385.
224. Id. at 384-85.
225. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
226. Id. In23, 31, 40, 55.
227. Id.J 78.
228. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982).
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1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In
particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by
watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the
interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate
protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the
watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development
thereof, as provided in the present Convention.
Article 6 of the International Watercourse Convention expands on the
principles established in Article 5 and further requires taking into account all
relevant factors and circumstances when complying with the equitable utilization
obligation, including:
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and
other factors of a natural character;
(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse
State;
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse
State on other watercourse States;
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the
water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to
that effect;
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular
planned or existing use.
The duty of "no harm" is a basic customary principle which extends to
various international legal regimes, from use of force law to that of transboundary
watercourses. This obligation is most famously articulated in the Corfu Channel
case, the ICJ's first case, in which the Court held that every state is obligated "not
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States." 229 The U.N. Watercourse Convention ensconces this duty in Article 7 and
specifies a threshold of "significant harm," mandating that:
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse States.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of
229. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
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agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard
for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected

State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to
discuss the question of compensation.
Finally, the substantive obligation to protect and preserve international
watercourses derives from the related obligation under the international
environmental legal regime requiring protection and preservation of the
environment. 230 Unfortunately, this duty remains relatively aspirational, as
opposed to established custom, 231 and possibly represents one of the primary
reasons underlying the lack of sufficient ratifications to bring the U.N.
Watercourse Convention into force. The individual and joint obligation of
protection and preservation is treated in Articles 20 through 26 of the U.N.
Watercourse Convention, which address the broader principle, but then specifies
implementation of the duty in regards to: pollution, introduction of alien or new
species, and protection and preservation of the marine environment. Additionally,
the treaty defines and outlines rules relating to management, regulation, and
installations. Article 21 defines pollution as: "any detrimental alteration in the
composition or quality of the waters of an international watercourse which results
directly or indirectly from human conduct."
The procedural obligations recognized under the law relating to international
watercourses are equally as binding as those that are substantive in nature232 and
are "regarded as essential to the equitable sharing of water resources." 233 The
general duty to cooperate, which some scholars discuss as a substantive obligation,
is also known as the principle of "good neighborliness" and derives from the
corresponding duty enshrined in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter,234 which requires all
states "[t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character . . . ."235 The necessity of
this obligation, in regards to international watercourses, stems from the nature of
water systems as indivisible units.236 This principle is contained in Article 8 of the
U.N. Watercourse Convention, requiring that states cooperate, and do so in good
faith:
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain
optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international
watercourse.

230. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 446-48.
231. Id. at 453-58 (examining the "emerging" obligation to protect the ecosystems of international
watercourses, indicating that the norm is not yet fully emerged and, therefore, does not reflect custom).
232. Id. at 464.
233. OSCAR SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 69 (1977).

234. NANDA & PRING, supra note 220, at 19.
235. U.N. Charter art. 1(3).
236. HERBERT A. SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 150-51 (1931).
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2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States
may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as
deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant
measures and procedures in the light of experience gained through
cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various
regions.
The obligation of a state to notify another state prior to acting in a manner
which the state knows would cause harm to the other is one of the most "firmly
established" principles in international law generally, 237 and was found by the ICJ
in the Corfu Channel case to be one of the "elementary considerations of
humanity." 238 Prior notification encompasses several other sub-duties, including
the requirements of consulting other states prior to acting, as well as engaging in
negotiations.239 These inter-related obligations, as established customary law,
must be executed in good faith.240 It is important to note that the threshold trigger
for this obligation under the U.N. Watercourse Convention is one of "significant
adverse effect" as opposed to one of significant harm.241 Specifically, Article 12 of
the U.N. Watercourse Convention articulates that:
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of
planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon
other watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely
notification thereof. Such notification shall be accompanied by available
technical data and information, including the results of any
environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States
to evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures.
In addition, Articles 13 through 19 lay out very specific procedures for
fulfilling this obligation. For example, Article 13 articulates notification six
months before planned measures likely to affect the watercourse, with the option
for the notified state to have an additional six months to evaluate the situation or
respond before the measure is executed. During this six month to a year period,
the notifying state is obligated under Article 14 to refrain from executing the
measure without the consent of the other state and provide, on request, additional
data and information.
The duty of consultation is, as discussed above, encompassed within the
obligation of prior notification when a state knows its actions will harm another
riparian state. However, this requirement also extends to an ongoing duty to
consult other riparian states in good faith for a variety of reasons, including: for
purposes of concluding water agreements for transboundary sources, in protecting
and preserving the shared resources, where necessary to achieve equitable
utilization of the water source, and if a state believes (as opposed to knows) its
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

NANDA & PRING, supranote 220, at 55.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
NANDA & PRING, supranote 220, at 55-56.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 469-71.
Id. at473.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

302

VOL. 41: 2

actions may harm the other state or affect its equitable utilization of the
Article 11 of the U.N. Watercourse Convention requires
watercourse.242
consultation and negotiation for any planned measures, not necessarily limited to
those that might significantly affect another state. Article 17 lays out very specific
details related to consultation for those situations where a planned measure is
protested by the notified state:
1. If a communication is made under article 15 that implementation of
the planned measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of
article 5 or 7, the notifying State and the State making the
communication shall enter into consultations and, if necessary,
negotiations with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the
situation.
2. The consultations and negotiations shall be conducted on the basis
that each State must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights
and legitimate interests of the other State.
3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the notifying
State shall, if so requested by the notified State at the time it makes the
communication, refrain from implementing or permitting the
implementation of the planned measures for a period of six months
unless otherwise agreed.
Finally, the procedural obligation to exchange data and information on a
regular basis is a crucial element to effectively executing the duties of prior
notification and consultation, as well as fulfilling the substantive obligations. As
Stephen McCaffrey explains, "this obligation may be said to be a necessary
adjunct to, or perhaps even an integral part of, the obligations of equitable
utilization and prevention of significant harm. ... 243 Further, this duty supports
and sustains the obligation to cooperate. 244 This particular principle is laid out in a
very specific manner in the U.N. Watercourse Convention and, most importantly,
it prescribes a very rigid standard states must meet of "best efforts" when
executing this duty. Article 9 states:
1. Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis
exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the
watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological,
hydrogeological and ecological nature and related to the water quality as
well as related forecasts.
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to

provide data or information that is not readily available, it shall employ
its best efforts to comply with the request but may condition its

compliance upon payment by the requesting State of the reasonable

242. Id. at 476-77.
243. Id. at 478.
244. Id. at 479.
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costs of collecting and, where appropriate, processing such data or
information.
3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect and,
where appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which
facilitates its utilization by the other watercourse States to which it is
communicated.
In conclusion, the U.N. Watercourse Convention encompasses the primary
principles and obligations present in customary international law relating to
environmental law and management of transboundary water sources. In addition,
it contains a few provisions that serve as lex ferenda, but exist as more than mere
progressive developments of the law and, instead, indicate the path contemporary
law is taking. As such, it represents an appropriate model for purposes of
analyzing other international watercourse instruments, despite its current status as
a non-enforceable treaty. Moreover, it articulates clear and specific standards that
facilitate interpretation and application.
3. Analyzing the Volta Convention
The first place to begin in analyzing any international watercourse treaty is
the definition of the watercourse under that instrument. In defining the scope of
the basin, the Volta Convention gives the VBA jurisdiction over "the Volta River,
its tributaries and sub-tributaries, the reservoirs and lakes, groundwater and
wetlands as well as the aquatic and land ecosystems linked to the basin, the estuary
of the river including the zone of coastal and oceanic influence. 245 This definition
of the watercourse is more inclusive than that in the U.N. Watercourse Convention
where a watercourse is defined as "a system of surface waters and groundwaters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and flowing
into a common terminus."246
The Volta Convention's progressive definition includes the wetlands, as well
as the aquatic and land ecosystems linked to the basin, which might not necessarily
be included in the scope of the U.N. Watercourse Convention's definition because
a wetland or an aquatic or land ecosystem does not necessarily "flow" into a
common terminus. The Volta Convention's inclusion of groundwaters into the
definition of the basin is a positive step, especially when considering that including
them as an integral part of a watercourse remains controversial, as illustrated by
the refusal of two delegations to vote on the UN Watercourse Convention because
groundwater was added to the treaty's definition.247
The Volta Convention contains both substantive and procedural obligations
for the member states, but these obligations are few and limited in scope. The
requirements for State parties include:

245. Volta Convention, supra note 192, art. 7.
246. U.N. Watercourse Convention, supra note 216, art. 2(a).
247. MCCAFFREY, supra note 204, at 360.
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(a) The use of the water resources of the basin and the participation in
their development in an equitable and reasonable manner;
(b) The general obligation to co-operate for the States sharing the same
river basin;
(c) The regular exchange of data and information among the State
Parties;
(d) The notification of planned activities that can have negative effects,
as well as the related consultations and negotiations;
(e) Precaution and prevention;
(f) The protection and conservation of the ecosystems;
(g) The obligation not to cause damage;
(h) The notification of emergency situation;
(i) The freedom of navigation on the river. 248
The substantive duties include: equitable and reasonable use of the Volta;
protection and conservation of ecosystems; freedom of navigation on the river;
precaution and prevention; and the obligation not to cause damage. 249 While
several of the substantive provisions' affirmative duties correspond with those laid
out in the U.N. Watercourse Convention, most of the obligations are overly broad.
The Volta Convention does contain an equitable and reasonable use
provision, requiring that the "use of the water resources of the basin and the
participation in their development in an equitable and reasonable manner." The
scope of this provision, however, is not as well defined as that in Articles 5 and 6
of the U.N. Watercourse Convention, where equitable and reasonable use is
applied to not only use of the watercourse, but to development and protection as
well. Moreover, the Volta Basin's treaty fails to address all relevant factors to
which equitable and reasonable use is applicable, unlike the U.N. Watercourse
Convention. Thus, this particular substantive clause's broad scope could cause
difficulties in interpretation and application.
The Volta Convention's "protection and preservation of ecosystems"
obligation is progressive and in accordance with the approach of the U.N.
Watercourse Convention's substantive obligation requiring protection of
international watercourses. Unfortunately, the actual breadth of the duty is
undefined, in stark contrast to the U.N. treaty's Articles 20 through 26, which lay
out a definition of pollution, expand the obligation of protection and preservation
to include prevention, reduction, and control of pollution, as well as set up
implementation and regulation procedures. In sum, the protection and preservation
portion of the Volta Basin treaty is insufficient for successful implementation,
regulation, interpretation, and application.

248. Volta Convention, supra note 192, art. 4.
249. To avoid excessive footnoting, the information in this section is based on the following
references: Volta Convention, supra note 192, art. 4; U.N. Watercourse Convention, supra note 216,
arts. 5-26.
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The "obligation not to cause damage" is the most troublesome substantive
obligation in the Volta Convention. Not only is there no defined threshold of harm
as there is in the U.N. Watercourse Convention's Article 7, where significant harm
is the requirement, but also there are no affirmative duties of elimination,
mitigation, or compensation for the riparian states. There is no explanation or
specificity as to what an "obligation to not cause damage" entails, and further, the
required harm is "damage," which is not defined. This provision therefore appears
to lack any concreteness, whereby implementation or enforcement would be
practical.
The Volta treaty further requires "freedom of navigation on the river," which
is oddly placed in a treaty dealing primarily with non-navigable aspects of the
water source. It is, however, an appropriate principle, because the only other
treaties in the basin do not create such an obligation.2 50
The "prevention and precaution" requirement in the Volta Convention, as an
independent principle, is unique from the U.N. Watercourse Convention, in that it
is a separate duty, whereas the U.N. treaty incorporates prevention into other
obligations. For example, Article 7 of the U.N. Convention requires states to
prevent causing significant harm to other member states and Article 27 creates an
obligation for states to prevent harmful conditions that would affect other riparian
states. There is no use of the word "precaution" in the U.N. Watercourse
Convention, so the prevention and precaution principle may supplement some of
the other substantive obligations where they are lacking.
Regarding the procedural obligations, although these principles mirror those
in the U.N. Watercourse Convention on a surface level, their scope is as undefined
as the substantive provisions. The procedural obligations are: the general
obligation to cooperate; the regular exchange of data and information; notification
of planned activities that can have negative effects as well as the related
consultations and negotiations; and, notification of an emergency situation.
The first procedural duty is the general obligation of the riparian states "to cooperate" and it appears to be in sync with the U.N.'s broad approach to
cooperation. Article 8 of the U.N. Watercourse Convention only expands on the
duty by listing the basis on which states should cooperate, namely, sovereign
The Volta
equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith.
Convention's cooperation provision might be strengthened to a greater degree if it
specified that the obligation requires states act in good faith.
The Volta Convention's obligation to notify the other riparian states of
"planned activities that can have negative effects" is extremely deficient compared
to the U.N. treaty's Articles 12 through 19. No time period is allocated in the
Volta Convention for which a state should provide prior notification, such as the
six months requirement in the Article 12 of the U.N. Watercourse Convention, and

250. See supra Part IV.B.. As this article deals primarily with non-navigational uses of the
watercourse and is not concerned with navigational aspects of the Volta Basin, this substantive
obligation will not be discussed thoroughly in this paper.
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no obligation exists for the notification to be prior or timely at all. Additionally,
States have no duty to provide additional data or information that is acquired after
notifications are given, much less specific procedures with which the notified
states must comply.
Even though the Volta Basin treaty requires the member states to engage in
"consultations and negotiations" with other states concerning any planned
watercourse measures, there is no requirement of good faith. Furthermore, the
treaty does not create a general obligation to consult or negotiate in the entirety of
the treaty, but only as those duties relate to planned measures. Accordingly, the
notification duty for planned measures may lack the specificity necessary for
practical implementation of the notification provision, as well as the consultation
and negotiation principles.
The duty of "notification for emergency situation[s]" is a particularly
important provision for the Volta Basin treaty in light of the recent emergency
situations in the basin, for instance, the floods and droughts. 251 The issue with the
Volta Convention's emergency obligation is that there is no definition of
"emergency," much less a comprehensive one, such as that contained in the U.N.
Watercourse Convention at Article 28. Furthermore, there is no requirement that
the notification be made expeditiously, as it is in Article 28 of the U.N.
Convention. This principle is the sole provision in the Volta Basin's treaty dealing
with emergency situations, and so overall, the treaty is lacking in a duty for states
to develop contingency plans or to take steps to prevent, mitigate, or eliminate
harmful effects of the emergency. Therefore, it appears the Volta Convention is
deficient in implementing a legal regime for emergency situations.
Finally, the "regular exchange of data and information" procedural
requirement in the Volta Basin treaty is extremely lacking compared to the U.N.
Watercourse Convention's Article 9 because no "best efforts" standard is required,
and no explanation is provided as to what the exchanges of data and information
should entail.
The World Wildlife Fund recently published a guide to understanding the
U.N. Watercourse Convention's obligations, promoting the treaty and
recommending its ratification by United Nations members. 252 Interestingly, the
guide also addressed the Volta Convention and recognized that the basin's treaty
was a "commendable step taken by the states concerned to improve transboundary
cooperation within the basin," but also cautioned that the convention does not
"clarify the rights or duties of the watercourse states" for future transboundary
disputes or emergency situations. 253 In sum, the intentions and goals of the Volta
Basin riparian states is indeed admirable, but with necessary substantive and
251. See supra Part III.B.
252. Volta Convention, supra note 192; see also FLAVIA LOUREs, DR. ALISTAIR RiEU-CLARKE &

MARIE-LAURE VERCAMBRE, WWF INTERNATIONAL, EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE
U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION (2009), availableat http://www.unwater.org/downloads/wwf un
watercoursesbrochure for web_1.pdf.
253. LOURES ET AL., supra note 252, at 6.
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procedural obligations lacking from the Convention's primary obligations, the
Volta Convention may lack teeth and ultimately fail as a transboundary water
governance tool.
V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE VOLTA BASIN

The future success of this watercourse is highly dependent upon the riparian
states implementing the current obligations of the Volta Convention, potentially
submitting amendments to the treaty that require more substantive and procedural
obligations in line with the U.N. Convention, and ensuring that the VBA
successfully carries out its mandate. Although the Volta Basin has remained
relatively dispute free in the past, the future looks grim as climate change issues
and competing hydroelectric energy production interests come to the forefront.
Another issue regarding the potential success of the Volta Basin stems from the
instability of the VBA, charged with the responsibility of implementing the Volta
Convention. The main concerns regarding the stability of the VBA include: lack
of sufficient financial contributions from the member countries, secretariat
staffing, incomplete set-up of the VBA structures, and high turnover of political
leadership.254 The VBA's lack of resources is one reason, of many, underscoring
the necessity of C6te d'Ivoire to ratify the treaty and assist the other riparian states
in committing financial and personnel resources to implement the Volta
Convention.
The recent droughts and floods plaguing the basin in recent years are only a
foreshadowing of the impact that global climate change will have upon the basin.
If the Volta Convention is not amended to correct the shortcomings of the
substantive and procedural obligations, as well as established emergency plans for
future floods, droughts, and similar situations caused by climatic changes, the
Volta Basin will become increasingly impoverished and more lives will be lost.
The basin states already lack the financial resources and institutional capacities to
effectively deal with potential natural disasters, and accordingly, a successful
transboundary water resource management program is crucial for preventing and
mitigating such disasters.
It is therefore in the best interests of the Volta Basin states to make immediate
amendments to the Volta Convention in order to make the existing obligations
implementable. The Convention's principles need to be more specific, in line with
the provisions laid out in the U.N. Watercourse Convention. Most importantly, the
notification duties, for both planned measures and emergency situations, need to
have more concrete procedures laid out for both the actor state and affected state.
Additionally, if there is a conflict amongst the riparian states, the treaty's terms
will be difficult to interpret and uphold because of the lack of the terms'
specificity. As the Volta Convention stands now, it is the bare bones of a
transboundary water resource management legal regime and the treaty's
provisions, both substantive and procedural, need to be supplemented.

254. AWF CASE STUDY, supranote 162, at 18-19.
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In addition, the VBA must complete its task of drafting its Water Charter,
which will provide a legislative type framework for implementation of the Volta
Convention. This Charter needs to ensure sufficient funding for the VBA to
properly execute its mandates and provide sufficient staffing for such execution.
The VBA should strive to provide access to the pertinent documents relating to the
Volta Convention, the VBA, and the basin, in order to ensure transparency in its
operations.
The ramifications of leaving the obligations as they stand in the Volta treaty
currently are infinite, from continued dam letting by Burkina Faso without
recourse for Ghana, to ongoing conflicts over dam building affecting hydroelectric
production. As the climate continues to change, the rainy seasons will likely
become more sporadic and shorter, but will produce rains with higher intensity.
Two devastating floods occurred within only two years of each other in the basin,
and most likely, with increasing climate change, the frequency of catastrophic
floods will continue to rise incrementally. As such, it is imperative that the Volta
Convention contain concrete obligations for the riparian states concerning
emergencies and planned measures, such as dam lettings. If the convention's
provisions are not amended, Ghana will have no recourse against Burkina Faso for
exacerbating floods by opening spillways.
Climate change is also augmenting the rate of desertification and the
frequency of droughts within the basin region, as well as affecting agriculture,
fisheries, and at risk populations due to the rising sea level. As discussed earlier,
the basin states are already experiencing water stress and shortages and this will
continue if the Volta Basin Authority is not given the legal and financial tools to
implement its mandate to promot3 poverty alleviation and sustainable
development. Droughts will also affect the rates of river recharge generally and
river flow, affecting hydroelectric energy production. Thus, it is necessary for
progress to continue in developing the VBA and that it be given the resources to
efficiently and comprehensively implement its mandate.
If the basin states work diligently and cooperatively to amend the Volta
Convention, there is hope that the VBA's mandate to promote sustainable
development and alleviate poverty will be successfully achieved. The VBA needs
to establish comprehensive cooperation plans and implementation procedures for
dealing with water quality issues, desertification, droughts, soil erosion, waterborne diseases, and floods, as well as tailor a program to specifically address
combating negative effects from global climate change.
The states have taken the first big steps in creating a basin wide legal regime
and even though the Volta Convention and its implementation program are in their
infancy, it is crucial that the states remain proactive and diligent in addressing
water issues. If the Volta Basin states continue on their progressive course of
transboundary water resource management, amend the Convention, and ensure the
success of the VBA, it is possible they can achieve their primary goals of poverty
alleviation and sustainable development. Moreover, they will have the legal tools
and infrastructure to effectively and cooperatively combat the pressing issues in
the basin.
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